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Hides and skins have been a resource that has created a wide range of 
activities such as clothing and footwear of all types, saddlery and 
riding equipment, travel goods and upholstery were amongst many 
industries using leather. This dissertation uses historical 
documentation to investigate the interactions of a small UK company 
working mostly in the USA that had a pivotal role in the 
transformation of the network surrounding the production, 
distribution and use of leather in the late 19th century.  As an 
extended historical analysis it offers a particularly wide perspective on 
the complex and continuing network outcomes of that networking and 
the innovations to which it leads.  This historical research location 
also provides an opportunity to examine innovation within the context 
of network evolution over many decades.   
 
There have been a number of attempts to describe and analyse 
networks and company positions in them and to help companies to 
manage or change their “network position” (Håkansson and Snehota 
1995, Ford et. al. 2003, Håkansson et. al. 2009).  But most of these 
have confined their attention to a particular point in time or have 
looked at network evolution over a restricted time period, such as 
Lundgren (1995) and Andersson (1996).  What can happen within 
networks over time has been looked at in certain narrow ways in 
specific studies related to trust (Madhok 1995, Mouzas et. al. 2009), 
and interaction (Medlin 2004) but no examination has been made of 
full organisation life-cycle situations where the full implication of 
macro-environmental changes might be considered in terms of 
networks. 
 
This dissertation is based on the idea that insights into the dynamics 
and evolution of networks and companies may be found by taking a 
longer term perspective; looking over many decades as opposed to just 
a few years.  It uses historical documents and correspondence 
covering the period from 1860 until 1930 to examine the evolution of a 
network and of a single company within it.   
 
Firms seek to differentiate themselves in a world of excess-capacity 
and wide customer choice.  The single-company view of this seems to 
have been based on the assumption that it is possible for an 
individual company to “turn on” an innovation tap and change the 
direction of a business. More recently, the interconnections between 
business actors, their activities and resources and the complexity of 
the innovation process have been emphasised.  For example, Dosi 
(1988) discussed the effects on innovation of complex intersectional 
linkages and Lundgren (1995) and Håkansson and Waluszewski 
(2002) highlight how difficult it is to predict the outcomes of any 
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attempt at innovation because of the limitations of actors’ view of the 
network otherwise termed as “network pictures” (Ford et. al., 2003, p. 
176) in a business landscape characterised by interdependency, 
variety and motion (Håkansson et. al. 2009).  
 
A common assumption across all examinations of business 
relationships is they do not remain static but change over time. A 
major tenet of network theory is that any dyadic relationship not only 
involves the actions of the two partners but necessitates an ability to 
adjust to activities involving other related companies. As a 
consequence the nature of the relationship between companies 
changes, most commonly in small imperceptible increments, over time 
and the total business environment is likely to be quite transformed if 
looked at after a period.  That is to say business networks are 
structures subject to a continuous organising process (Håkansson et. 
al. 2009) 
 
The dissertation establishes the value of using network pictures to 
trace longitudinally the development of the “whole” network, and to 
relate network pictures to the study of evolution and dynamics in 
business networks.  It shows that retrospective research approaches 
can be useful to study network processes and over large windows in 
time and can be valuable in helping to identify the emergence of 
temporal patterns and to highlight substantial changes in the 
network. The dissertation highlights the fact that networks and 
networking are not modern inventions, but are intrinsic to the nature 
of business activity.  The case study also provides illustration of a 
number of network phenomena, such as network position, networking 
and the paradoxes that are endemic in networks.   
 
As such the dissertation helps towards understanding the value of 
networks as processes. Networks are seen as continuously changing 
interactions carried out by individuals as part of the companies they 
work with. The dissertation identifies concepts such as “randomness 
as a strategy”, “networking to access resources” and “the value of the 
non-transactional dyad” (where companies maintain a business 
relationship but are not necessarily continuously trading) as 
important for a company wanting to be able to respond to an ever-
changing business environment. 
 
Finally, the dissertation concludes with some lessons that may be 
drawn from the case for successful management in a network. 
 
These include: 
1. Implications for working within networks 
2. Choices for companies between creating new networks or 
consolidating existing ones 
3. Choices related to using the company’s strengths to force a 
conclusion or concede to the wisdom of other actors 
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4. The value of maintaining many flexible relationships 
5. The benefits from constantly looking at the wider picture in network 
terms 
6. The value of understanding the dynamics of networks when it 
comes to innovation 
 
The final of these contributions has just been published in The 
Journal of Customer Behaviour as “The role of a single actor in 
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1.0 Context and Purpose 
 
The leather industry in both the UK and the US was, until the 1950s, 
one of the key strategic industries and it was in the top three in terms 
of turnover and employment well into the early years of the twentieth 
century. Hides and skins have been a resource that has created a 
wide range of activities.  Clothing and footwear of all types, saddlery 
and riding equipment, travel goods and upholstery were amongst 
many industries using leather. This dissertation uses historical 
documentation to investigate the interactions of a small UK company 
working mostly in the USA that had a pivotal role in the 
transformation of the network surrounding the production, 
distribution and use of leather1 in the late 19th century.  This 
extended historical analysis offers a wider perspective on the complex 
and continuing network outcomes of that networking and the 
innovations to which it leads.  This historical research location also 
provides an opportunity to examine innovation within the context of 
network evolution over nearly a century.   
 
The industry case study used is based around the Liverpool leather 
company Booths and the global networks of which the company was a 
part.  Booths were in business in Liverpool as international importers 
and traders from the late 18th century but in the 1860s entered a new 
business era. The business thrived until the mid 20th century but was 
taken over in the 1970’s and largely closed down over the subsequent 
two decades. Only very small parts have survived into the 21st 
century.  
 
The dissertation is embedded in the area of the rapidly growing body 
of work related to the IMP Group.  As business becomes increasingly 
global and complex understanding business in network terms is being 
accepted as increasingly valuable.  
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It has been suggested (Ford et. al. 2011) that the process of managing 
in business networks can usefully be examined using three variables: 
the network pictures of participants; their purposeful networking and 
the outcomes of that networking. An actor’s view of the network is a 
“network picture” (Ford et. al., 2003, p.176) and estimating network 
pictures for different actors gives a means to look at the interactions 
and relationships the actors consider important.   Clearly the 
outcomes of networking will be viewed differently by each of the 
participants and these views will change over time.  Further, perceived 
network outcomes will affect the network pictures of all actors, their 
view of their own position in the network and their approach to 
networking.  The concept of network position refers to the unique 
point in network space that an actor occupies at a particular point in 
time.  Network space is multidimensional and, among other aspects, 
may be expressed in terms of a physical, a relational and a 
technological dimension (Håkansson et. al., 2009).  Finally, network 
pictures will affect individual actors’ views of what is appropriate 
networking for themselves and for others and their view of network 
outcomes.   
 
For this dissertation on business networks we start with two 
questions: 
 
1. The first asks whether it is useful to look at longer-term business 
evolution in network terms from a historic viewpoint and the second 
how do these networks evolve?  The dissertation seeks to show how 
insights into the development of a single business can be obtained by 
examining the interplay between the business and the evolving 
network of which it forms part. 
 
2. The dissertation also contributes towards understanding the value 
of networks as processes for management, as well as filling a gap in 
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the academic literature in the study of the long term outcomes of 
networks. 
 
The research aims to estimate the relationships between and amongst 
the actors and the network pictures held by the actors. Many 
questions come from within and without the networks.  What creates 
reasons for a business to initiate changes in its relationships? Is it 
only in the hope of defending or improving its business position?  How 
do “events” such as a major technological or economic change find 
their way into the network and lead to changes? All external 
phenomena are mediated by relationships and the structure of 
interdependencies within them. Hence it is logical to consider that 
external phenomena are effectively network or relationship 
phenomena.  It is therefore not enough just to describe phenomena 
and put a time line on them to suggest links between phenomena and 
actors.  This research will try and go deeper by using network pictures 
drawn or estimated from the perceptions of actors. 
 
Business development has been studied in many ways which mostly 
support or strongly imply the existence of networks. Yet we are 
missing specific long term studies from an interactive network 
perspective.  Many of the outcomes of network theory come from 
studies over three, five and ten year periods. Given the very long 
periods that can be required for some events, in particular innovation, 
to play out it becomes important to have this gap in the networks field 
of study filled. 
 
Business histories, economic geography and economic history are 
mostly richly descriptive and can be used to draw on to estimate 
network pictures and to help identify when certain phenomena are 
occurring.  Of themselves they do not offer the type of analysis which 
can come from the network approach but instead provide substantial 
amounts of information that makes it easier to consider the network 
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pictures of actors and the complex situations they might have been in 
during frenetic moments of networking. George and Bennett (2005) 
note that scholars in economics have become increasingly interested 
in using historical case studies and the logic of historical explanation. 
 
The two questions of this dissertation as to whether it is useful to look 
at longer term business evolution in network terms from a historic 
viewpoint and the second on how these networks evolve in the long 
term fit well with the current state of the literature and the knowledge 
of the way networks evolve. The questions as to whether some of the 
tools of analysis and our understanding of networks from shorter 
periods of study are useful as the long term plays out should be a 
significant contribution. The approaches and insights should offer 
trustworthy outcomes which are transferable to other network 
situations.  
 
When considering technology and innovation the elements of 
interactions and jointness of resources is an additional area that is 
not yet well explored despite the fact that we clearly see indications of 
unexpected outcomes of the innovative process which is by its nature 
highly unpredictable indicated by Håkansson and Waluszewski 
(2002). This means that a company is likely to find itself doing 
business with a variety of different products and even in different 
markets.  It would appear likely that network theory could have a lot 
to contribute to understanding this process. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that there is value in examining the life 
cycle of an innovation in network terms and in looking at the larger 
area of the evolution of networks over long periods of time.  
 
At a time when interest in business networks is increasing the fact 
that so many key events and innovations need many decades to evolve 
and be properly understood heightens the need for a study covering a 
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long period of time. To be able to achieve such long term studies 
requires an historical method and a case which allows study to go 
beyond just looking at customers and suppliers involved in 
transactions.  
 
This dissertation is laid out as follows. In Chapter 2 the literature 
related to the areas of IMP studies and networks is looked at along 
with the areas of strategic studies, economic geography and business 
histories. A section also looks at some aspects of technology studies. 
 
Chapter 3 explains the research philosophy, the methodology and also 
looks at the choice of case study. In this chapter the analysis is 
explained along with the limitations involved in this work. 
 
Chapter 4 covers the period from 1860 until 1930 in terms of four 
time limited episodes the first two by being way of preamble and the 
final two being the episodes of key focus for the dissertation. 
 
Chapter 5 provides historical context for the leather industry in the 
19th and early 20th century and specific examination of the group of 
companies that were in 1893 to form the United States Leather 
company which was to be the largest founding company in The Dow 
Jones Industrial Average when it was established in 1896. The United 
States Leather Company periods is analysed in some detail.  
 
Chapter 6 offers an analysis of the episodes and the findings along 
with a discussion on the evolution of the Booth network from 1860 
until 1930.  
 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion and 8 the References. 
 
In the Appendices there is a time line for the entire period. It extends 
until the group was taken over and largely closed down and has 
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associated with it details of the companies, senior family members, 
employees and other background information on the business.  
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Studies on networks and using network tools have greatly accelerated 
in recent years as the landscape of business has been seen to evolve. 
This section looks specifically at the relevance of the IMP approach, 
along with many specific aspects of the IMP approach. It then briefly 
examines the areas of strategy, business histories, economic 
geography and finally technology studies.    
 
2.2 The increasing relevance of network approaches 
 
Developments in technology and communications over the last twenty 
years have changed the business to consumer (B2C) scenario.  
Consumers now become involved in dialogues and complex 
interactions with companies even to the extent of co-creation of 
products. With the advent of experiential marketing (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy, 2000) interpretive research and consumer culture 
theory (Arnould and Thomson, 2005) the stage has been reached that 
it is argued that there should be less distinction between business to 
business and business to consumer marketing.  As Cova and Salle 
(2007, p.9) argue “we should no longer be frightened of cross 
fertilization between B2B and B2C marketing.”  
 
Rather than diminishing the importance of the IMP approach this has 
raised its relevance as its boundaries now become extended to 
encompass the entire supply network up to and including the 
consumer.   
 
Network theory embraces many dimensions.  These include resources 
(Harrison and Håkansson, 2006), relationships, network pictures 
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(Henneberg et. al. 2006, Ramos et. al. 2005, Leek and Mason 2010) 
network position (Håkansson and Snehota 2006 and Ford 2003) 
network types (Markasen 1996; McCann 2003) Innovation (Edgerton 
2006; Waluszeski 2004), path dependency (Håkansson and 
Waluszeski 2002), strategy (Gadde et. al. 2003; Ford et. al. 2003, 
Håkansson and Snehota 2006) and managing in networks (Ford 2003; 
Ford and Håkansson, 2006). 
 
One connecting factor between the new ideas coming forward and the 
longstanding IMP approach is the move away from a transactional 
view towards interaction bringing together the more enduring dyadic 
relationships which have been at the core of IMP thinking.  These 
relationships involve looking at suppliers looking into the company 
just as much as looking out of the company to customers and can be 
analysed in areas such as core competency (Prahalad and Hamel 
1990), resource-advantage theory (Hunt 2000, 2002) and service-
dominant logic (Vargo and Lusch 2004, 2008, 2011).  
 
The study of networks is likely to continue to become the focus of an 
increasing number of studies as changes in communications and 
transportation, amongst other things, have given rise to complex 
business configurations to cope with competitive pressures.  Joint 
ventures to access new markets have become more common. It is now 
harder to define customers, suppliers and competitors and it seems 
likely that networks offer an increasingly useful way to examine and 
interpret what is happening.  
 
The IMP approach is based on asserting that firms working in 
business markets are linked through long lasting relationships which 
show increased commitment over time (Ford 1980, Håkansson 1982, 
and Håkansson and Snehota (1995).  This approach leads to better 
cooperation and coordination which adds more value when compared 
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to the conventional view of a chain where transactions take place 
more at arms’ length (Blankenberg et. al. 1996, p. 1037).  
 
When a business is considered as being part of a network of exchange 
relationships (Ford 1980; Axelsson 1992) certain phenomena become 
apparent that are not easily identified by other approaches. These 
include how the actors inter-relate and how they use and share 
resources.  
 
In network terms Håkansson and Waluszewski (2002) identify some 
major aspects of current business that suggest there would be value 
in looking back and re-examining areas where they consider 
judgement was made too quickly. These include an embedded belief in 
progress (Basalla 1988, p. 131), science as a creator of prosperity 
(Bernal 1939, p. 902), and a world which is less and less dependent 
on traditional resources such as land, labour and capital, with the 
major producers of wealth now being knowledge and information 
(Gibbons et. al., 1994, p. 57). 
 
In their study in 1998 Oliver and Ebers looked at a variety of papers 
published in different sectors which were related to networks to 
ascertain if some commonality could be found.  This led them to 
conclude that there was a high degree of confusion in terminology and 
they quote Nohria (1992, p.3): ‘Anyone reading through what purports 
to be network literature will readily perceive the analogy between it 
and a “terminological jungle in which any newcomer may plant a 
tree”.’  Oliver and Ebers (1998, p.573) consider there to be “a greater 
opportunity for fruitful cross-disciplinary and cross-perspective 
dialogue than is often realized”. They write that the network approach 
offers new ways of analysing existing subjects.  
 
These two aspects of revisiting the past with current IMP thinking and 
examining network evolution over the very long term are clearly areas 
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worthy of study which have not yet been the focus of any full studies 
using the IMP approach. This thesis focuses exploring these issues 
predominantly through exploring “Network Pictures”, which are actors’ 
interpretations of their network environment (Ford et. al., 2003). 
Empirical research into the “Network Pictures” of managers and the 
connection between these and business behaviour develops the 
researchers understanding of how managers perceive the 
relationships they have and fit them together mentally (Ford et. al. 
2003; Henneberg et. al. 2006; Ramos, et. al. 2005). These are valuable 
for identifying what interactions actors feel are important and form 
one of the three main observable artefacts of network interaction (the 
other two being purposeful networking and outcomes (Ford et al., 
2011). Thus they form the basis of our understanding of all the other 
phenomena of interest for IMP scholars and will be elaborated on in 
the next section. 
 
2.3 Observing Network Interaction 
 
There have been a large number of attempts to describe and analyse 
networks and company positions within them and to help companies 
manage or change their “network position” (Håkansson & Snehota, 
1995, Ford et. al., 2003). To examine what happens in these networks 
a number of theoretical tools have been suggested. The first is the 
Actor-Activities-Resources approach.  The “A-R-A Model” (Håkansson 
& Johanson, 1992) provides a conceptual framework of the process 
and outcomes of interaction, based on empirical studies in the IMP 
research stream (Ford et. al., 2003:Ch. 8) and is now a cornerstone of 
the network approach along with the associated ‘Model of 
Management in Networks’ (Ford et. al., 2003) shown in Figure 1 which 
helps understand what is happening in networks. These models offer 
a way of looking at actor bonds, resource ties and activity links 

















Håkansson and Snehota (1995) explain that even if a business tries to 
remain static within its network, the network itself is continuously 
evolving and changing all the companies within it.  Conversely, they 
observe that when actors choose to make a number of small positional 
moves, it does not take long before the whole network may look 
substantially different.  Each member of the network can have an 
impact on the look and form of the network (Andersson et. al., 1994).  
Thus over a period of time we can expect to see significant changes in 
the characteristics of the network and the presence, absence or 
position of any one company within it.  
 
Naturally we expect companies to try to influence those around them 
in order to better secure their long-term future.  But these attempts at 
influence will be based on the company’s view of the complex inter-
dependencies that exist in the network, their “network picture” (Ford 
et. al. 2003).  But it is unrealistic to think that a company can “make 
sense” of a network of effectively infinite size and complexity 
(Blankenberg 1992; Holmen and Pederson, 2001).  Lundgren (1995) 
suggests that when a company is analyzing its position it must set 
 












boundaries for the network it examines which are appropriate to the 
particular decisions that it is making.  This creates a dilemma for any 
business since significant events may take place in distant parts of 
the network, or in “another” network, not fully associated with the 
main or obvious one.  Also, threats to the future of a business often 
come from unexpected locations.  For example Christensen (1997) 
describes how a company can be outflanked by a new technology 
offering apparently inferior benefits into a separate, although linked, 
sector of the network.  
 
 
2.4 Network Pictures 
 
Logically each relationship a company has with another business has 
implications for the other relationships within the network.  As such 
the network comprises the companies and the relationships between 
them. Certain actors in the network may have a powerful influence 
without actually being involved in direct transactions.   
 
Individual actors will each have a different view of the situation 
depending in part on how they analyse the situation and what they 
plan to achieve from the analysis. The concept of network pictures 
was first discussed by Ford et. al. (2002) and were more precisely 
defined by Ford et.al. (2003) and Ford and Håkansson (2006, p.21) as 
“a descriptive construct that can be used by researchers to encompass 
a particular actor’s view of the surrounding network and its scale, 
structure and interactions, as well as the evaluative dimensions it 
applies to them”. Trying to understand how actors might use network 
pictures is an essential element of this dissertation. Their value as a 
measure of the organizational actors’ subjectively perceived view is 
made by Ramos et.al (2012) and Henneberg et. al. (2010). They 
identify how this view leads managers to take decisions related to the 
actors, activities and resources. At the same time Ramos et. al. (2012) 
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explain how network pictures can work at a different level as a 
research tool, being the researchers’ effort at sense making of the 
network. Effectively the researcher is picturing the actor’s network 
picture.  
 
The network pictures of companies, on which their interactions are 
based, provide an important explanatory tool for both the researcher 
and the manager.  Managers need to examine their own network 
pictures and those of the companies around them and the 
assumptions on which they are based.  These may form a way of 
improving their understanding of the dynamics of the network and to 
reduce the danger of missing significant changes.  Consequently the 
choice of network “horizons” is a major decision for management in 
the drawing of their “network pictures” (Ford et. al. 2003).  
 
One reason for this is that other actors in the network are obtaining 
new information, formally and informally, about the changes taking 
place and forming their own assessment of their implications.  A 
company has to continue to adjust its plans in anticipation or in 
response to activities elsewhere in the network. It has the capability of 
terminating some relationships and establishing some new ones, but 
there is a limit to how much disruption it can successfully undertake 
during any single episode (Håkansson & Snehota (1998); Waluszewski 
(2004)).  
 
A number of areas related to networks pictures have been covered in 
recent years in the IMP Group's business marketing literature. These 
include dimensional conceptualisations (Henneberg et. al., 2006) and 
operational aspects (Ramos and Ford, 2010), and the dyadic approach 
to compare network pictures of individuals from two companies (Leek 




The complexity of network pictures is highlighted by Henneberg et.al. 
(2006) when they demonstrate how different managers perceive them, 
noting the high level of subjectivity involved. The building blocks 
suggested by Henneberg (2006, p.416) shown in Figure 2 are useful in 
developing and studying these networks.  Relating network pictures to 
the study of the evolution and dynamics in business networks would 








Network pictures are significant in the process of organizing in 
business networks as they generate economic consequences for actors 
by shaping their decisions. Such strategic actions in networks are 




In addition to this aspect of network pictures which can be termed 
SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION Ford and Håkansson (2006) 
identified four further dimensions – INTERDEPENDENCE, 
RELATIVITY, JOINTNESS, and TIME – that characterise the 
interaction taking place in networks. It is suggested that these are 
important issues for researchers in trying to make sense of interaction 
between business companies.  These dimensions build on the IMP 
view of business networks that accepts a structure of relationships 
and a process of multi-lateral interaction, both conscious and 
unconscious between individual actors (Håkansson and Ford, 2002; 
Ford and Mouzas, 2008). Allied to this Araujo, Dubois and Gadde 
(2003) argue that a business network has no identifiable boundary 
and is not limited to those companies with which any one actor has 
contact.  The business network is not owned by any one company, 
managed by it, nor created by it.  
 
As such these dimensions suggested by Ford and Håkansson (2006) 
together comprise a useful theoretical device for examining the 
interaction within the network. Interdependence both precedes and 
flows from interaction and is related to the resources and capabilities 
of actors. The interactions taking place will depend on each actor’s 
view of the situation at that given moment in time. These will come 
from a complex mix of previous experience, views of the future, 
industry norms and expectations of how others are likely are likely to 
react. To start in business companies need to interact and over time 
this will almost certainly lead to more than just simple exchange and 
jointness of resources, of knowledge will be the result.  
  




Håkansson & Ford (2002) formulated three network paradoxes which 
they suggested be used to look at the business development process to 
gain a feel for the complexity that companies face in their everyday 
operations: 
 
1. “Strong relationships are the heart of a company’s survival and of 
its growth and development. But a well-developed network of 
relationships also ties a company into its current ways of operating 
and restricts its abilities to change” (p. 250). 
2. “A company’s relationships are the outcomes of its strategy and its 
actions. But the paradox is that the company is itself the outcome of 
those relationships and of what has happened in them. Thus a 
network is both a way to influence and to be influenced” (p. 252). 
3 “Companies try to control the network that surrounds them and to 
manage their relationships to achieve their own aims … the paradox is 
that the more a company achieves this ambition of control, the less 
effective and innovative will be the network” (p. 254). These inherent 
paradoxes are described in Figure 3 (Håkansson and Ford 2002).  
  
Figure 3: the three network paradoxes 
 
PARADOX 1:  
A company’s relationships are the basis of its operations and 
development. 
BUT 
These relationships may also tie it to its current ways of operating and 
restrict its ability to change. 
PARADOX 2: 
A company’s relationships are the outcome of its own decisions and 
actions. 
BUT 
The company itself is equally the outcome of its relationships and 




Companies try to manage their relationships and control the network 
that surrounds them to achieve their own aims.   
BUT  
The more that a company achieves this ambition of control, the less 
effective and innovative the network will be. 
 
In situations when companies are interacting network outcomes can 
be examined by way of the 6Cs (Ford et.al., 2003; Ford, 2002). These 
are laid out as follows: 
Confront or Conform,  
Consolidate or Create,  
Coerce or Concede 
These 6Cs exist within what Ford (2003) calls the Three Aspects of 
networking as shown in Figure 4. 
 































Understanding the Network Paradoxes and these aspects of 
networking suggest a way of looking at interactions within networks 
and fitting them with the complex relations going on in the 
surrounding network.  The dissertation will relate the business 
evolution in the case to these current ideas on the dynamics of 
business networks and will take into account the inherent Paradoxes 




The early work on networks put a very heavy emphasis on the dyad as 
the major focal point (Ford, 1980), looking at how the relationship of 
two companies might evolve as they get to know each other and make 
adjustments to work better together to meet market conditions. It 
later became clear that these dyadic relationships only made sense if 
the other influences on the actors were considered and the network of 
firms involved is considered. A number of attempts have been made to 
characterise types of network. 
 
Markusen (1996) was one of the first to do so and her typographies of 
industrial districts provides a useful basis to help us understand the 
overlap between purely local “networks” and the wider network in 
which firms and industries are placed. She rather rejects the concept 
of simple local area networks in favour of associations of companies 
that have some specific driver such as a key central client – an 
automotive or defence business for example – or government support 
such as one for a free trade area.  This is supported by Gordon and 
McAnn (2000, 2003, 2005) who considered some of the tighter 
networks in the UK to be a consequence of major firms being attracted 
by incentives and bringing suppliers with them.   
 
Markusen (1996, p. 297)   considers three basic forms of cluster: the 
“Marshallian Industrial District”, the Hub-and-Spoke District” and the 
“Satellite Platform District”.  The “Italianate” she describes as a more 
cooperative and interactive progeny of the Marshallian; much more 
willing to take risks. Her “hub and spoke” type and the “satellite 
platform” type in particular only function effectively in the longer term 
if the participants recognise that they are managing within a network 
which extends beyond the locality. Studies by Schmitz and Nadvi 
(1999) indicate that dangers exist if firms in a local industrial district 
do not establish and maintain relationships in a wider world. Rhoda 
and Burton (2010) explain this in terms of the Mexican footwear 
industry which has only recently moved from being insular and 
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protected from outside competition by duties and tariffs for many 
decades. This leads it to being less competitive globally.  The Mexican 
tanning trade, by comparison, had not had this protection and has 
systematically modernised and entered new sectors such as 
automotive leathers. 
 
The Markusen (1996) analysis is informative with regard to how 
companies might go about the process of purposeful networking and 
in particular decisions related to expanding or contracting networks. 
The decisions involved in staying with local partners or being 
determined to find more international relationships inter-relate with 
the Three Aspects and the Network Paradoxes.   
 
2.6 Network Outcomes 
 
In looking at IKEA Håkansson and Waluszewski (2002) give us three 
clear pointers to the way we can observe companies, relationships and 
outcomes by taking a network perspective.  Most critical is that 
network outcomes often have no clear connection to the start-out 
intentions.  Secondly during a change process there is no “true 
picture”, but rather a series of separate interpretations which the 
authors describe as “in the eye of the beholder”.  At the same time 
neither existing technologies nor innovations are neutral or simple in 
relation to the individual company. 
 
It is clearly demonstrated that the change process is neither stepwise 
nor mainly carried on within the boundaries of the individual 
companies.  At the same time the behaviours of companies change 
radically over time, and often final outcomes are not anticipated 
beforehand. 
 
The relationship between means and goals is a non-linear interactive 
one since “the amount and kind of information at the disposal of 
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actors is constantly changing”.  This fits perfectly well with the 
thoughts of Dosi (1988) on technology and innovation. The direction a 
company will take after a process of development is likely to be heavily 
dependent on the changing relationships going on during that 
process. 
 
Establishing the outcomes is a necessary element in understating the 
drivers and dynamics of purposeful networking. In looking at 
networks over long periods it should be easier to identify network 
outcomes that have come about as a result of years of interaction at a 
variety of levels of intensity.  The use of the Aspects allows 
examination of the dynamics within networks as do the Network 
Paradoxes.  
 
At the same time the limitations identified in the Three Network 
Paradoxes, in particular Paradox three, are network outcomes that 
have the potential to restrict a company’s future activity.  
 
Increased interdependency is also an outcome of purposeful 
networking and according to Håkansson and Olsen (2011) it is these 
interdependencies – along with motion and variety – that are key 
elements in innovation. It is clear that limiting networks is difficult as 
they continue to evolve, so any decision on an outcome relates to a 
subjective decision about the moment in time to be chosen. Ford et. 
al. (2009) talk of interaction as a process which changes and 
transforms aspects of the resources and activities of the actors. These 
could be small changes such as a product offering adjustment or lead 
to a total business reorganisation. Indeed Ford et.al. (2009, p. 11) note 
that “successive interaction over time can lead to outcomes that mean 
that the activities and resources of the actors and the actors 




Interaction between companies is an inevitable consequence of being 
in business and routine interaction is a tool to provide stability; yet it 
is often likely to produce unpredictable outcomes making interaction a 
mix of the dynamic and the stabilising. At the same time the outcomes 
of interaction will likely be the subject of different interpretations by 
different actors. The A-R-A model implies that outcomes of an 
interaction process can be considered in terms of the three areas of 
Actor Bonds, Activity Links and Resource Ties between the 
counterparts (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). Closely allied to these 
are the resources, the web of actors and any new patterns of activity 
created during the period of interaction. 
 
The IMP approach allows observation of the network outcomes of the 
same resources applied in different situations.  Waluszewski (2004) 
highlights this via an example of river ice, which has negative value 
when broken up to let shipping through but positive value when used 
for ice sculptures and other items related to recreation or tourism. Ice 
had even more value in terms of resources and their management 
within different networks when the 19th century New England ice 
industry is considered. Here ice was harvested from lakes and rivers 
to be used with great value as ballast for shipping and for 
refrigeration, especially when it could do both simultaneously. (Ford 
and Redwood, 2005) 
 
The IKEA study examines how the network affected and was affected 
by a single large company with clear objectives. We can identify some 
of the elements which drive a company to continuously examine and 
adjust its network position.   The relationships are the sources of a lot 
of technological change, but the studies also help us look for a better 
understanding of what is “new”. Often “new” has been known for some 
time, even decades, by at least some of the actors, but the innovation 




Also Håkansson and Waluszewski (2002) help us re-examine 
situations with their explanation of “heaviness” and variety of 
“resources” and to consider how they relate to each other, and are 
rarely neutral, but rather combine to create a certain direction.  This 
overlaps with the “role of the collective processes in the development 
of a new demand”.    
 
They also raise the question about the role of a lead user, and the way 
in which interaction is related to the creation of new supply and 
demand interfaces. They present the picture that path dependency 
stops a firm from straying beyond traditional lines, but the creation of 
crossroads between established paths can facilitate the development 




2.7 Technology and Innovation 
 
As one possible networking outcome Technology and Innovation needs 
special note. The role of technology and innovation in networks has 
great importance as nearly all the studies of medium and long term 
identified have had their focus on these areas. Business networking 
involves multiple actors, each of which initiates interaction and reacts 
to the initiatives of others.  Business networking takes place within 
the context of a pre-existing pattern of interdependencies between 
actors and contributes to the evolution of those interdependencies.  
These interdependencies form the links between the variety of 
resources and activities within individual actors and relationships 
that are distributed across the network.  The networking of multiple 
actors and the evolution of activities, resources and interdependencies 
contribute to the constant motion of the network.  Thus, the process 
of innovation in this landscape is multi-actor, multi-dimensional and 
sequential.  Innovation is an outcome of an existing and evolving 
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pattern of resources and activities and the networking of multiple 
actors.  Innovation is a continuing process and its outcomes at any 
point in time will be perceived differently by those involved in it, 
whether they recognise it or not. Each of these actors will selectively 
confront some of the issues or problems that it faces before or within 
that process while conforming to other aspects of its current 
interactions.  Each will seek to create or consolidate on its existing 
patterns of interaction and lead or follow counterparts in aspects of 
their interactions and in the direction of innovation or change. 
 
Recent studies on network pictures and their role in the process of 
change within business relationships and network structures include   
Abrahamsen, Henneberg, & Naudè, 2010; Colville & Pye, 2009; Kragh 
& Andersen, 2009; Håkansson and Olsen, 2011.  
 
Many new technological developments have been described as coming 
from co-location of firms in what is termed a cluster or local industrial 
district.  Porter (1990, 1996, 1998) has led this discussion with the 
definition of a cluster as “a group of interconnected firms and 
institutions in a particular field present in a particular location”, 
(1998, p. xii) which evolves from earlier definitions by Schmitz (1995) 
and Piore and Sabel (1984)2.   The origins of cluster thinking go back 
to Alfred Marshall (1890) who wrote that “industries tend to cluster in 
distinct geographic districts, with individual cities specializing in 
production of narrowly related sets of goods”.  
 
Lundgren (1995) asks us to consider the three stages of network 
evolution as genesis, coalescence and dissemination.  He is 
considering new high technology innovation and while there is an 
                                                 
2
 A group of producers making similar things in close vicinity to each other (Schmitz 
1995, p.533) “Cluster” is an industrial district, i.e. a core of more-or-less equal small 
enterprises bound in a complex web of competition and cooperation (Piore and Sabel 




assumption that a new technology can lead to an altogether new 
network in fact it seems that companies link together in new ways 
with a mix of start-ups and established firms. 
 
He covers the linkages that unite scientific research, technological 
development and economic change, and the forces (Lundgren 1995, 
p12) that “provoke the emergence of a new industrial structure, a new 
network”. 
 
The emergence and evolution of new technological systems are parallel 
processes and new knowledge in terms of process or product ideas will 
often emerge at the interface between different knowledge areas.  “In 
exchange situations different kinds of knowledge come together to 
create innovative solutions” (Håkansson, 1987, p.4). This is taken 
further by Håkansson and Olsen, (2011) who highlight the importance 
of motion, interaction and variety since the “value of a given resource, 
activity or actor depends on its combining with particular others” 
(Håkansson and Olsen, 2011, p.25). The managerial activity is 
considered a critical function in making this happen.   One important 
aspect of managing innovation is acknowledging the dependency on 
others and interactions involved in managing friction in the network 
as new ideas evolve. It forms a network of shared understanding 
(Håkansson and Olsen, 2011, p.22). 
 
History, and time, is clearly very important when it comes to 
innovation, and Lundgren (1995, p.61) gives examples as widespread 
as the steam engine to computers to demonstrate gaps of many 
decades between the invention and widespread uptake of an 
innovation.  
 
Lundgren’s work brings history and economics together through the 
window of the development of new technologies.  The stated aim of 
Lundgren’s work is to explain the “emergence of a new industrial 
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network” (Lundgren, 1995, p.69) but perhaps in terms of the way we 
now look at networks we are actually looking at a situation where new 
linkages develop which join up elements of a number of existing 
networks to create what appears to be a distinct and individual 
network. Something of this sort happened when Woolworths closed in 
January 2009. New relationships were quickly established so that 
other stores could sell the same or similar products that had been in 
Woolworths and the retail gap was soon filled. Even if many of the 
companies in an emerging technology are start-ups they each start to 
function within already existing networks and the linking of those 
networks will create a new appearance and a new network area. 
 
The approach by Lundgren discusses network theory in terms that “a 
specific firm’s behaviour is controlled by its relationships with the 
other firms and not by internal factors or by aggregates of unspecified 
units, such as competitors and markets for supply and demand”. This 
is allied to the arguments, earlier discussed, that companies must 
beware of becoming too involved in a thought process that defines 
them as being either suppliers or customers. They need to be able to 
take a wider view.  One danger implied by Lundgren’s work is that as 
the technological systems and the networks of inter-related firms 
extend their interplay it becomes easy to take a narrow view of the 
total scope of the network. 
 
Lundgren develops some guidelines as to why this might be.  For 
instance technical problems in a network view appear to be much 
more important than price, and individual relationships between 
companies are heavily affected by the relationship each party holds 
elsewhere in the network, and by the properties of the network as a 
whole. As such networks can in some ways be considered to represent 
a coordinated mechanism, a governance structure which is quite 




What is clear is that over time technological change is one of the 
propelling forces determining the future structure of a network.  It is 
also an interactive process, which involves search processes to deal 
with problems, and the associated evolution of technology is a process 
of accumulation. 
 
Inside any given network Lundgren points out that the cost of 
transfer, diffusion or imitation of technology is different for different 
actors.  Innovations bring together new sets of actors who create what 
he defines as a “new technological system”. This “newness” is to a 
large degree a reorganisation of the old order, but Lundgren argues 
that what is new is the inclusion of some novel element – a new 
activity, a previously untapped resource, or new actors. 
 
Evolving out of this is an argument that it is unhelpful to think of 
technological development as having a beginning and an end, in a sort 
of discovery, innovation and then diffusion and imitation cycle.  
Lundgren suggests that it needs to be acknowledged that the 
evolution of technical systems has no real beginning and no ultimate 
end.  Most important is the recognition that technology is not 
autonomous but resides in a system that has links to a network of 
actors, who are all in some way there to govern and develop what is 
happening.  This is part of any process of legitimisation and adoption, 
which is not segmented or necessarily consequential but is described 
as “omni-present, continuously altering the structure of the industrial 
network.”  Changes in the network are occurring as the result of 
changes in the socio-technical processes of creation, integration, and 
expansion.  This also resonates with Edgerton’s (2006) arguments on 
the non linear movement from the stages of invention to use of new 
technology. 
 
The technical system evolves as a result of the creation of novelty, the 
development of that novelty and its adoption and use.  The network of 
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actors changes appearance as a result of networking that is driven by 
the identification, the legitimisation and the use of the novelty.   
Taking a biological metaphor from Pantzar (1991) Lundgren (1995, p. 
194) suggests “business networks evolve from a dispersed structure 
into a unified structure, which is transformed into a 
compartmentalised structure”. Making success of an invention usually 
requires generating income of some sort, developing a means of 
generating self-sustaining growth. To do this a business needs access 
to users and to suppliers.  These linkages enable adaptation and this 
in turn forces the firm to adapt to some of the more stable structures 
of the industry. 
 
Although this covers only the limited time period of the development of 
digital imaging (Lundgren, 1995) in Scandinavia it does demonstrate 
the way in which a new technology can evolve out of local 
circumstances.  It also shows that key actors must be receptive to new 
ideas for diffusion to take place. It demonstrates the potential value of 
a longer term study such as this. 
 
Amongst other work on networks themselves studies have been done 
on Pharmacia Biotech (Andersson 1996), digital imaging Lundgren, A 
(1995) and on IKEA (Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2002) that are 
longitudinal but only covering a limited number of years.  All these 
studies are largely built around the area of innovation which is of 
course one of the most important areas for modern business. Ford 
and Saren (1996) and Teece et. al. (1988) link innovation into both the 
economic and network areas while Cowan (1997) looks at the 
development of technical systems through the centuries tying them 
into social and economic changes.  
 
This brings to the fore the importance of time in terms of any such 
study and how at any moment in time the resources, the relations and 







Various attempts have been made to describe and analyse networks 
and company positions at a particular point in time and to help 
companies to manage or change their network position (Håkansson 
and Snehota 1995, Ford et. al. 2003). There have also been a large 
number of in-depth single case studies permitting thorough 
description and analysis of network processes and structures (see e.g. 
Baraldi, 2003; Gressetvold, 2004; Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2002; 
Holmen, 2001; Lind, 2006; Lundgren, 1995; Andersson, 1996; Wedin, 
2001) all looking at periods between three to ten years. 
 
It is clear from this research that networks are not created, controlled, 
operated or owned by a single company.  There are no new networks 
(Ford and Redwood, 2005). When a new company emerges, it does so 
into an existing network.  The company’s start and subsequent 
development will be affected by the interactions that are and have 
already taken place in that network.  But in turn, the company will 
have an effect on the network itself.  The very idea of interaction in 
business networks clearly involves time. Ford and Mouzas (2008) 
consider episodes and scale along with non-linear and recursive time. 
Any business relationship is the result of an interaction informed by 
what has happened before. Ford and Mouzas (2008) highlight 
important aspects for the actor to consider such as time to first order 
after the first contact, and to first profit.  
 
Business relationships are often long term and imply a considerable 
investment in various company resources from both sides. They may 
lead to relationship specific investments by counterparts and to high 
levels of trust and familiarity (Ford and Mouzas, 2008). This along 
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with interdependence which develops at the same time can limit a 
company’s options for change.  
 
 As a consequence the effect of events on a network over a long period 
of time is clearly of interest. Since many areas of change from 
personal through to fundamental technologies can take years or 
decades to work through an industry this is a deficiency in the area of 
network analysis. 
 
This is highlighted by Ford and Håkansson (2006) as an important 
element in understanding what happens to networks. Yet network 
evolution over time has been difficult for researchers to cover as the 
tools of network analysis have only been developed over the last thirty 
years, while we know that the implications of certain events such as 
technological or economic change often evolve over much longer 
periods. Many innovations and inventions only make a real impact on 
the marketplace four or five decades after first being tried. Looking at 
networks over extended time periods would therefore appear likely to 
offer the chance to obtain some valuable insights. Relationships can 
be observed as they evolve and develop and some can be seen to be 
strengthening while others decline.   
 
Addressing the subject of process and temporality in business 
networks has been an area of increasing focus.   It has been looked at 
in the business network literature from the two aspects of theory and 
methodology (Halinen & Tornroos, 1995; Easton & Araujo, 1999; 
Araujo & Harrison, 2002; Medlin, 2004; Mattsson & Andersson, 2006, 
2009; Hedaa & Törnroos, 2008; Dubois & Araujo, 2004).  The 
approach has largely been to explain change and evolution in 
business networks, modelling sequences of events and deriving 




Underlying the thinking on time in these cases always reverts to a 
dualistic approach explained by Araujo and Easton (2012) in terms of 
“subjective and objective”. They discuss the historical approach to 
time in terms of the A series which involves a continuous flow between 
past, present and future with Time conceived in terms of tense. The B 
series uses a different scale which looks at time in terms of 
chronological dates. Araujo and Easton consider both these series and 
how they might best be applied to the point of view of the situated 
actor. They consider it important that we want to work in a tensed B 
series environment in which our network concepts can be encompass 
the meaningful experience of situated actors.  They consider, however, 
that in reality situated actors approach uncertain futures using a 
combination as they “stabilise” entities and their relations to make 
sense of the possibility of action in the “here and now”.  Important to 
this stabilisation is the telling of compelling narratives which need to 
be more than just a plausible listing of a sequence of events. They 
require credible interpretations of the past and compelling versions of 
the future. An important conclusion from Araujo and Easton (2012, 
p.317) is that to understand events we need to find ways to “capture 
the messiness, uncertainty and situatedness of action in business 
networks”.  This means getting closer to the challenges that actors 
face while they are involved in active decision making.  
 
Looking at some of the major documents covering changes over time 
we have to consider strategic studies, economic geography and 
business history (see e.g. Amin and Hausner 1997; Grabher and Stark 
1997; Pyke and Sengenberger 1990; Staber et. al.. 1996), along with 
aspects of technology: as well as the work of the IMP group (see e.g. 
Ford, 1997, 2002; Håkansson and Snehota 1995; Axelsson and 




2.9 Strategic studies 
 
While strategic studies do not look at business from a network centric 
point of view in many instances (Berger and Luckman 1967; Weick 
1979; Porac, 1989) they have pointed to the existence of some form of 
network environment inside which a company has to enact its 
business. As such this work suggests that a pure network approach 
has been missing and could add new levels of understanding to these 
complex movements of events. 
 
Porac (1989) analyses the thought processes of individuals in 
assessing a business and its environment, and their ability to reflect 
upon and articulate their interpretation of the network outcomes 
(Berger and Luckman 1967, Weick 1979).  Porac (1989) discusses the 
important interrelationship between “firm level strategies” and “group 
level structures”. 
 
Weick (1979) interprets this process as one involving understanding 
linkages. It is accepted that one company’s actions are likely to be 
impacted by another’s, but Weick does make it clear that the mental 
models of the decision makers can only be partial representations of 
the transactional network and it also argued that organisations only 
use “parts of persons” (Weick 1979, p.13) so that an actor can behave 
in different ways in different circumstances.  
 
When a business considers its strategy in terms of a transactional 
network a company might consider itself to be part of the “consumer 
products industry” (Porac, 1989, p. 399) and in doing so locate itself 
psychologically in the supply side of the business.  Alternately another 
view would be the demand side “market” definition.  As each business 
builds its mental model of its network the comparison with 
competitors tends to take priority. From this and the various levels of 
network interconnectivity the concept of “socially-shared beliefs” 
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evolves. Porac’s conclusion, which flows from Stigler (1964), Porter 
(1980), and Huff (1982), is that strategic choices of individual firms 
take place within the context of many shared beliefs about how and 
with whom to engage in transactions in the market place. 
 
This aspect of socially shared beliefs overlaps with a similar concept 
when looking at the foundation of businesses by selected groups such 
as Quakers or Jews, where shared beliefs and high levels of trust are 
apparent.  In Porac’s work he argues that a set of shared beliefs may 
arise from the fact that companies work in the same area, have to face 
the same difficulties and competitors, and so grow “together” over 
time. This aspect has considerable relevance to evolution of networks 
as these groups have “ready-made” networks of expertise in many 
areas for the business start-up and so become a short cut to 
resources.  
 
Studies in strategy also look at the various ways in which companies 
decide with whom they should partner and the type of relationship the 
partnership should be.  Teece (1988) indicates the significance of 
firms working only in the areas of their “core competences” which Dosi 
explained as doing “what they are good at”.  This thought immediately 
impacts on organisational literature in terms of the degree of vertical 
integration and diversification.  The rather abused modern term of 
“business model” applies here. Core competencies also relate to the 
availability of resources and capabilities to a company. The decision to 
own or buy-in directly impacts how and with whom a company inter-
relates in its network.  They also impact on whether the other network 
partners are perceived as partners, as customers, or as competitors.  
Increasingly this position is harder to define with many situations 
creating hybrids of all three. 
 
One significant aspect is path dependence (Teece et. al. 1997, p.522-
3). This suggests that a company’s activities today will be constrained 
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by its actions yesterday.  Arthur (1989) explains this as a “lock in” 
affect such as happened with the QWERTY keyboard and the VHS 
video recorder. Araujo and Easton (2012, p. 314) explain how 
innovation process involves a subtle balance between path 
dependence and creation (Garud & Karnøe, 2001, 2003). In path 
dependence, temporally remote events, sometimes spanning decades, 
define the possibilities for the emergence of new ideas, whilst path 
creation focuses on the role of situated actors as they attempt to 
shape history in the making. “Innovators stand at the intersection of 
past, present and future.” They offer interpretations of past history, 
actively shape objects and contexts of action, mobilise resources 
based on a particular version of the future which they attempt to 
render “real”. 
 
Dosi (1995) and others (Miller, 1992; Greiner, 1972) evolve this at firm 
level to argue that a correct action by a company today will contain 
the seed of its own future crisis – “the Icarus Effect” – as described by 
Miller.  This marries well with the IMP approach (Ford, 2002) as does 
the concept of core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1995).  She argues that 
an organisation that tightly controls its “core capabilities” finds these 
same capabilities ossifying over time.  
 
2.10 Economic Geography and Business Histories 
 
While the network studies area lacks long term case studies, there are 
other studies that do look at business in this way. These include 
economic or industrial geography which provides data on the rationale 
behind the location and relocation of industries, helping us to 
understand the significance of labour costs, societal and political 
change, economical aspects such as transportation costs, and the 




Business economic historians, applied industrial economists and 
some studies of technology have helped to give us an understanding of 
the way companies adapt to events around them and how they 
manage innovations. They build on empirical “stories” with a focus on 
the uniqueness of the detail, while strategy and economic theory is 
more analytical and searching for simplification and abstraction.3 
   
Many of the macro-environmental factors that impact on networks 
were highlighted in the work of Hoover in the 1930s. Hoover (1937, 
1948) looked at industry costs and societal change in the New 
England area of the USA at a time of rapid industrial and population 
growth. He is sometimes classed has having been one of the major 
founders of economic geography.  His work identifies events that effect 
business at specific moments and how industry reacted to deal with 
them.  As such this material provides useful contextual material for 
network analyses.  
 
The seminal text in economic geography is Hoover’s 1937 treatise on 
the shoe and leather industries of New England.  This work 
demonstrates how varying costs such as raw material, transport, and 
labour build pressures on firms to relocate in different places.  
Indirectly this work highlights the many network connections which a 
company needs to carry on its business, including many in quite 
separate and less obvious sectors.  It becomes clear that complex 
changes and adaptations take place in network relationships before a 
company can move its physical location.  Hoover’s work is important 
for this dissertation as the industrial areas and some of the time 
periods he look at overlap. 
 
                                                 
3
 Dosi, G (1988) Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation Journal of Economic 
Literature Vol XXVI (Sept 1988) p 1120-1171 makes this point in his discussions of the literature 




Implied in Hoover’s study is how new or stronger relationships 
developing elsewhere in a network can impact on a business that 
would actually prefer to stand still, and yet is forced to relocate to 
avoid becoming non-competitive.   
 
Furlan et. al. (2009) examines how local SMEs can utilise local 
relationships to gain access to international markets by building on 
the knowledge and experience of their nearby network partners with 
whom they are interacting.  It is clear that a local cluster without any 
international links could happily continue on its own until, more than 
likely, it finds itself unable to compete in the global network which has 
continued to change and evolve around it. 
2.11 Technology studies 
 
Technology and innovation are closely allied. It is hard to look back at 
any business without considering the role played by technology. 
 
Since the start of the Industrial Revolution and especially from the 
mid18th century the speed of technological change has continued to 
accelerate. Cowan’s (1997) work on the development of technology in 
the USA, and in particular her work on technological systems places 
the development of technology into the social and economic picture.  
She shows how technological systems require people to be embedded 
within them to be successful and the approach extends to an 
understanding of how the firm itself has to be embedded into a 
network of other firms in order to develop and exploit its skills. She 
argues that although the modern world of computers, plastics, 
automobiles and skyscrapers may make us think of current times as 
characteristically technological we are no more or less technological 
than our ancestors. In all times and places mankind attempts to use 
tools of some fashion to control the natural environment in which we 
live. In order to exploit technology people become embedded in arrays 
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of technologies, or technological systems. Her study (Cowan, 1997) 
looks at the evolution of certain technologies in the USA over its 250 
years of history. The leather industry was just such a system with an 
enormity of skills from the slaughterhouse to the boot, saddle or 
garment. Cowan notes (Cowan, 1997, p. 63) that as industry moved 
from the farm to the factory by 1860 the production of boots and 
shoes alone was one of the top ten leading industries in the USA. 
 
The late 19th century saw the introduction of interchangeable parts 
and of transport systems that reduced journey times dramatically. An 
example relevant to this dissertation is the journey from New York 
City to Albany (the upstate capital) which reduced from many days, 
indeed weeks, to two days when the first 4 miles per hour paddle 
service started in 1807. It then went down to 10 hours by mid-century 
and then to 3 hours and 19 minutes in the “Mary Powell” in 1904.4  
Today we are seeing technical developments that are too complex and 
carry too much risk for one company to undertake alone in areas such 
as defence and aerospace.  Companies increasingly have to work 
together in teams to share knowledge and financial risk. All these 
technologically related developments have profound impacts on the 
relationships needed for their development and introduction, and 
consequently upon the potential value of studying networks.   
 
The literature on technological development, apart from some recent 
papers on digital imaging by Lundgren, A (1995) and on IKEA by 
Håkansson and Waluszewski (2002) does not examine the network 
perspective, but does provide us with material information to 
recognise the imperative for relationships to be developed and to 
evolve.  Even without going into depth about the technical systems 
that Cowan analyses the fact that so many innovations come from 
fitting one new idea with a number of older ones in a new 
                                                 
4
 New York Times, August 7, 2004 A29, and Thurston (1891) 
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configuration or format highlights the potential and actual advantage 
of understanding and utilising resources within a network. 
 
Dosi (1988, p.1121) makes it clear that the process of introducing new 
products and processes is “the outcome of the interaction” both within 
and without an industry. In particular he relates to “broader causes 
external to the individual” business.  He further develops this into a 
need for research external to the firm associated with formalised 
activities and applied research, through which it becomes apparent 
that for successful technology management and progress institutions 
and companies need to make more connections within networks. 
 
More recent work by Parsons and Rose (2003) also indicate that 
technology is not a linear process of improvement but a matter of fits 
and starts, and that technology occasionally becomes “lost” as new 
ideas are introduced and heavily promoted.  This aspect is also 
emphasised by Waluszewski (2004) when she discusses unexpected 
uses of the Facit company technology some decades later in the 
biotech supply industry. 
 
The utilisation of technologies in different contexts is highlighted by 
Edgerton (2006) and Lindquist (1994).   Technology needs to be 
considered in terms of both the innovation and use.  Edgerton 
considers that an innovation centric timeline of technology leads us to 
overlook the longevity and long term importance of technologies. The 
bicycle rickshaw may be an old technology but its true worth and 
highest utilisation only came with asphalted roads. Although many 
countries are now trying to eliminate the rickshaw as “old technology” 
Edgerton (2006) argues it is in fact an excellent transport technology 
for many places in the world today. 
 
Edgerton’s (2006) position is that a use-centric history looks at 
technologies throughout their lives, asking when they are in 
  
 44 
maximum use, among many other things. Asking what technologies 
were in use, when and what for, leads to conclusions about 
significance, which an innovation-centric history cannot begin to ask 
but often assumes. It also leads to consideration of such subjects as 
the history of maintenance and the associated resources needed to 
carry it out. Use-centric history needs to be distinguished from a long 
tradition of study which asks how users influenced innovation as 
discussed by Cowan (1997).  He also argues that the best use of 
innovation often happens in a distant location (frequently a different 
country) where its configuration with other developments gives it 
additional value. 
 
The apparent increasing need for innovation today as a differentiator 
in a world of over supply is much discussed5. Innovation has always 
been important but as well as being an exciting act of discovery and 
potential for profit in the 21st century it is now considered, especially 
by governments, a significant aspect of business survival. For many 
industries innovation in technologies – product, process or marketing 
– are a requirement and be they incremental or disruptive are 
demanded as a routine. 
 
Dosi (1988, p.1128) defines a technological trajectory as “the activity 
of technological process along the economic and technological trade-
offs defined by a paradigm”. For example the aircraft industry is 
characterised by trade-offs between horsepower, cruise speed, gross 
take-off weight and wing loading.  Increasingly to manage these trade-
offs requires a wide network position in terms of relationships to find 
these technologies but also a “heavy” network position in terms of 
many strong relationships to allow joint development and subsequent 
exploitation. 
 
                                                 
5
 Marcus Brauchli wrote his seminal article “cups run over in the industrial world” 
in the Wall Street Journal in 1998 
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One of the underlying themes of Dosi’s work is that innovation comes 
via design improvements, by learning by doing, and by learning by 
using.  Most of all it comes through “connections” plus an open mind. 
In the area of microelectronics Dosi sees an excellent example to 
“illustrate the complex intersectional linkages in the innovative 
process”.    What is more he suggests that relationships which may 
not involve an economic transaction may have importance.  He calls 
these “arms length” relationships which may link producers and 
users, or actors in other networks.  An example would be the way in 
which the production of shotguns provided technology for the 
development of bicycles in the late 19th century.  It is concluded that 
a “structured” set of external relationships are beneficial to 
innovation, and as Teece (1982) and Pavitt (1986) state these develop 
into forms of consistent patterns linking “different technologies and 
industries”. 
 
There are many network aspects to this thought process.  First it 
leads to the concept of knowledge spill-over, which is mostly described 
with regard to local industrial networks but has wider relevance and 
value in the context of different industries and technological areas, 
from which it flows into the area of bench-marking. 
 
Dosi argues that since innovation and imitation continuously change 
the firm’s relative performance the “dynamics of industrial structures” 
are always on the move.  Effectively he is saying that innovation and 
networks do go hand in hand, and he accepts that industrial “webs” 
or “filieres” are significant in the diffusion of new technologies (Dosi 
1988, p.1147). The term filiere, which in French means thread or 
chain, was coined to look at the supply chain related to a particular 
commodity or product and evolved into one of the methods of 
examining the value chain (Duruflé, G., et. al., 1988) being liked as it 




Dose explains that the further back in the filiere a company is 
situated the more its interests may change.   For example Intel 
concerns itself more with the technology and less with the application. 
This is as a result of it being situated quite far back in the filiere.  In 
consequence the filiere view helps give us a technological definition of 
a network picture. 
 
At the same time Dose was unable to find a “representative firm” that 
could be latched onto as the format for successful innovation over 
time.  What he did conclude was that the firms’ behaviour evolved out 
of the “processes which created them”.  As with the resource based 
theory a company’s likelihood to innovate or not, its willingness to 
diversify or not, or even its willingness to grow large or not may derive 
“from the variegated nature of the evolutionary processes that 
generated them” (Dosi 1988, p.1163). 
 
 
2.12 Research Objectives 
 
Given that there have been many studies of the development of 
businesses and of the associated networks what is missing is an 
extended study over a very long period of time. Taking the argument of  
Dosi (1988) that the company’s current capabilities are hugely 
determined by its long term history understanding what constitutes 
that long term development becomes essential.  What is more doing so 
with the tools of the IMP Network approach should allow us to better 
evaluate the processes involved and the outcomes from them. Using 
correspondence and other material offer an ability to gain thorough 
impressions of the network pictures of the major actors, while the 




While the IMP Network approach has done many shorter studies it 
has not taken into account the advice coming from the non-IMP fields 
that highlight a clear need for a truly long term network case study. 
 
2.13 Concluding remarks 
 
Examination of a wide number of aspects of the IMP Group approach 
to networks and the additional areas of limited aspects of strategy 
along with economic and business history make it clear that business 
events unfold over quite lengthy periods. The studies over the last four 
decades into the relationships companies have with each other have 
led to an increased understanding of the way in which any individual 
business exists within a network or a number of overlapping 
networks.  The sheer complexity and extent of these relationships 
makes it clear that companies are never able to fully control events. A 
company which understands these limits and both watches and 
estimates the interactions going on elsewhere in its networks is likely 
to do better than one who does not.  
 
Clearly it is important for a company to be aware of the nature of the 
networks within which it is embedded and to have considered the 
ways in which various events might create changes in the network. 
The company has then a better chance to take actions appropriate to 
improving its position.  
 
The papers on digital imaging by Lundgren (1995) and on IKEA by 
Håkansson and Waluszewski (2002) pick out a number of different 
points which indicate how valuable studies on the longer term 
evolution of networks might be to both the academic and the 
industrialist in understanding the dynamics and evolution of the 
networks and recent work on networks pictures and the tools to use 




In looking at the current knowledge of networks from a variety of 
aspects it is clear that the literature requires a useful long terms 
study to identify if insights can be gleaned from observing the very 
long term events that span decades rather than years.   At a time 
when many businesses in the digital world – MySpace might be typical 
– have very short life cycles the comparison with the many great 
brands that have survived so much longer is an area of great 
potential.  
 
The next Chapter explains the research philosophy and methodology 
which will be used for this thesis.    
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In this chapter we consider the ontology and epistemology along with 
the methodology that has been used. The use of case studies, the 
choice of case study and the analysis will be explained. Finally we look 
at potential issues of research quality and the limitations involved in 
the approach that has been used. 
 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
 
Gerring (2004, p.351) describes ontology as a vision of the world as it 
really is, a more or less coherent set of assumptions about how the 
world works. In this situation we start from the standpoint that 
networks do exist, and indeed, have always existed. Easton (1995) 
introduced the realism approach to the IMP studies mainly to support 
the use of case studies (e.g. Harrison & Easton, 1998) as well as the 
search for underlying mechanisms in networks (e.g. Harrison & 
Easton, 1999). This approach has become the pervasive ontological 
orientation of IMP researchers due to the pervasive belief in IMP work 
that reality is constructed based on the network bonds and activities 
ties between actors. The IMP approach assumes this realistic ontology, 
drawing on both subjective or objective orientations (Moller, 1994). 
Following this tradition this thesis also follows a realist ontology 
drawing on a belief in a subjective reality created by those actors 
operating within that reality. 
 
This realist ontology is understandable in an IMP tradition by 
researchers exploring the actors interpretations of realities (Easton, 
1995), or as we have termed in this thesis the “Network Pictures” 
(Ford et al., 2003). As such an IMP world view directs researcher to an 
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interpretivist epistemology where an understanding of a subjective 
reality can be exposed through comparing and contrasting multiple 
actors’ interpretations of their reality. It is accepted that the 
interpretive view can create problems in deciding how one 
interpretation is better than another (Easton, 2010). Historians argue 
that the past decides the future but the problem is that there are too 
many interpretations of the past. Researchers therefore try to identify 
areas of ambiguity and highlight them.  
 
This makes it logical for most case study researchers to work from an 
interpretive epistemology (Gall, et.al. 1966), in which understanding 
“the meaning of a process or experience constitutes the knowledge to 
be gained from an inductive, hypothesis- or theory-generating mode of 
inquiry, rather than a deductive, hypothesis- or theory-testing mode” 
(Merriam, 1998, p.34).   Merriam (1998, p.33) points out that a "Case 
study is a particularly suitable design if you are interested in process". 
It allows for detailed monitoring of the collaborative process (Merriam, 
1998) and it is suitable in this instance to look at the evolution and 
the dynamics of the networks.  
 
The approach addresses the challenges involved in studying processes 
that unfold over long time periods. The theoretical framework chosen 
to address the empirical phenomenon is rooted in the IMP approach 
(see e.g. Håkansson, Ford, Gadde, Snehota, & Waluszewski, 2009) 
working from the basic assumption of companies as interdependent 
and interacting with other companies.  
 
3.3 Using Historical Case studies 
 
Taking a subjective orientation in relation to methodology, the IMP 
approach relies on understanding industrial systems as complex 
networks of organisational relationships and to prepare and nurture 
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managers to integrate network thinking into their everyday practices. 
It traditionally adopts an inductive, interpretative and idiographic 
methodology. Deeply descriptive Case Studies and intensive use of 
secondary data as used in this dissertation are the predominant 
research methods.  
 
Yin’s view of a case study as an empirical enquiry suggests it is useful 
“when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (Yin, 1994, p.13).  Yin notes that case studies are 
especially good for answering the how and why questions related to 
events. Further case study research is used for a broad spectrum of 
purposes including the descriptive, exploratory, and explanatory. 
Descriptive case studies should not be used simply to describe 
everything: there is a need for careful selectivity to achieve the goals of 
the study.  So selectivity is a major issue because individual pictures 
will always be just that.   
 
Halinen and Törnroos (2005) distinguish four major challenges of case 
research for research on industrial networks which are further 
analysed in Aaboen et.al. (2012): these are network boundaries, 
complexity, time, and the problem of case comparison. It can be 
argued that every case study approach must offer ‘solutions’ to these 
problems. The problem of network boundaries exists because 
networks of connected relationships extend infinitely, which makes 
any network boundary arbitrary. The issue of complexity is associated 
with structure and embeddedness (Halinen and Törnroos, 2005), and 
to describing a network with all its actors and the complexities of the 
links between them. 
 
Time is always relevant because industrial networks are subject to 
constant change so valid descriptions of network processes require an 
incorporation of time. 
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The theoretical grounding of the industrial network approach has 
mainly been developed on the basis of a large number of in-depth 
single case studies permitting thorough description and analysis of 
network processes and structures (see e.g. Baraldi, 2003; Gressetvold, 
2004; Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2002; Holmen, 2001; Lind, 2006; 
Lundgren, 1995; Wedin, 2001). However the problem of case 
comparisons arises because each network case is unique and 
therefore it can be difficult to compare one case with another. 
 
The IMP approach is based upon the fact that dyadic relationships do 
not stand alone, and that each company, or actor, has multiple 
relationships. These are likely to progress in such a way that even if 
the focal company wished to stand still its position will alter as the 
other relationships in the network weaken and strengthen.  
Consequently the analysis of this “network” will be an interpretative 
view (Henders, 1992; Welch et. al., 2002).   Events, and with them 
relationships within a network, are difficult to predict and very 
dynamic. They are strongly dependent on context (Hagg & Johanson, 
1988).  Context has a number of aspects as there is the wider context 
of events outside the network as well as the context of the network 
itself to be considered. In this regard the explanation is most 
important in this dissertation. 
 
As well as being descriptive and explanatory the approach is 
qualitative. “The scientist practitioner who “grounds” his or her 
theories or models of organisational life in interpretative or 
experiential data is operating fundamentally within the qualitative 
paradigm.” (Brewerton and Millward, 2001, p.12)  After some years of 
argument it is now accepted that qualitative science is a sound means 
of generating knowledge. 
 
A case study is often justified by the fact that careful analysis can 
offer interesting insights. This approach accepts that businesses exist 
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as do the networks and relationships which create such networks and 
our questions looks at what causes the network outcomes observed in 
a variety of episodes each with somewhat different contexts. From this 
we answer our questions as to how the business networks evolve and 
whether this is a useful approach to examining a business or set of 
businesses over time. 
3.4 The Single Case Study 
 
George and Bennett (2005) note the increasing interested in using 
historical case studies and value the logic of historical explanation. 
Their argument is that the case study approach allows the detailed 
examination of an aspect of an historical episode to “develop or test 
historical explanations that may be generalisable to other events.” 
George and Bennett (2005, p.4). Single subject case studies involve 
the systematic evaluation of change in individual cases.   
 
A single case study approach enables a more in depth examination. 
The information it yields can be rich and enlightening and may 
provide new leads or raise questions that otherwise might never have 
been asked. George and Bennett (2005, p.9) support the view that 
case study methods add value particularly when used in the 
development of typological theories and are good at exploring many of 
these aspects of complex causality such as we expect to find within 
the networks.  This fits with the current growth in interest in 
modelling and assessing complex causal relations, such as path 
dependence, tipping points, and multiple interaction effects.   
 
It is in his study of the Clyde shipyards in the 19th century that 
Schwerin (2004) uses historic records to examine in detail the way 
relationships evolve. In doing so he identifies the potential value of re-
examining old records which are rich in narrative and points towards 




Texts on single industries or even companies help us understand 
network positions in ways not always easily picked up elsewhere. That 
is by examining both the social and the technical changes going on 
during the period.  In this dissertation some leather industries texts 
help to give context for the technical changes and help in the 
understanding of how sourcing and industry location in particular 
change with time. 
 
Dosi (1988) asserts that historical case studies of a business or even 
an industry are based on stories with empirical conclusions which 
mostly serve to highlight the highly individual situation of those 
companies and industries.  Nevertheless they provide a rich source of 
well-researched material. Every indication is that if we apply network 
theory to these we can throw light on how companies viewed and 
managed their position within the network when faced with major 
events such as political, economic, social and technical change, along 
with equally important areas such as generation change.   
 
3.5 Choice of Case Study 
 
Given that in order to obtain a true feel for the evolution of both 
innovation and the various network positions in which a company 
may find itself, a long study is required. To look at a business 
situation over many decades requires that we delve into history. 
 
It is necessary to find material which is complete, relevant and 
accessible. The time period, regional areas and companies looked at in 
detail chosen for this study offered the following criteria: 
  
1. - A period that allows study of a number of different types of events 
that will impact a business network in a variety of ways.  These 
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include technological, economic, political and social changes plus 
aspects of generational changes in management. 
2. - Adequate rich biographical documentation of the individual 
companies from which to deduce networks that are more than lists of 
companies with which they had financial transactions 
3. - Sufficient contextual material to be able to assess the impact on 
the ‘iterative business activity’ (Pearson and Richardson (2003)). 
 
It is recognised that the study of economic geography owes much of its 
academic origins to the work of Hoover (1937, 1948) on the New 
England leather and footwear industry. The development of this 
industry in the period of rapid US population growth, industrialisation 
and internationalisation is well recorded. The Booth Group of 
Liverpool and New York were a major element in the development of 
this industry and as well as good archival material being available the 
author has been given access to privately held company and family 
material which permits analysis of how the managers viewed their 
relationships with other actors in the networks. 
 
The industry case study used is based around the Liverpool leather 
company Booths and the global networks of which the company was a 
part.  Booths were in business in Liverpool as international traders 
from the late 18th century but in the 1860s entered a new business 
era. The business thrived until the mid 20th century but was taken 
over in the 1970’s and largely closed down over the subsequent two 
decades. Only very small parts have survived into the 21st century. 
 
The primary documents used were the founding partners’ letters. 
Some of these were available in their original format and some via 
family biographies and the company history. The founding partner of 
the Company was Charles Booth who was a prodigious writer and 
would regularly write to his wife and to his business partner. Charles 
Booth subsequently produced an influential survey into Life and 
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Labour in London (1886-1903). As a result of the fame he achieved 
from this his wife donated his letters and papers to the University of 
London on his death and this archive is now fully accessible at the 
LSE.  His great grand children, other family members and many of the 
later employees of the company hold other material which was made 
available. Other family papers are held in the University Library at 
Liverpool University although refurbishment at that location has 
meant that only very limited use has been made of these and full 
examination must await a later date. 
 
The partners’ letters were extensive: “When Alfred Booth and 
Company was founded, long letters were written by the two brothers 
almost every day. In the tradition of mercantile correspondence, they 
contained not only business matters, comments on contemporaries 
and customers, but also long statements on political events in 
England and America” (John, 1959, p. 47). Other materials included 
company newsletters which partially replaced the partners’ letters 
when the company grew in size. 
 
In addition there were available: 
a. Company papers 
b. Trade Press reports 
c. National and local press from the period 
d. Papers from other companies in the sector 
e. Academic studies covering the industry of the time 
f. Private family papers and interviews with current family members 
 
The period examined runs from 1860 through to 1930, with some 
limited examination of the earlier years to provide background.   
 
During the 19th and early 20th century it was quite common for the 
owners to mark a key moment, perhaps a significant anniversary or 
the opening of a new Headquarters by the commissioning of a 
  
 57 
company history. John (1959) on the Booth Group and some of the 
books on Quaker businesses (e.g. Matthews and Tuke, 1926) fall into 
this category.  These books are often written by journalists or 
historians and are well researched, having access to the papers and 
comments of senior and knowledgeable family and company members. 
These texts can provide rich material that is a mix of narrative and 
analysis helpful in explaining management thinking at the time.  
These comments aid the assessment of the positions the company 
held within the network and the importance with which the company 
viewed some of its relationships. John (1959) has been used 
extensively in this dissertation, illuminated with notes on discussion 
with the last Managing Director of the Booth Group and advice from 
the current Booth family members. 
 
Contextual material and data for additional associated episodes come 
from an examination of the United States Leather Company and 
selected areas of the more traditional British Leather Industry.  The 
UK trade press and the US local and national press reported the 
industry extensively during the period and where accessible these 
records have been used. 
 
The company was involved in some of the most significant technical 
developments in the history of the leather industry, evolving from a 
trading only business to become one of the largest tanning groups in 
the world, and extending its reach to Africa, Latin America and Asia in 
the search of raw materials. The business started as a partnership 
with an American and then became wholly owned by the Booths 
moving through a number of iterations before, more than one hundred 
years on, becoming a publicly traded company on the London Stock 
exchange, still managed by the family. A number of areas about the 
company are well documented.  Its roll in New York was significant 
and brought them into well documented contact with the other 
tanners in the city who were mostly rich and famous families. As a 
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consequence it is possible to put the Booth Company in context with a 
number of these families through writings of the period.   
 
Many of the tanneries owned by old established New York families 
were put together in 1893 to form the largest joint stock company in 
the US and one of the DOW Jones Industrial Average twelve founding 
companies in 19966.  The United States Leather Company, 
incorporating some 80 tanning companies is fully documented in 
primary and secondary sources. This development had significant 
impact throughout the industry. 
 
The leather industry has always been important in war, and until 
modern transportation this was for horse furniture and saddlery as 
much as for boots and gloves.  Since one of the Booths was appointed 
Deputy Director General of Munitions Supply in the Great War the 
impact of War on the leather industry was in some ways increased.  
The sinking of the Lusitania was caused when information was leaked 
that a cargo of Booth sheepskins were really armaments. Some senior 
Booth staff died on the Lusitania.  Again this has created a large 
amount of primary and secondary material. 
 
The period of detailed study runs from the death of elder Charles 
Booth (father of the founder Charles and his brother Alfred) in 1860 
until 1930 when the company had steadied and started to grow after 
the First World War. The death of their father the elder Charles Booth 
provoked the sons into a start up in leather in 1860 and then a move 
into shipping in 1864.  The takeover of Kent and Stevens Tannery in 
1978 marked a major change in the structure of the group and the 
start of a period of technical innovation in the leather trade that was 
to run until the mid 1890s by which time they would have the most 
significant kid leather tannery in the world using an entirely novel 
process. From 1895 until 1930 we see the transfer of the business 
                                                 
6
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into the next generation, the death of the two founding brothers and 
the globalisation of the business under the hands of the new senior 




To assist in identifying the various events during this period a timeline 
has been developed to cover this period. Time lines can form useful 
scaffolding in the research process in terms of interrelating complex 
trends and networking activities. The timeline is built up from family, 
company, industry and other data including economic and political 
information.  There is a holistic element here, in line with what is 
described as “total history” which evolved in the Annales School in 
France in the early 20th century (Burke, 1990).  From this we can 
develop a listing of sequential observations of the network and look at 
interactivity by picking out instances and examples in time.   
 
According to Weick (1995, p.128) “sequence is the source of sense” 
when discussing storytelling and there is a heavy element of story 
gathering from the sources mentioned.  
 
Easton (2004) notes that net social capital resides within the actors in 
the network, and being diffused across the network can be called 
upon by any member as required.  The timeline is used to look for this 
at how resources and social capital are shared over time, to help 
ensure that the context is as clear as possible, the sequence of events 
is correct and in particular to help identify episodes which might 
usefully be interrogated in more detail. Being thorough with regard to 
context is a major recommendation of Araujo and Easton (2012). 
 
One of the major concerns (Brewerton and Millward, 2001) is for 
authenticity and completeness.  The use of partners’ letters as a rich 
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source of material from which to recreate network pictures recreates 
the approach of Schwerin (2004) and the additional papers provide 
context and meaning to events.   
 
Amongst these is Hoover’s (1937) study of the economic geography of 
the leather and footwear industry of New England which is considered 
as founding that discipline and covers the period when Booths were at 
their height in the region. In addition to Hoover’s work is the library of 
historic documents covering the period about which he writes.  There 
are a wide variety of such documents, especially for the New England 
area where there has been some enthusiasm to retain historic records.  
Some documents cover individual companies, some individual 
factories and some cover the history of an industry, with many being 
supported by original documentation held in public libraries or private 
collections.  Many such documents are used to provide the contextual 
background in Chapter 5. 
 
The analysis of the case study provides a detailed description of the 
case and its setting (Cresswell, 1998).  The material is broken into 
four main segments covering the  
1. Starting period of the company,  
2. The subsequent start of the shipping line,  
3. The major period of transformation and growth of the business,  
4. The later years.   
 
The two start-up periods involve considerable amounts of network 
activity as the company identifies partners. This intense networking is 
well documented and the analysis allows consideration of the long 
term implications of the relationships developed. In both instances the 
company is establishing itself as a new business within existing 
networks and these two episodes are preliminaries for the main 




The third period includes the two areas of the growth of the firm and 
the reaction to major innovations, while the final element covers the 
transfer of the business between generations and its continued 
expansion into new area. By separating the episodes in this way we 
can interrogate individual phenomena using the methodology chosen 
as well as see the bigger long term picture. 
 
Additional material on the industry at the time in particular the one 
other very large tanning company, The United States Leather 
Company, is provided to aid with the area of industry context. This is 
presented as a short case study being more anecdotal and written by 
Dewing (1911) and Donham (1930) with additional associated material 
from Norcross (1901) and Watson (1950). 
  
Each episode is analysed in detail.   
 
This is done incorporating the A-R-A model with the aid of the drawing 
of network pictures which are used as a tool to envisage how 
individual actors may have viewed their network position. This 
picturing of a single business and surrounding leather network over 
the period is used to assist in interpreting the dynamics of the 
business as well as the development of the overall network. The 
network pictures help to trace longitudinally the development of the 
“whole” network, and to relate network pictures to the study of 
evolution and dynamics in business networks.   
               
The caution which is required when drawing network pictures is 
highlighted in Pearson and Richardson (2001) who use a network 
approach to look as matters around the time of the Industrial 
Revolution.   
 
In the exchange following a negative response from Wilson and Popp 
(2003) argues that there is an over-dependence on drawing networks 
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using only formal company documents and risking missing the impact 
of non transactional relationships and other matters at the periphery 
of the network.   “…It seems clear that these sets of people have been 
identified as networks a priori, rather than as a result of any analysis 
of ‘iterative’ business processes unfolding over historical time. 
Networks thus identified must inevitably seem rather more bounded 
than permeable and more static than dynamic.” A riposte from the 
original authors (Pearson and Richardson, 2003) redressed the 
balance agreeing on the approach needed to develop meaningful 
network pictures. “We did not deduce networks from stock companies’ 
by-laws but gleaned evidence of ‘network linkages’ from biographical 
documentation of the individual company directors.” Effectively they 
made use of company correspondence, diaries and other rich material 
such as internal company newsletters in order to build estimations of 
the network pictures management was building as they took 
decisions. 
 
Schwerin (2004) analyses the dynamics of innovation and institutional 
change in Clyde shipbuilding. During the nineteenth century 
shipbuilding transformed into a modern high-tech industry, driven by 
emerging innovation systems in regions such as the Clyde. His paper, 
based on newly evaluated archive materials, identifies several 
overlapping channels of information exchange within the shipbuilders' 
network. From a dynamic perspective, it discloses changes in the 
pattern of individual and organizational behaviour. Moreover, it 
establishes the importance of ‘correctly’ mixing formal and informal 
institutions in an analysis and describes the link between these 
institutions and the geographical size and evolution of the innovation 
system. 
 
Schwerin (2004) uses the extensive letters and papers of the main 
business leaders and the minutes of their meetings on product 
development with other bodies such as the University to get beyond 
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the transactional linkages and look at the other interactions in the 
network.  The approach of Schwerin, largely adopted in this 
dissertation, using the much more wide ranging information from the 
correspondence and diaries of key actors should avoid any danger of 
creating network pictures which are too bounded and should give 
insights which offer transferability to other situations.   
 
The Three Network Paradoxes and the 6Cs are used to look at 
relationships within networks and allow some discovery of inflections 
or changes which otherwise might be missed. The analysis also uses 
the inherent paradoxes of networks (Håkansson and Ford 2002; Ford 
et. al. 2003, p 184) and it relates this evolution to current and 
emerging ideas on the dynamics of business networks, including the 
‘Model of Management in Networks’ (Ford et. al., 2003).  The first 
paradox essentially relates to working with existing relationships, the 
second with the management of the current position and the third 
with strategies about how to network. (Corsaro et. al., 2011) 
 
Useful in examining interactions and the dynamics of what is 
happening within the networks are the four aspects of networking: 






As well as an individual examination of each period a separate 
analysis is undertaken of innovation throughout the time period of the 
case study allowing a full examination of the many steps involved. 
 
It is the importance of observation over a long period of time which is 
central to this research paper. It is difficult to delimit events in time, 
and to be able to define a beginning and an end. The long term case 
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study is intended to help us with this as well as to examine the 
consequences of subjective interpretation and the way these flow 
through jointness, inter-dependencies and relativity within the 
network.   The time period is sufficient to observe a large number of 
different economic, technical, political and social episodes. These 
involve such events as the price of gold and currencies, a number of 
new technologies, expanding raw material supplies, and war.   Each of 
the actors felt the changes and takes a view of their implications and 
how they consider other actors will view them.   So in part we are 
looking at the inter-connection between the network pictures and the 
events in the greater world.  Certain types of events bring some groups 
of actors closer together while some make them move apart.  In some 
instances they come together to fight for certain benefits or 
protections while in others they may choose a joint venture or major 
process adaptation.  This may be the result of a need for resources 
such as time, money, personnel or technologies. 
 
3.7 Addressing Research Quality 
 
Although a very long term case study and a historical one this study 
involves many of the problems found in more contemporary studies.  
What to include and what not to include; difference in interpretation 
between researcher and actor; and recognising that the identity of the 
unit of analysis is itself subject to evolution all create potential issues.  
 
By placing the detailed information from the letters and other 
qualitative material in the context of wider, well documented events, 
and examining them rigorously using the tools described errors in the 
interpretation can be diminished, if not fully eliminated.  The analysis 
and insights developed can be views as trustworthy and transferable. 
 
Some of the difficulties with studies of this sort relate to geography.   
Schwerin (2004) does cover the relationships the shipbuilders hold 
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with the Ministry of Defence, and with technological and competitor 
developments elsewhere, but his study is essentially one of the Clyde 
Valley. Pearson and Richardson are studying insurance in selected 
towns in the north of England.  Their “networks” display many 
elements of what we would describe as “network theory” but more of 
“local area clusters”.  In the opinion of Gordon and McCann (2000, 
2003) many of these local “networks” are communities which benefit 
more from agglomeration effects of being in one locality and are not 
really specialist sector related networks.   
 
While this case study is not compromised by being geographically 
bounded it is limited by being essentially restricted to one industry, 
which will mean that comparison with other industries will have to be 
made with care. 
 
Amongst the wide range of sources the letters and papers held in 
Liverpool University Library form an important element. This library 
was undergoing a major refurbishment during the period of data 
collection and as a consequence not all the papers read were fully 
referenced and this is apparent in both chapters 4 and 6. It also 
means that for references in these chapters a greater reliance has 
been made of John (1959) to provide references for these papers.  
 
 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
This dissertation is an interpretive study based on a single case study.  
A long term case study is required to achieve the research objectives.   
 
The case chosen offers sufficient material of a quality to analyse the 
evolution of the business in relationship to a wide variety of actors in 
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many networks, in areas and during times that new technologies both 
incremental and disruptive were making their impact on events. 
 
The dissertation is based on the letters written by Charles and Alfred 
Booth the founders and partners of Booth and Company. In many 
instances the actual letters are available and in others they are 
heavily quoted in the company history (John 1959) and books 
published by Mary Booth (1918) and Duncan Crow (1965). Other 
contemporary material from company records, the trade and national 
press and industry sources are also used to ensure reliability. A large 
amount of contemporary material is now available, particularly in the 
USA, which allows the examination of the position of many actors in 
the leather network.  
   
This approach using the much more wide ranging information from 
the correspondence and diaries of key actors should avoid any danger 
of creating network pictures which are too bounded and should give 





4.0 Booth and Company from 1860 to 1920 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This section examines in details the periods of development of Booth 
and Company. We start with a preamble which explains how the 
founding brothers were integrated into pre-existing family networks 
which provided resources and linkages into a number of business 
areas. Four further episodes are discussed; covering the founding of 
the leather business in 1860 and its early years until 1865, the 
founding of the shipping business in 1864 and its early years, the 
period of leather innovation from 1878 and the consolidation and 
globalisation of the business from 1890 onwards. The first two 
episodes covering the starting of the leather and then the shipping 
business are laid out by way of scene setters for the final two episodes 
although they both highlight the importance of social and negotiated 
networks in building an international business at the time. 
 
Each episode is followed by a discussion and analysis examining the 
network evolution and the dynamics involved in terms of subjective 
interpretation, relativity, interdependence and jointness. 
 
The long term case study is intended to aid in assessing elements 
which take a long time to develop and a final section of discussion is 
added to cover innovation and technology. 
4.2 Preamble 
 
The foundations of the Booth Group go back into the last decades of 
the 18th century. Thomas Booth left the family farm near Warrington 
when he was eighteen years old and in less than ten years had 
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established himself as a successful Liverpool corn merchant.7  By 
1789 he was representing the Liverpool corn merchants at the Board 
of Trade. As was normal at the time with corn merchants he owned 
and ran a number of ships to carry grain along the coast and 
overseas.  Their largest ship was the “Esther” which in 1798 was 
registered with Lloyds as being of 210 tons and carrying six guns.  It 
was used to trade in the Baltic. 
 
In 1829 Charles Booth, his third son, along with his brother Thomas 
took over the grain business while their other brothers all did well in 
public life, James with the Board of Trade and two Henrys in the 
steam railway business as inventors, engineers, managers and 
commentators. 
 
At this time society split into the Nonconformist families and the 
Whig, Anglican families. The more radical group of Nonconformists 
was the Unitarians who were increasingly important in the UK during 
the late 1820s and through the 1830s. The Booths had left the old 
Presbyterian Church in the late 18th century and moved to the 
Unitarians and Thomas and George Booth were founder members of 
the Renshaw Street Chapel in Liverpool in 1811. 
 
Contemporary papers talk of the families lined up in their carriages in 
Renshaw Street outside the Chapel after Sunday services.  “A long line 
of carriage-and-pairs awaiting the exit from the Chapel of Rathbones, 
Holts, Brunners, Tates, Jones, Thornleys, Mellys, Hollands and Gairs, 
their stately locomotion to and from Chapel on a Sunday morning 
being then one of the sights of Liverpool”.8 It was usual for there to be 
inter-marriage between the different Chapel families and this 
happened with the Booths. The most relevant relationship in this 
                                                 
7
 Norman-Butler 1972, p30 
8
 Jacks, 1942, p141 
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regard was the marriage of their daughter Anna to Philip Holt who 
founded the Holt shipping line, the Ocean Shipping Company. 
4.3 Episode 1: Starting in the leather industry 1860-1865 
 
While the company itself began in 1860 one might say that this 
dissertation effectively begins in the 1850s’ sitting room of the Booth 
family home in Liverpool where the senior Booths, their elder children 
including Alfred, and members of the Holt and Lamport families 
gathered to discuss the future. The Booths had realized that their 
business as corn merchants was no longer likely to bring in 
reasonable profit. Like other medium sized grain merchants they had 
suffered considerably from the depression caused by the long fall in 
prices after the Napoleonic War9 and by the tax on grain applied to 
pay off the post war national debt.  They had already sold their ships. 
In discussion with the extended family they decided to educate their 
two sons Charles and Alfred in international trading and shipping, 
using family friends in their tightly knit nonconformist, Unitarian 
society to place them in suitable positions. The business of corn would 
be terminated. 
 
Alfred was born in 1834 and educated at the Liverpool Mechanics 
Institute and then at Edgbaston Proprietary School.  His brother 
Charles was born on the 30th of March 1840. Charles Booth is most 
famous today for his philanthropic work in London and he was the 
driving force behind the introduction of the universal old age pension 
in January 1908. He was honoured for the latter by the House of 
Commons in 1909: “to you more than any man this first installment 
to the aged is due.”10 Both were the sons of Charles Booth and Emily 
Fletcher. Charles Booth had married Emily in 1829 and she was the 
daughter of a West Indian merchant who was also a Unitarian 
philanthropist.   
                                                 
9
 John, 1959 p.22 
10




Charles went to the Royal Institution School in Liverpool, 
undistinguished other than in arithmetic and then was trained at 
Lamport and Holt's merchant house starting at the age of sixteen. 
Alfred had been apprenticed to Lamport and Holt in 1850 and this 
was the moment when the family started on the journey that was to 
build the skills and access to the resources needed for them to enter 
the leather industry a decade later. Mr Lamport, a senior partner, was 
second cousin to their father and Lamport and Holt did a lot of work 
in the Mediterranean. During the 1950s he was beginning to replace 
sailing ships with steam. 
 
In 1857 Alfred, aged 23, finished his apprenticeship with Holts and 
went to New York to work temporarily in the New York office of 
Rathbone and Company.  Rathbone was one of the biggest Liverpool 
Trading companies and had offices throughout the world, including 
places like Shanghai and Canton. The two managers of Rathbones in 
New York were also members of the Renshaw Street Chapel and one of 
them, William Lidderdale was later to become Governor of the Bank of 
England and to deal successfully with the first Baring crisis in 1890. 
The idea was that Alfred would spend two years there deciding on his 
future. We know he turned down one good job offer with Thornleys the 
cotton trading business before agreeing a one year extension with 
Rathbones.   
 
We do not know how involved Charles and Alfred were in the decisions 
being made about their own futures back around 1850. Looking back 
the activities Charles undertook later in life suggest he may have 
preferred an alternate career, such as becoming an academic. Yet 
there is no indication in any correspondence that suggests other than 
full support for the decisions made about their early training. If 
anything what we do know indicates that the discussions were open 
and frank. We are also relatively certain that this was not a male only 
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environment of discussion but that the wives and daughters were 
important contributors.  
 
By the time Alfred went to New York his brother Charles had also 
followed him into Lamport and Holt where he had soon “taken to office 
work uncommonly well” according to his father’s letters. During his 
extended year with Rathbones Alfred started to plan setting up in 
business independently although matters were upset by the 
unexpected death of his father in 1860. 
  
The elder Charles Booth (1799-1860) died in the February of that year 
and it was time for the two sons to make their own way in business.  
On his death elder Charles Booth left legacies to the children Anna, 
Alfred, Charles, Emily, and Thomas Booth which are most accurately 
put at £14,000, although some reports place them as up to £20,000 
for each child.   It may be that the £14,000 was an extra amount put 
aside to fund the new business.  The outcome was that later in 1860 
Alfred set up the Booth Company as a joint venture in New York with 
an office in 57 Broad Street, New York. 
 
What Alfred Booth established was a business that based primarily 
around importing English light leather (skins from sheep and goat 
rather than hides from cattle) into the USA.  The office was not placed 
in the traditional tanning area in New York (the Swamp) but nearer 
the docks in 57 Broad Street where they also rented a showroom. The 
initial office was in a basement due to the high cost of rents and the 
basement tradition was largely to remain with Booths in the USA until 
the 1980s. 
 
The family papers indicate that the leather industry was chosen as it 
offered good growth but slipped below the radar of the major trading 
houses. To assist entering a market in which they had no obvious 
previous expertise that we are aware of they chose a local partner in 
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the USA. This was a local leather expert Mr Charles Walden about 
whom we know very little. The business was called Walden & Booth 
and quickly became an established part of the New York Leather 
industry. 
 
The plan was to “establish a merchant house primarily for the import 
of English light leather into the USA.”11 Additionally an agency for 
Alfred and Philip Holt was taken on to help with cash flow and 
perhaps their location nearer the docks is explained by the work for 
this shipping company whose steamers traded between New York, 
Liverpool and the West Indies. 
 
The move was actually quite rushed after the death of Charles. Alfred, 
then 26, had indicated in his letters that he did not want to stay in 
New York and in turning down the offer of a partnership in cotton 
broking agreed only to stay an extra year with Rathbones. The idea 
was that Walden would do most of the US work while Alfred would set 
up things in Liverpool and move back and forward.  As it happened 
after the death of his father in 1860 Alfred spent even more time in 
the UK than was expected sorting out family affairs.  
 
Charles had gone off on a personal tour of Turkey and the Middle East 
in September 1860 and went to New York late in 1862. It was then 
that they discovered that Walden was becoming ill. In January 1863 
Walden’s health deteriorated and he was confined to a sanatorium. 
The two brothers had to move forward on their own and they decided 
this would be their careers.  The business became known as Alfred 
Booth and Company Liverpool and Booth and Company, New York. An 
office was opened in 5 India Buildings, Liverpool.   
 
The new business was also impacted by the start of the American Civil 
War which ran from 1861 to 1865. Unlike most Liverpool city 
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merchants both Alfred and Charles preferred the North and opposed 
the support given by Europe, including the city of Liverpool, to the 
1863 Confederate Loan. William Rathbone also wrote at the time that 
the support of the loan by the UK (along with France and the 
Netherlands) was “a disgrace to this country.” 
 
The leather business for Booths was initially a commission business 
dealing principally in skins and leather. It is said that the energy and 
enthusiasm which Charles brought to the business quickly led him to 
become the leading figure in the partnership, although the name of 
the firm remained as Alfred Booth and Company. It was during these 
years that he developed the foundations of his business methods, 
reflections of which would be later observed in his approach to social 
investigation. 
 
In 1863 they were working with capital of £14000 plus credit facilities 
offered by Alfred and Philip Holt, Rathbone and Company and 
Lamport and Holt, and buying skins from the UK worth £2500 a 
month.  
 
Two types of leather were initially imported. One was vegetable 
(sumac) tanned sheepskins primarily for the footwear industry. These 
were used in shoe uppers where they were thinner and more supple 
than cattle hide leather although less durable. They also imported 
what they called “splits” or the grain upper parts of sheepskins in the 
pickle stage.  Today these are called skivers or chamois grains and the 
bottom part of the skin is retained to be tanned with cod oil into 
chamois leather.  These pickled grains were not tanned but de-woolled 
and split before being preserved in acid and salt, which kept them in 
good condition indefinitely.  The grain or upper part was to be made 
into gloves and handbags although for gloves it was certainly not the 




We do not know how the Booths went about looking for UK suppliers 
but they quickly built relationships with tanners in Bermondsey for 
sumac leather and for the split grains they used three companies: 
1. Turneys in Trent Bridge, Nottingham 
2. Boots of Leicester 
3. Johnstone in Bootle 
 
Tanners to this day discuss the “problem of the hundred skins” 
meaning that within every batch of leather there are to be found 
grades which are hard to sell.  With their limited experience each of 
the early shipments led to some difficult stock being left on the 
shelves in New York. 
 
As a consequence the brothers worried that the business of leather 
was not going to suffice and also looked in other directions. They 
spent £700 buying into the Weed Sewing Machine Company in the 
US. They tried unsuccessfully to sell this machinery into the UK but 
gave up in 1864.  They also did some foodstuffs trading between 1862 
and 1864 but then discovered it had yielded a net loss of £185. In 
1864 Holts sold their West Indian Line to the West Indian and Pacific 
Steamship Company and Booths lost this agency business. This jolt 
appears to have returned the focus to leather. 
 
Learning about leather was complex and Charles wrote in a letter to 
his brother “I was never able to tell whether the skins were right or 
not and Turney could always shut me up” and Alfred replied “shall we 
go and try our fortunes in the Antipodes or join Robert Crompton 
sheep farming in La Plata?”12 Charles indicated that he had never 
imagined they would have had to lose money to gain experience but 
was determined to sharpen his focus and carry on. 
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His papers indicate that “after an early shock at the real cost in 
capital terms that gaining experience in the business has 
demanded”,13 Charles Booth instigated the practice of system and 
order in the handling of the firm's affairs and took it upon himself to 
master the details of the trade.  He visited tanneries, inspected 
cargoes of skins, and gathered volumes of information summarised 
into facts and figures. Associates sometimes balked at the quantities 
of detail he required from them, but the habit clearly served him well 
and the business prospered. (Booth Online Archives) 
 
“We must put an end to this sloppy brotherly way of doing business or 
we shall pay dearly for it. The lazy impulse not to think how a thing 
will be, but to leave everything to the other won’t do”14 Charles wrote 
to in 1866. John (1959, p.30) considered that Charles liked to follow a 
technique in “the conduct of affairs” that involved the analysis of 
broad trends, as “shown by statistical evidence and the creation of an 
organization by which the emerging pattern of wants could be met.” 
 
Fortunately 1865 was a good year for the Booth sheep business and 
they made a solid profit. Some of the companies whose goods they 
sold in the US worked on a consignment basis so Booth took their fees 
and commissions but did not finance the goods. The brothers decided 
to approach all their UK clients to see if they would agree a similar 
arrangement.  All did so and most pleasing was the support from 
Turneys of Trent Bridge Nottingham who had become their most 
important supplier. The deal made was to advance five-sixths of the 
cost of the invoice value, by the acceptance of a three or four month 
bill of exchange, and to charge a commission of 5% in addition to the 
costs involved in transport.15  
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In this five year period we see the Booths working in a number of 
networks. Their family and chapel network brought them into contact 
with the overlapping networks of banking, shipping and trading. 
Through the work in the US Alfred made links in to the US leather 
business and having defined their needs he made contacts with a 
group of suppliers from the UK. Many new relationships were 
developed very quickly and trusted businesses with known resources 
structured into the relationship to reduce uncertainty in many areas. 
While both the UK and the USA had existing leather networks that 
inter-reacted fairly well it was the Booths who brought the two 
together, using the skills and resources from their training and other 
relationships to create a transatlantic network.    
 
4.4 Consideration of Episode 1. 
 
A new business does not start with a blank sheet.  In the same way 
that networks pre-exist any single new entry (Ritter, 2000; Ritter and 
Gemunden, 2003), so each new entry brings with it its own history.  
Thus an actor can hardly ever be said to “enter” a network completely 
from the outside.  Thus the Booth family used an existing relationship 
to apprentice Charles to a Liverpool trading house where they learned 
about trading and shipping and Alfred took a temporary post in the 
New York office of the well-known Liverpool merchant house, 
Rathbone and Company.  In doing this the brothers would have been 
building up a picture of the networks in which they were interacting 
and assessing the actors and the technologies involved.  Having 
revised and extended their “network pictures” they would then be 
estimating both how easy it would be to move into the network as a 
new member and what would be involved in “networking” within it. 
 
Their first moves would have been delicate.  As employees and ex-
employees they were already actors in the networks and would have 
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had to decide how to manoeuvre into the business areas of others 
without provoking retaliation.  The company documentation indicates 
a decision to set up in the same business, but in a non-
confrontational way.  Their existing network was already both 
empowering and restricting their new business, in line with the first 
network paradox, (Håkansson and Ford 2002). 
 
The Booths established many new relationships in the business start-
up phase.  These then became part of an organisational structure 
covering each of the two areas of manufacturing and trading and 
uniquely, when the two were combined.   In its first fifty years the 
company never lost its strong Liverpool roots and “Chapel Culture”.  
The very large number of relationships which had a similar origin 
made between actors who held shared beliefs, common backgrounds 
and of course, religion, had a very strong influence on the evolution of 
the network and the type of actor-bonds that were developed. 
 
It is apparent that companies work in more than one network and 
that to analyse them it is necessary to look beyond just a simple 
“leather industry” or “shipping network”. Also the dual dimension of 
networks in terms of the hard economic/technical and 
softer/organizational sides is clearly highlighted throughout this first 
period of the Booth evolution.  
 
Subjective Interpretation 
The best overall window we have on events come from the partners’ 
letters but as the business started we have to rely more on the views 
given by those looking back on events and other formal documents. 
The most apparent element in the early days of the company was the 
way in which the discussions mixed a global big picture with fine 
detail.  In this we see a high degree of social context and what might 
be termed as norms of conduct in the way the Liverpool business and 
the Chapel communities interacted and communicated.  This would 
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have considerable impact on both the brothers’ views of the future 
and their specific expectations of how other actors would react when 
they began to be active in the leather trade networks.  
 
The context here is important as it is clear that at the period Liverpool 
was a centre for global shipping and trade. For many business people 
the links to New York were much stronger than those to London where 
the railway had only just started to become an option for faster and 
safer travel. Also working as a commissioned agent was a quite 
common area for those involved in industry and commerce at that 
time. So having taken the decision to start up in business 
independently and being further spurred into action by their father’s 
death they were able to mix many of the linkages offered by their 
friends and relationships with quite a global view.  In this the brothers 
were able to build a view of multiple contexts that would surround the 
interaction taking place – the UK leather network, the US leather 
network and the transatlantic shipping and trading networks.  
 
The brothers were greatly impacted by ongoing trade events in and 
around Liverpool and that there would have been considerable 
reinforcement in terms of their experience and knowledge from their 
training as well as discussions with family and friends.  
 
They also were able to assess their position and options via making 
use of the great social capital (Easton, 2004; Ogilvie, 2004) held within 
their extended social circle. They were able to interact with groups and 
individuals within this circle to decide on the companies that they 
should start to build relationships and would offer the resources they 
would need access to.  
 
Relativity 
It is in the area of relativity that much can be learned about the 
Booths.  Very early on we see them with ties into global shipping, 
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banking and international trading. Many of these were family ties and 
others came via the family relationships at the Liverpool Chapel.  
These ties, however loose, remained intact throughout the period and 
were used quite extensively. 
 
All these links meant that the brothers had many choices to make. 
They could have stayed in employment rather than starting a new 
business. They could have started a wide variety of trading 
businesses.  They could have chosen trading or shipping rather than 
trying to combine both.  At the inception of the business they had 
quite a lot of money to start with and many choices.  
 
As they moved forward and started to interact within the UK and the 
US leather networks there would be interactions within the existing 
networks. We do not have records of these but can note that the most 
successful relationship in leather developed initially was with Turneys 
in Nottingham which was itself a new company just entering the 
leather industry. Initially the trade with the more established industry 
in London was very limited and no major relationships with Booths 
are recorded there.  Relatedness defines capabilities and it was only 
with the first few relationships in the UK that the Booths had 
anything to trade into the US. 
 
In the US the leather network entry was via Walden about whom little 
is known.  Yet we do know that New York was the primary centre for 
leather matters in the US at that time with Gloversville and Boston 
closely linked to it so it can be fairly surmised that Walden was 







The decisions to start first a leather business and then a shipping 
business were made.  With the establishment of business operations a 
number of clear dependencies came into being. These included: 
a. The three tanners in the UK who supplied the raw material 
b. Charles Walden in the US who became their partner and link to the 
US market 
c. Alfred & Philip Holt for shipping fees income in New York 
d. Rathbone, Lamport & Holt and Alfred & Philip Holt for providing 
credit to the business in the early years 
 
Unfortunately we cannot gauge how dependent Charles Walden was 
on Booths for his livelihood. For the other three sets of relationships it 
is clear that Booths relied on their partners much more at the start of 
the business than the partners did on them. The Holts and the 
Rathbones had sound profitable operations and did not need the 
Booths. On the other hand it would appear that the Booths were both 
intelligent and likeable and so quite likely to succeed. Helping them 
could perhaps be construed as low risk with useful long term 
potential. These relationships defined the capabilities of the Booths 
and constrain the use and development of the actor’s resources. For 
example the UK tanners were all new  
 
While hides, skins and leather looked to be a valid venture to enter it 
was very much a minority trade between the UK and the US at the 
time so such a move would not be seen as a threat to the activities of 
the Rathbones and others whose support the family would wish to 
keep. It does appear that a lot of extended discussion took place in 
coming to find a market place which offered opportunity without 
threatening other relationships.  
 
Looking at this in terms of the three aspects of networking is 
instructive as we see that at the start of the business they take 
choices that incline to conform with the suggestions and positions of 
  
 81 
their future partners and in going about the networking process 
choose the more passive routes.  
 
There role at this stage is best described as creating their position in 
the network and they largely conformed with the positions their 
chosen partners wished and conceded to their wishes as to how 
matters came together. 
 
Later in this early period they see that the relationships become 
stronger in business terms they become more equal partners and their 
contribution is recognized. This is most evident when they wished to 
change the financing terms for their UK suppliers.  In this instance 
they chose to both confront and to a degree coerce the adaptations out 
of their partners, albeit they managed to do so without causing any 
serious upset in the relationships in so doing.  
 
They also had to make many choices when the West Indian shipping 
route was taken from them, when the Weed Sewing Machine 
Company, and when they experimented with shipping other materials. 
In each case they chose to consolidate and simplify matters rather 
than to look to create alternate relationships to continue these other 
ventures.   
 
Jointness 
In the early years there were activity links with all the parties 
mentioned, and all parties provided resources that the business 
needed. Walden offered market knowledge and contacts, the UK 
tanners provided the material and a lot of technical advice about that 
material, and A&P Holt linked helped them set up the management of 
the West Indian Shipping agency.  
 
Looking at these facts it is useful to consider the process of 
“networking” that was actually occurring. By the late 1850s both 
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brothers had been groomed in international trade and the information 
we have is that both were good at it and had done well. Associated 
with this was the fact that in the middle of the nineteenth century the 
commission agent was viewed as one of the most important 
individuals in foreign trade in the UK and the US. According to John 
(1959, p 39) “to create a successful commission business was the aim 
of ambitious young men in trade”.  With his years of living amongst 
the wealthy and influential traders and bankers in New York Alfred 
had built up exceptional contacts.  As a result the brothers would 
have felt certain that they had skills and resources to be successful in 
a trading venture and that they had advice close at hand for any 
surprises that may arise. 
 
While the choice of the leather industry may appear curious it was 
classed at that time as the third largest in the US (when employment 
and output from the leather using industries such as footwear, 
saddlery and clothing were added in). The Swamp area next to Wall 
Street was famous for its leather concentration as were its many 
wealthy tanners with whom Alfred no doubt socialized. Given that 
Alfred was in New York for three years before starting the business it 
is quite certain that he would have had both time and the opportunity 
to get to know the business and build relationships with a number of 
important players. 
 
It is clear that he was aware that opportunities existed for imported 
material to meet the rapidly growing domestic for all types of leather. 
The Eastern USA did not have the raw material supply to meet that 
growing demand. He would also have been aware of the potential to 
trade the skins into Gloversville in Fulton County in up-state New 
York which was an important centre for glove making, and into 
Massachusetts where Boston was at the centre of a cluster of growing 




Alfred used the American named Walden to develop and extend his 
contacts in the leather industry, and no doubt to help specify what 
they needed from the UK.  The company shared their names until 
Walden became ill in 1863. We do not know how successfully they 
worked together although the heated arguments with the UK suppliers 
that subsequently arose over quality would likely indicate that Walden 
was a trader rather than a tanner with technical knowledge. What he 
brought to the table was a good knowledge of local requirements and 
customers. 
 
During this period we see the brothers developing relationships and 
assessing their available resources in terms of  
- international finance and trading 
- transatlantic shipping logistics 
- the US leather industry, its locations and requirements 
- searching for suppliers in the UK, based on no technical 
knowledge and limited understandings of the precise market 
needs.   
 
UK leather had been exported routinely to the US since the first days 
of settlement in the 17th century but a requirement for part processed 
material rather than finished leather required a big adjustment.  
 
Jointness is particularly measure when two partners start to make 
adjustments to product or service details to fit better with the needs of 
one another. We know more about the activity links with Turney Bros 
than the other suppliers that Booths had and it seems the level of 
jointness between the two soon became quite strong.  The constant 
stream of letters complaining about the quality of the skins did not 
seem to damage the close relationship with Turneys which was to 
remain until the building at Trent Bridge was closed and converted 
into apartments in 1981. At no stage is there ever a mention of bad 
relationship or consideration of a split. Indeed all the comments we 
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have indicate an increasingly close relationship with the issues being 
treated more as tiffs in a marriage than anything likely to cause a rift.  
The agreement on the new financing to make matters easier in the US 
was seen as a major breakthrough and there were other adjustments 
in the grading mixes and detailed specifications being sold.  
 
Turney Brothers of Nottingham was a new tannery, only just founded 
in 1860, with a large production capacity in sheepskins. The 
comparatively new technology of splitting meant they produced split 
pieces of sheepskin. They made an upper called a “skiver” and a lower 
flesh which was used mostly for chamois. With a start up tannery it 
seems logical that John Turney would be pleased to find someone who 
could potentially open up the United States market, and that a large 
new tannery would like to test the US market.  
 
So in the early1860s the Booth Brothers would have seen themselves 
as sitting within four networks which gave them access to things to 
sell, places to sell them and the skills to manage everything involved 
in safe and economical movement of those goods from one continent 
to another. 
 
































Figure 5 shows a simple network picture giving an overview of the 
position after the start of the leather business. It is an 
oversimplification given that in the UK they started with three 
suppliers and must have built up many contacts to establish those 
three. We know their relationships in trading and shipping were 
extensive and would be used for transportation goods over to the US, 
logistics and finance. In the US we know the least about their 
relationships at the start but we are sure they were connected into the 
senior figures of the New York business and then used Walden for 
links into centres such as Boston and Gloversville. So each of the 
circles in Figure 5 would have had many spikes or relationships 
linking them to individuals and companies which meant they were 
tightly embedded in these complex networks. 
 
What is important is that coming from a background strong in trading 
and shipping rather than a tannery background meant that the 
finance and logistics resources they had would be different from those 
in standard use in the leather industry. As we have seen most US 
tanners had their own banks or specialist leather banking facilities 
which had evolved out the Swamp area being such an important 
leather centre for two centuries.  Bringing in resources in banking 
from a more global perspective at a time when international trade was 
accelerating would have been very useful. To a degree at least there 
configuration was unique. 
 
It is clear that they developed strategy steadily over time using a wide 
network horizon. They brought in knowledge from other networks and 
areas wherever they thought they might impact the leather business. 
 
We are to discover that keeping out of the public eye became a 
constant in the Booth Company, but there is no evidence that it was a 
planned strategy. It was never articulated in any publication, informal 
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or formal, found to date and may just originate in the natural modesty 
and religious underpinnings of the family. In these early years and for 
100 years or more the company did not locate its offices in the most 
obvious locations: in New York nearer the docks rather than in the 
leather district, and subsequently in London not in the Bermondsey 
leather area but nearer the city. At no time did they seek a “big” image 
in the leather industry. One reason for this would have been to 
strengthen their links in the associated networks such as finance and 
shipping rather than becoming totally leather centric. This fits with 
Charles’ natural desire to be fully in tune with the bigger picture and 
watchful of trends that might impact his business areas. Perhaps in 
these areas offices were more expensive than in the leather district 
and the tendency to use basement offices came as a result of trying to 
maintain competitiveness with other leather dealers. 
 
The first years proved quite difficult. The American Civil War broke 
out and the market proved tougher than expected. They discovered 
that leather is not a homogeneous commodity and if it is badly 
preserved or carelessly shipped it can deteriorate. What looks good at 
one moment can soon be made to look poor in a different light or in a 
different economic climate. A trader who is unable to understand the 
technicalities of the material or to be able to assess their true worth 
will fail. Both customers and suppliers can mislead him, and perhaps 
even cheat him. So for most of the first decade the brothers had a 
steep learning curve in the details of leather grading and quality.  
 
In the middle of the decade Albert did remark in a note to Charles that 
their company had a complex structure that they would never have 
built from first principles. Yet it was the management of this 
complexity that was to be the essence of their success. 
 
In this period we can identify: 
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1.  Booths went out of their way to develop relationships before 
starting the business 
2.  Booths redefined the network they entered and viewed it 
differently from incumbent actors 
4.  Specific relationships evolved to a level that Booths were able to 
confront the relationships rather than concede 
5.  Booths were aided by the fact that their network picture 
encompassed both sides of the Atlantic while each of their partners 
only knew their individual country. 
 
4.5 Episode 2: Starting a Shipping Business 1865-1870 
 
From the start Charles had always wanted to start in shipping and 
with his brother focused on leather he put serious planning had into 
starting a shipping line. It was natural, given their history, 
relationships and location that shipping would have been in the minds 
of the family for a number of years. At the time steam was most used 
for activities such as mail delivery around the world as the new 
engines and large amount of coal carried left little space for cargo.  
The ships stayed mostly on establish routes and schedules, running 
to a timetable as best the seas and weather would permit although 
Charles wondered in an 1864 letter to Alfred16 whether this system 
would remain: “You will perceive that the thing to be considered is 
what shape will steam trade eventually take – will it be established 
lines? – or free steamers going anywhere on charter like (sailing) 
ships". 
 
When Charles left the US in 1864 to return to the UK he planned to 
set up the shipping line. He had helped stabilise the leather business 
in New York and Alfred was happy to remain there to run it. He 
                                                 
16
 quoted in John 1959, p. 33 
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wanted to add in a shipping line to “not only carry Alfred’s skins but 
merchandise to and fro across the Atlantic.” 17 
 
As with the leather business many relationships had been developed 
and prepared to make it easier for them to enter the shipping industry 
network. He understood the resources he would need and had those 
from his brother in law Philip Holt in terms of both technology and 
shipping line management experience.  He had his own knowledge 
from his apprenticeship and from knowing the requirements involved 
in moving the Booth leathers across the Atlantic. Having built these 
relationships over time he was able to insinuate his business more 
tightly into the shipping network. Effectively Booths had considerable 
social capital (Easton, 2004) available with the shipping network that 
he could call upon to finalise his plans. This had been aided by the 
learning gained from the management from New York of the Holt’s 
New York to West Indies trade had given them some direct experience.  
 
He used 1864 to look for suitable routes, considering and rejecting 
Liverpool - New York, New York – West Indies, New York-
Newfoundland-Liverpool, and New York - Rio de Janeiro. In this 
instance the overlapping informal and formal shipping network within 
which Booths existed allowed for open discussion but clearly created 
constraints.  
 
It appeared that Charles really wanted to establish a Calcutta trade 
but was advised that since all the family would be able to afford was 
two small boats to open up this route they would merely create an 
opportunity for other larger operators to follow them in.  This was 
discussed with their cousins the Holts, who were at that time looking 
at the China trade and had in 1864 established a South Brazilian line. 
Trials with a new steam engine by Alfred Holt had been successful in 
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1864 and in 1865 the brothers decided to start with two small 
steamships doing general shipping and mail business between three 
northern ports in Brazil (Fortaleza (Ceará), Maranham and Belem 
(Pará)) and Liverpool.  The historic or traditional method of financing 
ships in a business that could not afford all the capital itself was to 
divide the cost into sixty four parts.  Alfred Booth bought as many as 
they could and acted as managing owners. Family and friends were 
found within a month to buy the remainder, albeit with some refusals. 
For each of the first two, Augustine and Jerome, the Booths held 49 
shares in the name of Alfred Booth and Company, members of the 
Holt family had 14 and a James Quinn 1. For the subsequent two 
vessels Booths reduced their shareholding to 20 and 33 respectively 
and additional shareholders came in.18 According to their mother the 
“two brothers invested practically the whole of their modest fortune in 
the purchase of (these) two steamships”.19 
 
A separate account was set up for each voyage and a management fee 
of £25 charged plus an amount for maintenance, depreciation and a 
reserve before the profits were paid out. The contracts for the two 
ships were placed in February 1865 and the Augustine was the first to 
be launched later that year using Alfred Holt’s new engine of 95 horse 
power. It was a three decked schooner rigged screw driven ship of 
1056 gross tons.  She had accommodation for twenty five saloon and 
fifty steerage passengers.  
 
So by 1865 they had begun the shipping venture in earnest and both 
businesses were together absorbing large amounts of capital. The 
company was very dependent upon credits from the Holts and 
Rathbones. They also borrowed from the Royal Bank of Liverpool. 
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 Heaton, 1987, p.17. 
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 Booth, 1918, p. 6 
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Charles Booth sailed with the Augustine on its first voyage to Belem 
(Pará) and Forteleza (Ceará) in Brazil via Lisbon on February 15th 
1866.  His presence was necessary because of his understanding of 
both the engines of the ship and the postal services of South America. 
 
A good business was eventually built up with these smaller ports but 
not without difficulty. On the first voyage they obtained the mail 
contract from north-east Brazil. Yet the perils of such a venture 
became quickly obvious when the Jerome was adjudged to be at fault 
in a collision with another vessel and large amounts of compensation 
had to be paid out. 
 
Alfred stayed in New York not returning home until he came back to 
Liverpool for two years in 1867 after his marriage to Miss Lydia Allen 
Butler, daughter of Benjamin F. Butler, who was a law partner of 
Martin Van Buren and Attorney General in President Jackson’s 
Cabinet. Charles remained in Liverpool to be hands on with the 
steamship business. So a cousin Thomas Fletcher had been appointed 
junior partner in 1867 and sent to New York. In 1867 the business 
employed six people in Liverpool and four in New York (a partner, two 
clerks and a warehouseman).  US Sales in 1868 continued at about 
US $2500 a month but the losses from errors and poor valuations 
diminished.  On top of this were the various other commissions and 
shipping income. 
 
In 1868 Booths persuaded Gunston, Wilson and Company to 
withdraw its sailing ships and provide them £10000 to build two more 
steamers, the Ambrose in 1868 and the Bernard in 1870.  In this 
latter vessel we know that Booths held 35/64ths while the builders 





The arrival of competitors such as the Singletons (three ships) and 
Hugh Evans (two ships) to compete in the North Brazilian trade in 
1869 was seen by external observers as a potential disaster for the 
Booth Line. The Booth and Holt combined view was that actually a 
large number of steam ships working the Brazilian market would 
remove the intense competition from the sailing ships rather than 
each other, and this was to prove the case. After some initial battles 
with Singletons agreed timings and routes were worked out and the 
competition from sailing ships was seen off.  Foreign competition 
when it arose was also fitted in to everyone’s satisfaction. 
 
For Booths at this stage the shipping network was quite separate from 
the leather business. In the period we see them start to use their 
social and family contacts to access resources in design and build and 
to decide routes. With Singletons we see that with Booths more 
strongly embedded in the network with strong relationships allowing 
Booths to negotiate from strength to achieve a satisfactory conclusion.  
 
4.6 Consideration of Episode 2. 
  
The key to any analysis of this period comes in a quote from Charles 
that we find a letter he was to write in 1883: “the working up of new 
business....is the life of any concern such as ours”.20 In the first half 
of the 1860s the Booths worked to establish a successful leather 
trading business between the UK and the US. In that period they tried 
a few other things but eventually settled back to the core business of 
leather. Yet somewhere in the entrepreneurial spirit of Charles in 
particular remained the desire to be a ship owner, as the family had 
been thirty years before.  
 
Subjective Interpretation 
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The view Charles had of the situation in the mid 1860s is made clear 
when he returns to the UK from the US and feels able to discuss 
setting up a shipping line which he declares would move his skins and 
other goods across the Atlantic. 
 
In order to achieve this through building his own ships meant he 
required many resources including capital and expertise and these he 
chose to find from his family connection with Holts and from the 
Banks. The final outcome in no way resembled the initial plan and it 
was many years before the ships would be used to carry skins, and 
this was between Brazil and the US rather than Liverpool and New 
York. 
 
This indicates that his desire to move into shipping was stronger than 
his desire just to have a transatlantic line and in his network activity 
he was willing to make many compromises to get established. Also 
that on examination he wanted to find a way to work with the Holts 
that would be easy and amicable. They were after all the leaders in the 
sector in Liverpool. 
 
Relativity 
The discussions on the start-up and the early years of the shipping 
business were very much a Liverpool matter and Charles was in 
Liverpool throughout the period of setting up.  
 
Given his logical starting position of wanting to work with the Holts he 
at once limited his choice in relationships and also to a considerable 
degree where and how the line operated. In return for access to 
resources he quite strictly reduced his options as to where he would 
trade.  
 
After the New York to Liverpool was shown to be too competitive his 
preference was Calcutta but the finances available did not run to the 
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size of ship required. Also relevant was the fact that the brothers 
Alfred and Philip Holt set up a new company in April 1866 to service 
China and the Far East (Heaton, 1987, p14) and likely had this plan 
while the initial Booth plans were being discussed. We know that the 
Booths used all their free capital for about two thirds ownership of the 
two ships with the Holts providing most of the other third, and the 
Banks being used to help provide working capital for the leather side.  
 
So the first two years were very much about a dynamic networking 
process balancing the resources of technology and finance which 
Booths needed along with the destinations and cargos that did not 
compete directly with their key partner Holts. 
 
Interdependencies 
The relativities meant that at the start of the new shipping venture the 
Booths created significant dependencies to ensure access to resources 
and this limited their networking choices. So in terms of choices the 
company both conformed with and conceded to the suggestions from 
Holts on the types of ships to built, there size and the destinations 
that would be best.  As with the leather side this was a moment of 
establishment so the company was striving to create a structure of 
relationships that would be secure for the future.  
 
The three aspects of networking are very much concerned with the 
paradoxes of the company having control and taking decisions about 
its network position but that in so doing the company ends up 
creating limits and boundaries for itself.  This is very apparent at this 
stage.  
 
At the start little is said about what the ships would carry and it was 
mail and passengers that were to prove the key items initially.  This 
was only worked out on the first voyage. Getting a mail contract with 
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the ports of north eastern was a key development in making this quite 
risky venture viable.   
 
When later in the decade a competitor entered the trade the time that 
had passed meant that Booths had stronger relationships and were 
willing to confront their bigger competitor and coerce them into 
making a deal which worked for all parties. The network position of 
holding a strong relationship with both the Holts and the Brazilian 




As opposed to leather Booths had a much more junior position in the 
shipping industry and would always have to fit in amongst much 
bigger companies. Over time the relationship with Holts might become 
less symmetric but certainly at the start Booths were very much the 
junior partner. Nevertheless Holts were willing to provide engineers to 
travel on the Booth ships to minimise the chance of problems with the 
new technology they had bought  
 
The jointness with Holt was clearly quite large, and beyond that of just 
family friends. Although Holts had the scale and capital to afford it 
they did work with Booths in a number of ways from the agency for 
the West Indian to New York line, through capital for the first two 
ships and the aforementioned provision of engineers. All this was over 
and above many hours of free advice. 
 
A level of jointness could also be said to have developed with the 
Brazilian ports that relied on the Booth steamers to move their mail to 
Portugal and the UK and through this came to rely on them for other 




Towards the end of the first decade of the business the Booth and Co 




Figure 5: Booths around 1870 
 
In addition to this rather basic structure shown in Figure 5 they had 
many significant relationships: 
Banking and Investors: 
 Royal Bank of Liverpool 
 Bank of America 
 Rathbone 
 Holts 
 Other friends and associates 
 Gunston, Wilson and Company 
Leather: 
 Sumac tanners in Bermondsey, London 





 Gunston, Wilson and Company 
 The cities of Ceara, Maranham and Para in Brazil 
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 Lisbon and Porto 
So the network outcomes of the decade were a successful business, 
but not quite what anyone had expected at the start. 
 
In this section we see the start of the Booth shipping business with a 
number of similar characteristics to their approach to leather: 
1. Charles had clearly built close relationships which he could develop 
into transactional relationships and use to enter the shipping network 
2. Intense interactions made it clear that he had to conform in the 
decision regarding routes as his network position and resources would 
not allow him to go to the areas of first preference. 
3. Later with greater jointness developed with Holt and the Brazilian 
ports Booths did not have to concede to pressure from Singlehurst but 
were able to interact with all parties to a mutually workable solution. 
3. It is clear that Charles took a great deal of time interpreting what 
his network position was and what his expectations were of other 
actors in the network  
4. Early on he made efforts to develop a high level of jointness with 
Holts in order to ensure support with the design and running of the 
steam engines. 
5. Other than perhaps in some back office functions the Leather and 
the shipping networks did not inter-relate in this period. Yet the Booth 
configuration in a network that included many relationships in north 
east Brazil in Portugal and in Liverpool did create a Booth network 
picture which overlapped a number of individual networks.  
 
 
4.7 Episode 3: Innovation and Major Network Change 1870-
1890 
 
Despite industrialisation already being well underway the average 
leather producing unit on both sides of the Atlantic remained small, 
and quite complex in terms of materials used.  As late as the 1880s in 
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the UK the average tanner only employed 18 people making new 
plants like Turneys the exception.  Despite this lack of scale the UK 
had started exporting shoes to newly developing British dependencies 
in the main – Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the West Indies – 
and leather to France, Holland, Germany and Belgium in the 1860s. 
London, and in particular the Bermondsey area, was the centre of this 
trade. The US had high levels of protectionism at that time and 
finished products were banned.  Part processed was only allowed 
where there were proven gaps. 
 
In the leather industry Booth and Co were positioned to serve the US 
market in a number of ways: 
- a one stop shop for US customers, with specific types of sheep 
and other material available 
- an ability to handle special orders for raw ( during March, April, 
May 1873 special orders made up 30% of the business) 
- provision of credit to smaller firms (on both sides of the 
Atlantic). Sales were made on 30, 60 or 90 days.     
 
These capabilities involved adaptations needed to meet the needs of a 
fast growing and evolving market. “The recovery of debt so created was 
one of the ways in which Alfred Booth and Company were later forced 
into the manufacturing side of the industry, both in England and 
America”.21  While forced is a strong word to use in this instance the 
comment is fair as they were, as we shall see, put in a position of 
making a difficult choice as a result of having extended credit. 
 
In 1870 Alfred Booth was thirty five and Charles Booth almost thirty. 
If 1865 had seen the company come through its probation by 1870 
they were a fully structured business in what was a much more 
mature market place. Alfred Booth had an excellent reputation for 
reliability and good judgement, Charles was expert in the business of 
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the “steamers”. This meant that essentially Alfred had been needed in 
New York from 1865 on and Charles in the UK available to sail with 
the ships and manage the office in Liverpool.  
 
Around 1870 they began to recognise the need to develop their 
organisational structure and introduce more staff to whom they could 
devolve some responsibility. The Hon. Henry Romilly (related via the 
Crompton family) joined in 1871. Romilly worked for Booths for 16 
years, most of the 1870s in the USA. He was essentially a financial 
man.  Sadly he suffered from ill health throughout this period. 
Nevertheless he made some important improvements and this new 
structure allowed the business to develop without either of the 
brothers spending that much time in the USA.  Alfred Booth settled 
back into Liverpool and was Congregational Treasurer at the Renshaw 
Street Chapel from 1875 to 1883. 
 
Again the importance of family links came into play. Alfred married 
Miss Lydia Butler in 1867 and Charles married Miss Mary Macaulay 
in 1871. This latter relationship brought Charles into the network of 
the extended Potter family including Beatrice Webb and her many 
influential cousins. This new set of relationships, while not directly 
relevant to the leather industry, was to have a major impact on the 
activities Charles undertook later in his career.  Charles was 
renowned for his late hours “going early to the office and remaining 
late not leaving till ten or even eleven o’clock at night”22. These long 
hours with little sleep and little time for eating led to illness and 
Charles succumbed to a form of nervous indigestion. To avoid being 
permanently invalided he was advised to go abroad to rest and from 
December 1873 until the summer of 1875 he lived with his wife and 
daughter in Switzerland. He took no salary but determined to live off 5 
per cent of his savings per annum until fit to take up work again.  
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On his return he decided to live in London but was still unable to 
work.  He was thinking about the business, however, and arranged for 
the building of a steam vessel with a much smaller boiler which would 
take cargo only, travelling much slower, but using a fraction of the 
coal.  In the summer of 1876 he travelled on this vessel to Brazil and 
subsequently came back into the business full time. This three month 
trip was one of very few business journeys when he was joined by his 
wife and it remained one of his most memorable. The new ship did use 
much less coal, but was not to prove viable long term, although his 
wife tells us that he gained “much insight into points which were of 
use to him afterwards”.23  
 
When he had been in Liverpool Charles had become involved in local 
social and political causes. He represented Liverpool on the executive 
committee of the Education League. He was also involved in the Legal 
Aid Society, the Toxteth Association and the Liverpool Operatives 
Trades Hall. These areas of intense interest and the relationships 
developed through his marriage were part of the reason for him to 
move his business activities to London. A new office was opened in 84 
King William Street. This was not in the expected leather sector in 
Bermondsey but close to the financial centre of London instead. A 
major part of the rationale for being in London was to gain access to 
European raw and semi-processed skins. With London being such a 
major centre in the UK leather industry skins from many countries 
were readily available there. For the Booth Company to gain access to 
these the simplest method was to have a full time base in London and 
to start to interface with the companies and individuals involved. 
Charles with his family connections now had many contacts and 
acquaintances in the City. These were to be useful both for the 
company and his personal pursuits. 
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At the start of the 1870s they offered their American clients a way to 
get hold of raw material in a variety of process stages suited to their 
needs, with a confirmed focus on sheepskins. At the same time they 
offered credit to clients on both sides of the Atlantic.  Buying a specific 
product on behalf of US clients was relatively straightforward but 
taking goods into the US on consignment from UK tanners was more 
complex, as grades and qualities in leather are a very subjective 
matter.  Complaints about the quality of goods shipped by a tanner 
have been an issue of contention for many centuries. They were the 
subject of many UK Acts of Parliament in the Middle Ages.  Dealing in 
this way required a great deal of skill and knowledge.  Charles wrote 
“it is not in our interest to get the better of either the men we buy from 
or those we sell to – but to do the best we can for each subject to a 
moderate remuneration for ourselves, and to give our chief attention 
to getting the utmost value out of the goods we deal in 1, by proper 
preparation and 2, by bringing the skins into use for the purpose they 
best suit.”24 
 
This was no easy matter. The US market was quite volatile and had 
two seasons while the UK market was strongly seasonal to the extent 
of the spring lambing period and influenced a lot by the price of wool 
and domestic demand.  Untanned pickle pelts may be classed as a 
commodity but below the surface the age, the breed, and the diet of 
the animal will have a big impact on their potential quality even before 
consideration of the skill with which it has been flayed, preserved and 
then de-woolled and pickled. Often if the value of the wool is very high 
the skins can be treated quite badly as the felmongers tries to ensure 
the longest and best fibre is obtained for the wool sale. 
 
Into this equation comes the valuation of stock which was always an 
issue for tanning companies.  Normally the idea was to sell not based 
on the purchase price but on the replacement price. Charles worked 
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out detailed approaches about what to do when they thought they 
were in a rising or a falling market, and when they thought the market 
was holding at the bottom. He analysed this in terms of what was best 
for both buyer and seller and noted that after a while it was 
technically safer to move goods into the tanned state rather than hold 
them indefinitely as pickle. 
 
Back in 1868 Alfred Booth wrote to his brother in July about a 
meeting with Mr. Johnstone of Bootle who had come to the office in 
Liverpool complaining that he had lost patience with some of his 
workforce and intended to bring three of them up before a magistrate 
for going off “last Monday morning and letting £20 of pelts get spoilt in 
the summer heat”.25 These sorts of events meant that over time 
Booths became experts and were actually known to give wide ranging 
advice to their suppliers. This was particularly the case for the smaller 
ones who wanted to get started in the trade.  
 
Booths brought family values and training skills to the business, 
although for a while their financial and meticulous accounting skills 
appear to have been the most useful.  They paid their suppliers 75% 
of the value on delivery to the warehouse in Liverpool and in the US 
sold initially on 10 days which might occasionally be allowed to 
stretch to 30 days. In the early seventies sixty days became more 
common and ninety was not unknown. In the quiet trading times of 
the mid seventies records show some dealings at 120 days with a 
discount of 1% for cash. Final accounts were settled with suppliers on 
a regular basis but even here on many occasions Booths advanced 
cash for work in process.  This meant that Booths had to be very 
skilled as very large amounts of cash were tied up in financing the 
business.  
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On top of this from 1863 through to 1878 the dollar was not pegged to 
gold and the company had to deal with a wildly fluctuating exchange 
rate to which they were the ones most exposed. They did consider 
offering suppliers the chance to “hold for exchange” but the suppliers 
did not have the expertise to understand the elements that impacted 
on the exchange rate. These included the timing of the main 
shipments of cotton from the US to the UK each year and the 
associated transfer of gold. 
 
The charges the Booths had made during the Civil War included a 
2.5% del credere for the assumption of risk.  The general commission 
was 5% with the supplier paying for the transatlantic shipping.   After 
the war this was reduced to an overall 6% and in 1871 when the 
impact of the better communications from more steam shipping and 
the telegraph the regular supplier’s commissions was further dropped 
to 5%. 
 
Shortly after he joined in 1870 Henry Romilly was asked to set up a 
company code for the telegraph so they could communicate effectively 
globally, although partners’ letters continued until the 1930s and then 
were largely replaced by the company newsletters.   
 
As indicated most of the imports were sheep pickle grains and fleshes 
but at the start of the 1870s a new material was added - the roan. 
Two elements made this interesting for Booths. First during the 1860s 
they had seen a rise in the demand for footwear leather especially in 
the Boston area where the footwear makers were industrializing 
fastest. “Boston is a good staple trade” wrote Alfred Booth in 1870. 
Just as the Americans have boots “we must find them leather”.  In the 
UK the wool price was high and pulling in sheepskins which were too 
thin for splitting when the wool was removed.  These “roans” were 
then exported to the US in the pickle and this trade formed the 
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backbone of much of the Booth business until the turn of the century 
when domestic supplies in the US had grown to compete.   
 
Alfred Booth had actually started to develop the business in 1868 and 
senior staff had made fortnightly trips to Boston from New York. In 
1870 New York was selling £8000 a month and an office was put in 
141 Purchase Street, Boston.  This trade continued to grow all 
through the 1870s and for example by 1873`was registered at £16000 
a month, although profit margins were not always maintained 
throughout. 
 
For Booths 1872 appears to have been remembered more as the year 
that raw hides were placed on the “free list” of imported raw materials.  
Duty had been put on all leather imports in the 1840s although at a 
lower rate for raw material than finished. When they were put on the 
free list there was considerable hostility from some tanners including 
an Englishman, born in Newcastle, James Kent. Kent who made glove 
leather in Gloversville argued that “free hides would ruin the leather 
and glove business in this county”26 but he was later happy to admit 
this had been quite a wrong judgment. 
 
The timing of the start of Booth & Co had been good, since with more 
and more people emigrating around the world new sources of 
sheepskins had opened up.27 The largest source was Australia and 
New Zealand, and it was profitable to import the wool skins to the UK 
where English felmongers would remove the wool and then to export 
the pelts in the pickled condition to America.  The light leather 
industry continued to expand quite quickly and there was also a 
considerable hunger for goatskins which was the first material of 
choice for the many “morocco” leather tanners who had established in 
Wilmington, Philadelphia, and New England.  Some sheepskins were 
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used in the Moroccan trade but mostly they went to the glove trade in 
Gloversville in upper New York State where domestic deer and 
imported sheep were the raw materials used. Things accelerated after 
the 1872 changes and soon Mr. Kent was to become one of Booth and 
Co’s principal customers in Gloversville.  However in 1877 the Kent 
and Stevens plant in Gloversville started to get into financial 
difficulties and Booths had to become financially involved. 
 
Around this time Booths made what was to become a key hiring. In 
1873 Booths hired Julius Kuttner as temporary book-keeper.  He had 
come to the US having worked in a corset factory in Stuttgart, 
Germany and had been developing a machine production for corsets 
to replace the existing hand-made methods. He had also worked on 
improving textile machinery but had ended up “at a loose end” 28when 
he joined Booths. In 1877 Charles Booth was in the US for about five 
months  - “the business being in a critical condition”29 - and took 
Kuttner with him on a trip to Gloversville to learn in detail about the 
Kent and Stevens problems.  There were a lot of business failures in 
Gloversville around that time and Kent’s position had deteriorated as 
a result of dishonest activity of Fred Stevens, the junior partner: 
 
The cause of the failure dates back to the palmy days of the old firm of 
Kent & Stevens, when the junior member was rushing blindfolded into 
every species of extravagance, purchasing stock far beyond the 
requirements of the business or the dictates of prudence. But the most 
serious drawback was caused by the extensive forgeries of Fred 
Stevens prior to his unceremonious departure. The forgeries are 
believed to have aggregated nearly $100,000, and the spurious notes 
held mainly by the National Bank of Gloversville, Hays & Wells' bank of 
Johnstown and Booth & Co, of New York.30 
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The debts at failure were actually over US $120,000 although Kent 
had managed to repay some US $50,000.  The Booth papers record31 
that US $70000 was due for South African deerskins and Brazilian 
goat. Initially Booth & Co paid off the other creditors and helped 
secure loans for Kent to run the business via a mortgage (in the name 
of Kuttner and his wife). When it was later agreed that Booths would 
become more interested in dried skins of goat and kangaroo in 
particular the business was completely reorganized and became Booth 
and Kent.  James Kent continued to work on technical and research 
matters but with Kuttner, who had been made manager of the New 
York office, taking a careful oversight over matters in Gloversville, 
superintending all the commercial areas. 
 
Kuttner used this connection to rekindle his own interest in 
technology as well as business. “He found a congenial spirit in James 
Kent, who was also an inventor”.32  As a consequence a number of 
new technological developments were to come from the Gloversville 
tannery and two fundamentally new ways of tanning were developed 
there in 1879 (Dongola) and 1884 (Chrome Tanning).  The latter was 
to become the dominant tanning technology in the world after the 1st 
World War and remains so all through the twentieth century. 
(Thomson, 1985 and Luck, 1986) 
 
The best description of events in the discovery of Dongola is given in a 
detailed account in the New York Times.33 James Kent is described in 
the article by “G.F.S” who was writing about the leather industry in 
Fulton County which includes both Gloversville and its adjacent town 
of Johnstown.  He was an Englishman with a “genius for investigation 
and experiment”.  The abolition of duty in 1872 already mentioned 
brought in skins of “every kind of animal from every quarter of the 
globe” including kangaroos which had been thought good for gloving.  
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“Mr. Kent, always on the watch for something new, accumulated a 
considerable supply of these Australian rat skins, as they were called, 
and began experiments”.  It apparently took some years after which he 
discovered the “secret of producing a tough, strong, pliable leather, 
impervious to water which had been his technical target.  Kent’s 
process was worthless for gloves and mittens, but it proved an 
excellent substitute for the (vegetable tanned) calf of which shoes were 
then almost wholly made.”  Mr. Kent enlarged his factory, “guarded 
closely his secret and prepared to furnish the world with his product”.  
The article goes on to explain that like most entrepreneurs he was a 
“poor business manager” and had to be saved by Booth & Co. “Mr. 
Kent became its practical manager, and before he died (in 1886) …..he 
drew from its profits a competence and had the satisfaction of 
realizing that to his own efforts was due the beginning of this 
surprising growth of modern leather dressing.” 
 
The scale of the growth should not be underestimated as we 
understand that in 1872 he had only two rooms and a very small 
number of employees, whereas by the start of the 1880s with the 
involvement of Booth & Co this had grown to 500 workers and what 
the paper calls “the largest manufactory of its kind in this country”.  
The glove business in Fulton County had peaked during the Civil war 
and was stagnating but this new technology gave the leather side a 
boost and appears to have revitalized the glove side also. In the 1880s 
the area had 73 tanners dressing leather for gloves and footwear 
uppers.  Booth staff  were headhunted by out of state tanners trying 
to get access to the technology. 
 
The Dongola kid (Daisy Kid from 1880 according to John, 1959, p 
5134) was “one of the first products to receive a brand that is known to 
the trade anywhere”.  Its desirability as a substitute for calfskin was 
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recognized, and the demand for it “far surpassed anything that Mr. 
Kent could supply”. 
 
The process had two elements of discovery, the first being what is now 
called “fat-liquoring”. “So long as tanners were restricted, on the one 
hand, to the ordinary methods of stuffing tanned leathers with oils 
and fats, and on the other to the use of egg-yolk, which had long been 
common in alum tannages, combination tannage remained of but 
secondary importance, and it was the application of the method of 
‘fat-liquoring’ by James Kent in his Dongola leather which gave them 
the place they now possess, by providing a cheap substitute for egg-
yolk, and enabling the tanner to obtain softness and resistance to 
water without producing the greasy feel which is common to curried 
leathers” (Procter, 1922 p.376).  It was when this discovery was 
applied a decade later to the chromium tanning patents that chrome 
tanning became commercially viable. 
 
While it might be thought that the continued expansion of the 
business meant that cash flow and profits had grown strongly in fact 
the problems facing all tanners in Gloversville and elsewhere in the 
US led to shrinking margins. In the US the period between 1873 and 
1879 is now termed the Long Depression and thousands of businesses 
went bankrupt. The footwear trade was not doing badly but the glove 
trade which used the split skins was affected. On top of this both 
partners had to go to the US in 1879 to examine a sudden rise in roan 
stock.  A new additional sales office was put in Frankfurt Street in 
premises shared with the Volks Zetiung newspaper and tighter control 
was taken over activities in Boston.  The trip did seem to stimulate 
improvement.  
 
In 1865 the recorded capital of the business was £14,000 and by 1880 
this had grown to £73,415. 1880 started in an exciting mode with the 
expansion of the Daisy Kid production requiring large quantities of 
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Ceará goat.  Charles Booth visited the plant in Gloversville and bought 
the adjacent Dodge factory (for $US 30,000) for expansion. In 1882 
the Dongola tannage was being successfully used on kangaroo and 
the records show that some $US 260,000 were employed in the factory 
in Gloversville, while sheepskin sales through New York and Boston 
combined were running at £200,000 or about US $1m at the exchange 
rate of the time. 
 
The sales problems in the late 1870s led the company to consider the 
fit of their offering of products for the US market and they decided 
that a thicker sheepskin grain was needed that was not currently 
available in the market. They linked up with a UK tannery in 
Nuneaton owned and supplied by a Mr. Johnson to form the 
Nuneaton Leather Company in 1882. The purpose was to produce a 
product specifically to suit the New York market. They sold this under 
the brand ABC. It was at this time that Mr. Charles Wade joined the 
business as a technician in Nuneaton and started to become a trusted 
colleague in the Booth business. 
 
Other changes took place during the decade.  James Kent died 
unexpectedly at the age of 55 in 1886 and Booth and Co became 
outright owners of the tannery in Gloversville. With demand growing 
rapidly for kangaroo they hired Mr. Miller in Sydney (via Richard 
Young and Company) to buy kangaroo skins for them. They also set 
up a shipping route to bring the skins from north east Brazil to the 
USA. 
 
The Dongola tannage was undoubtedly the feature of the 1880s for 
the group, and indeed for the industry as a whole. It was to remain a 
serviceable tannage well into the 1930s despite all other technical 
developments. Yet the company was actually to be involved in another 
technical development which was to lead to a much bigger 
transformation of the world leather industry. This was the initial 
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discovery and development of chrome tanning, which was to become 
the dominant tannage for the whole of the 20th century. For the 
second half of the 20th century chromium was used for more than 
90% of the leather tanned worldwide. Without question the 
introduction of chromium tanning moved leather making from craft to 
science. Tanneries started to employ trained chemists for the first 
time. 
 
Commercial chrome tanning had its beginnings in a New York 
restaurant. Julius Kuttner was a regular for lunch at Racky’s 
restaurant on Frankfort Street, one of the major original streets in the 
Swamp leather area in New York.  Towards the end of the 1870s he 
met Augustus Schultz, who also dined there.  Augustus Schultz had 
been born in Germany in 1833 and was working in New York as a 
chemist for Kuttroff and Pickhardt, a German dyestuff importer.   
 
Their lunch time discussions must have been very interesting and 
certainly ranged far beyond the weather and politics. Both were clearly 
of an inventive frame of mind and they discussed improvements in 
tannery technology.  They discussed work on further fatliquors to 
replace egg yolk and then on leathers suited for corset making, an 
interest of course of Kuttner.  The problem with corsets was that the 
white alum tanned leather used at the time became wet very easily 
and rusted the corset steels when moistened with perspiration. 
 
It was in this latter area that Schultz went to work and appears to 
have been given some access to the tannery in Gloversville35, and 
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certainly a lot of help with skins and chemicals to work on. Through 
his work with dyes Schultz was aware of the use of bichromate in 
dyeing and knew of the historic work in Germany by Knapp to make a 
chrome tanned leather.  Working on this process using “two large 
goblets” he came out with two patents in 1884 for what was to be 
called the “two bath process”.  This put bichromate in the first bath 
and hypo in the second reducing bath.  It is not known whether this 
leather worked for corsets at first – it certainly did some years later – 
but it is known that little was done with the process in Booth and 
Kent in Gloversville.  According to White (1956) some experiments 
were carried out to use the process with kangaroos but with limited 
success.  
 
As already mentioned kangaroos were first imported into the USA in 
1860 and Newark appears to have been the chief centre of 
manufacture.  In 1876 the Booths had skins tanned in Gloversville 
and sold on a commission basis by Richard Young Co. for two years 
after which, in 1878, they tanned them regularly in Booth and Kent. 
They opened a store in New York specifically for the sale and 
distribution of their Gloversville shoe leather.  The leathers involved 
were gambier tanned kangaroo, gambier tanned matt kid and Dongola 
tanned glazed kid.  The famous American boxer John L. Sullivan had 
started to wear Dongola tanned kangaroo shoes in one of his big fights 
and as a consequence the product had become very popular.  Booth 
and Kent continued to make glove leather for the local market. 
 
James Kent died in June 1886 having contracted malaria on a holiday 
trip to Florida.  In just a few years of his life things had changed a 
great deal. From a long time customer who bought South African 
deerskins and Brazilian goatskins and for whose technical ability 
Alfred and Charles Booth had a high regard to a partner with whom 
Charles himself spent many months working out how to turn this 
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crisis into an opportunity and put in place a structure that would 
leave the Kent family secure and protect the Booth investment. 
 
In 1879 when Booths were asked by James Kent to supply dried skins 
such as goat and kangaroo it was agreed to turn the arrangement into 
a joint venture, and finally on the unexpected death of James Kent his 
family asked Booths to take on the whole company, which they did. 
This transformed Booths into tannery owners for the first time.  
 
After he died further attempts were made to introduce chrome tanning 
into Gloversville.  First Asa Bellis and then a Mr. Gottschalk (a 
technician from Jersey City) tried to make chrome leather but again 
with limited success.36 
 
The records available do not really explain in detail what Schultz and 
Kuttner did with the chrome tanning research and why it was not 
used in the Gloversville tannery but it is clear that Kuttner made no 
demand for ownership or involvement in the Intellectual Property as 
might happen today. Kuttner left his day job to try and commercialise 
the patents and there was some litigation between 1888 and 1992 in 
which the Booths were not involved. 
 
Sig Saxe who later founded the Philippine Cutch Corporation was a 
Morocco leather tanner who had started making morocco out of goat 
using sumac, and then converted to the Dongola gambier and alum 
process. In 1886 he is noted as being interested in the Schultz’s 
chrome process and recognising that it would replace French Kid.37  
Schultz’s chrome patents did attract a lot of interest and we do know 
that Schultz sold them for US $25,000 before going on to research the 
area of domestic central heating. 
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As suggested by the Saxe comments a major discussion within the 
industry at the time was the popularity of imported “French kid” 
which was used for the top end of ladies’ footwear. As families moved 
into the cities and cities grew the demand for softer more elegant  
footwear grew also. The two leathers being used and sometimes called 
“imitation French kid” were Kent’s Dongola process and the “brushed 
kid” tanned by the old Morocco manufacturers in Philadelphia. 
 
These tanners were using a process which involved a sumac tannage 
and brushing with a special “kid brush” but this leather became wet 
very easily and was “lacking in mellowness and richness of feel.”38  It 
also did not take a high lustre.  The French article was very expensive 
since it was tanned with alum and egg yolk and then aged for several 
months before finishing and polishing. It was silky and luxurious in 
feel at first wear but was not very durable. Dongola could be polished 
by glazing and was both durable and cheap, but was not so smooth 
and silky as the original. 
 
It was logical, therefore, that this was one of the first areas where 
progress with the “chemical tannage” might give quick returns. While 
many who tried the Schultz process gave it up quickly Robert H. 
Foerderer from Philadelphia persevered and noted that getting the fat-
liquor right would be the key to stopping the leather becoming too 
hard and tough.  Fat-liquoring was an essential part of the Kent 
Dongola process so perhaps Foerderer realized that borrowing this 
approach would give him success.  Backed by Abe Stein of New York 
and Marcus Beebe of Boston Foerderer bought the patents and 
successfully marketed a chrome tan kid under the brand “Vici” kid in 
1889.  He started to move quickly to obtain total control of the Schultz 
patents which he succeeded in doing in 1891. 
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In the midst of all these developments Charles Booth wrote in a letter 
in 1893 that the “working up of new business..… is the life of any 
concern such as ours”.39 He was talking about both Dongola and 
Chrome tanning but also about the fortunes of the Brazilian rubber 
industry which was impacting the shipping side of the business. 
 
Steam ships had been rising in importance and Charles had long 
thought that as soon as the ships were able to make more economical 
use of coal - hopefully by halving the amount of coal needed – the 
steamship would take over the market.   
 
Neither the shipping nor the leather business had been easy in the 
late 1860s.  The Liverpool to North Brazil route deteriorated 
throughout the Paraguay Brazil war as labour had been diverted from 
the cash crops and the Brazilian currency had considerably devalued.  
During the 1870s nuts, drugs and cotton were the main exports from 
Brazil handled by the Booth ships, with cotton increasing by mid-
decade. This changed in the late 1870s as rubber became increasingly 
important and with it the need in Brazil for railway material, stone 
and power equipment. 
 
Also since the Booth steam ships did a long voyage via Portugal to 
three Amazon ports a sailing ship going directly from Pará to Liverpool 
could actually be quicker.  Reports from the captains about stopping 
“for 3 or 4 hours to cool bearings” or experimenting with “letting some 
air into the combustion chamber” also indicated quite a high level of 
technical experimentation with the engines post introduction.  A 
strong point for Booth and Co was the relationship with Philip and 
Alfred Holt. Until 1873 the Booth Line ships carried engineers 
supplied by the Holt’s Ocean Steamship Company and the Holts 
worked with them on all the technical developments and problems 
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with the new technology of steam shipping. In 1873 Booths hired 
Edward Crompton as superintendent-engineer of the line. 
 
In one area cooperation failed. In 1870 the provincial government of 
Pará offered a £10000 a year subsidy for a bi-monthly service to 
Manáos.  The idea was that Singletons and Booths should run this 
under the management of Charles.  However, Booths would not agree 
to a full merger and the Red Cross Line took the contract and held it 
into the 1880s. 
 
The results between 1868 and 1874 were pretty good and after a 
difficult couple of years in 1875 and 1876 the rubber trade started to 
grow rapidly. Overall their shipping trade was strong, despite having 
to see off new foreign competition, for the next decade.  But some 
managerial skill was required. Alfred Booth wrote that there was a 
need to work on the choice of return port: “a ship with a considerable 
outward cargo can be made to pay by shifting ports for homeward 
cargo.”  Charles Booth then purchased two sailing ships to handle the 
lower value high bulk cargos and set these up sending gunpowder to 
Pará and rubber and nuts direct back to London.  This was done in 
1879 and 1880 and also in 1880 a specific Pará to New York route 
was set up.   The Pará trade was generally separated from the other 
shipping routes as it required bulk direct shipping at low cost per unit 
and the other routes carried more high value cargoes and passengers. 
This required seven ships, two for the Pará route and five others to 
serve the slower service to the other ports.  The Booth Steamship 
Company was thus incorporated in 1881.  In 1882 a new service from 
Manáos to New York was started and then one to Antwerp and 
Hamburg.  This required raising the issued capital from £81500 to 
£141450 and this was found from family and friends in order to buy 




The New York runs partly involved shipping skins into the US to feed 
the Booths tannery and others, and so as the company moved in to 
the 1890s it had been totally transformed and the foundation laid for 
a strong future. 
 
4.8 Consideration of Episode 3 
 
The Three Paradoxes of networking suggest that the more a business 
gets tightly bound up in a network the more it is likely to get trapped 
within that network. This means that when crises or major changes 
hit a company it can be harder for them to make the necessary 
adjustments to prosper. In this sense the period after start up when 
the company has become established becomes more interesting and 
makes Albert’s comment that they would never had made such a 
complex structure if they had started from scratch almost a template 
for the difficulty that a company has in managing relationships in 
networks.  
 
Looking at the various relationships which Booth and Company had 
around 1870 perhaps a more complex view of their network picture is 






























Figure 6: Booth & Co around 1870 in detail 
 
Seen in the light of Figure 5 we have a business with very many active 
links into quite a number of distinct market areas each with their own 
complexities. Once the company starts trading it signs contracts and 
makes deals with its chosen suppliers and customers so it is clear 
that these will start to limit it.    
 
Another element is that as the two brothers became more involved in 
family and community life back in the UK they had to divest power 
and create structure where their control was managed via high levels 
of trust in others. 
 
 
Up until 1870 the number of full time employees – excepting the crew 
on the ships – had remained small. This meant that over the years 
after 1870 the company grew more nodes of activity where they had 
offices.  To Liverpool and New York were added London, Gloversville 
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and Boston along with much closer links into Amazon ports and 
completely new ones with far flung places like Sydney, Australia. 
 
Many new relationships were developed, some directly through 
business as with James Kent and some by accident via social 
meetings as with Schultz. The rubber business in Brazilian meant 
finding sources for materials such as rails to meet demand there and 
new routes and approaches to bringing the rubber back to Europe. 
 
During this period the networks in which the Booths were operating 
were impacted by many events: 
 
- The removal of tariffs on hides and skins in 1872 
- The development of the Dongola tannage and associated 
fatliquoring 
- The discovery and beginning of chromium tanning 
- The gold and dollar exchange issues 
 
The financial developments alone would have stretched most 
companies. They involved: 
- managing gold until 1878 
- sorting out extended credit which sometimes meant up to 4 
months 
- managing currency exchange risks 
- dealing with partners in both US and UK who were poor at 
handling money 
 
The most serious single financial crisis that arose was the problem at 
Kent and Stevens where the losses required them to conform to the 
problem, accepting the high loss and moving on, or to confront it and 
put in more capital in the hope of being able to recover everything and 




Decisions related to ownership are about the balance of control over 
flexibility (Håkansson and Snehota 1995).  The moves with Kent 
meant there was a big change in the outcomes of interaction with the 
Gloversville tannery, Booth’s first move into ownership of 
manufacturing meaning they now had large numbers of employees to 
look after, a factory to keep busy and high potential exit charges if 
they should choose to change direction later. 
 
Subjective Interpretation 
While most of the written history about the company in the period 
after 1870 relates to moments of crisis and intense activity it is clear 
that the company made steady progress and the brothers were able to 
manage the business spending less time in the USA.  
 
There view of matters was clearly one that valued good relationships 
and long lasting partnerships. Once they had passed through the 
experimentation periods n the 1860s the forward movement of the 
business was very much a matter of logical evolution rather than 
delving into new areas. Increasingly we see them viewing the business 
arena through their experienced eyes rather than through those of 
their friends and external advisers. Leather became the central 
component and the partners’ letters describe their view of the leather 
business as “a retail business basing its claim to profits on special 
work and special knowledge of what we deal in.”  Over time it is clear 
that they gained very considerable knowledge in all matters to do with 
shipping and with leather and able to form their own judgment about 
how to react to events. 
 
While the discussions with Gunston and Singlehurst in the 1860s 
must have been quite intense the Booths had the experienced Holts 
sitting at their sides while these went on.  On the other while the issue 
with Kent and Stevens was equally serious and involved huge 
amounts of money the central figures in all the decision making 
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processes were the Booth brothers themselves. This was both the 
natural role which their experience and knowledge had put them in, 
but also what was expected by the other actors in the network both 
companies and individuals.  This includes the Banks who if asked 
would almost certainly have said that they should cut their losses and 
rebuild the business in other directions. 
 
The decision to let Schultz start experimenting with chromium 
tanning was similar. By that time we see the start if what were to 
become known as “Booth men”; employees who understood the 
approach of the two partners and were sufficiently trusted that they 
could move forward without endless approvals. So asking Schultz to 
experiment and see where it led was a natural initiative for Booths 
and not something seen as a risk or a diversion.  
 
Relativity 
What is clear during this period is that relativities did evolve meaning 
that decisions had to take into account many more factors than in the 
early years. In facing competition in the Amazon shipping and 
deciding what to do with Kent the implications for other partners had 
to be taken into account.   
 
In the Amazon the other shareholders, the port cities and the mail 
service promised to them, other competitors, other customers and 
regular clients figured among the many bodies involved.  In 
Gloversville the banks, their reputation in New York, other clients in 
Gloversville and their specific relationship with Kent himself would 
also have an impact on what was happening.  
 
In both instances their understanding of the technology was becoming 
more important which for steam they could use Holts, but for leather 
probably had a mix of inputs from Turneys and other UK suppliers 
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and US customers. From the early 1880s it is clear they considered 
Charles Wade a good technical adviser.  
 
All these relativities affected their options to various degrees. The 
implications in shipping in terms of relativity were that they worked 
more closely with Holts to discuss tactics over the competition in the 
Amazon and during a fairly hectic period of networking in Liverpool to 
work out a solution to the new competition.  
The relationship with Schultz is one where it would appear that he 
was managed essentially by Kuttner without the Booths being closely 
involved. Yet from their writings they were aware and watchful.  
 
Interdependence 
Along with changes in the relativities there naturally came increasing 
interdependencies. Those with the Turneys soon became obvious and 
relationships with Holts moved into serious areas when Holts began to 
invest and provide engineers for the ships.  
 
There were others in this period worth consideration 
 
1. The Singlehurst episode 
2. The Kent crisis 
3. The Schultz patents 
4. The purchase of two sailing ships to trade gunpowder with 
nuts/rubber from Para 
5. The development of roans in 1870 
6. The further development of roans with Charles Wade in Nuneaton 
7. Establishing links with France and Belgium for skins 
8. Breaking with Holt and moving to London 
9. Establishing Surpass leather in Philadelphia 




All three Network Paradoxes are clearly highlighted in these separate 
moments in the company’s development. With time they became more 
confident about confronting the situation and using their network 
links to allow this to happen. 
 
The Singlehurst and Kent and Stevens approach demonstrate the 
willingness to confront difficult situations and find a solution. Their 
relationship with Holts gave them access to many skills in the 
shipping sector and their banking relationships will have made it 
easier to work out solutions with Kent which gave them some 
protection for them investment.  So in both these cases the 
relationships they held actively assisted them in their decision to 
confront the situation. 
 
As the company grew its various linkages allowed it to bring the 
shipping and leather together in terms of moving skins from Brazil to 
the US but the economic requirements of each meant that in other 
arras there were few overlaps.  Steadily the two businesses appear to 
become quite separate.  
 
As a consequence we see during the period a move to consolidate in 
each sector and although each was individually growing the company 
as a whole was not creating a total new business.  
 
In the leather business the relationships needed to build into the US 
industry lead them into tannery ownership and then as we look at the 
other elements of development in London, and Sydney we steadily see 
a company that becomes tanning centric with a supply arm and a 
finished leather trading capability. So as the 19th century moved on 
the Booths got stronger but their structure got tighter as they 
expanded direct ownership of tanneries, leather sales and distribution 





This throws an interesting aspect on jointness. We see that over time 
the  activity links and resource ties come closer and the companies 
work together each making more adjustments to improve they worked 
with each other. In the instances in which Booths chose to confront 
the situation roughly half of the events moved them into ownership or 
something close. They ended up owning Kent, they more or less owned 
Nuneaton, they set up their own offices in London, Boston and 
elsewhere and were soon to take over full ownership of Surpass. 
 
In this period many major network events occurred: 
1. On their first really big confrontational event acquisition became 
the chosen route.  This tightened the network structure and reduced 
the external links. 
2. This did not become an immediate pattern but success led them to 
be more willing to deal with future issues through ownership rather 
than building relationships. 
3. Within the network they observed tanneries creating new and 
tighter relationships with suppliers making their trading business less 
secure and this accelerated their thinking that manufacturing might 
not be a bad route. 
4. They chose to develop a network position with a broad and dense 
relationship pattern, which helped to recognise opportunities and 
threats (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2002) 
5. They kept a very flexible position in the network and did not try and 
control events or technologies.  
6. In the development and commercial success of both chrome 
tanning and Dongola the interfaces between different networks and 





4.9 Episode 4 Growth and Global Expansion 1890-1920 and 
beyond 
 
For the Booth Company the 1890s were entered in good heart. The 
company was doing well based on the Brazilian rubber business and 
on the Gloversville Dongola. The leather industry or at least the small 
skin side – as opposed to the bovine world – was deeply interested in 
the development of chrome tanning.  Looking back on the 1890s 
Charles Booth was to say that the decade saw “more progress in the 
art of leather manufacture than in any decade of the world.” He clearly 
enjoyed being part of it. Over the decade hide usage in the US grew by 
21%, sheep consumption by 39% but goat driven on by chrome 
tanning and the fact that the resulting product was so good for all 
parts of footwear uppers grew by 1600%. 
 
The Schultz patent was licensed out on the basis of a royalty of 12.5 
cents a dozen and a US $12500 annual fee; not only a high price but 
also hard to collect and so by 1895 there were many tanneries in 
Philadelphia making copies. The production of chrome kid had 
become a specialty of Philadelphia. Legal challenges to the patent were 
initially successful but finally on appeal the Schultz patents were 
supported in late 1895.  The UK press was delighted: “this decision, 
from a commercial standpoint, must be very satisfactory to 
Englishmen, for it raises the price of chrome tanned leather to the 
same level as before, and all firms will have to pay their license to the 
Company.”40 
 
All appeared to be successful in a period for Philadelphia tanners 
which White describes as the “gold rush days of the kid industry.”41 
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This glazed leather had all the qualities and none of the defects of the 
previous product, could be made quickly and sold at a good margin. 
 
While Booths had not been involved in any of the wrangling about the 
ownership of the chrome patents they had been watchful and ready to 
get involved in any successful commercialization. Booths got involved 
in chrome leather through buying a product from Richard Patswosky 
a tanner from New York to replace Dongola glazed kid in the late 
1880s. This was called “Bonafide” glazed kid.  They gave this up in 
1894 to work more closely with John P. Mathieu of Philadelphia. 
 
1894 was an important year for Booths.  Julius Kuttner, who was by 
then a partner in Booth & Co, signed a contract with John P. Mathieu, 
a Philadelphia tanner, to manufacture for them black glazed kid.  
Mathieu had succeeded in producing this leather using the “Schultz 
process” and had given it the trade name “Surpass Kid”.  The deal 
made was that Booth & Co. would take the full production of 250 
dozen skins daily.   
 
Mathieu was 10 years younger than Kuttner and at the age of 30 in 
1883 had set up a small Morocco leather tannery making brushed kid 
in Philadelphia, and then expanded into a new plant he built in 
Allegheny Avenue in Philadelphia in 1892.  The 1894 agreement saw 
the closure of the downtown Philadelphia sales office of Surpass and 
the manager there, Albert G. Greier, move to the 6th floor of the Healy 
Building at 90, Gold Street, New York where a sorting office was 
placed. Greier worked under Charles Becker who now had charge of 
sales of shoe leather from both Gloversville and Philadelphia.  
 
The market was very much a sellers’ market and for a long time 
Surpass Philadelphia only produced black leather in one finish. J.P. 
Mathieu remained general manager of the Surpass tannery and ran it 




We have already mentioned that the period between 1893 and 1898 
was one of general business depression and that this was particularly 
felt by the US Leather Company and others working bovine leathers in 
the traditional way.  The period was not so much of a problem for 
Booths as even although the Dongola kid declined the new chrome 
leather was taking its place. 
 
Certainly technical advances in the lighter skins were giving that side 
of the industry considerable buoyancy.  Fatliquoring, Dongola using 
gambier and aluminium (still in use for kangaroo shoe leather), and 
chrome tanning were being noticed world-wide.  To put the work of 
Booth & Co in a proper perspective we must look overseas to see the 
reaction. From the UK Professor Procter was the world’s leading 
authority on leather technology. He visited the US and returned 
extolling the quality and importance of chrome tanning. At about the 
same time the German tanning and footwear industry chose to 
transform itself by using the methods it discovered in the USA. 
 
In December 1898 the US Consul General in Frankfort, Frank Mason 
wrote an extensive report report42 on the industry in Germany:   
 
“in the whole of record of industrial development in Germany during the 
past four years there has been no feature more striking and significant 
than the progress of the leather industries which now rank about fourth 
in the productive interests of this country……This whole subject derives 
an especial interest to Americans from the fact that the German shoe 
and leather industries are in a state of transition from the slow and 
primitive methods of hand labor to the most modern forms of chemical 
tanning and shoe production, and because this transformation consists 
largely in the adoption of American methods and machinery.” 
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Much of the change had started after the 1873 World Exposition in 
Vienna when Mr. Schultz (not related to the Schultz of chrome 
tanning fame) had sold American quality leather so successfully to the 
European market.  The Europeans had noted that a lot of this leather 
was made on European raw stock, exported to the US by Booths and 
others, and came back to Europe at a profit even after paying German 
import duties.  Not all of this related to the leather chemistry. Some 
had to do with factory layouts and the machinery used, symptomatic 
of the mentality that grew up in the US alongside the concept of 
exchangeable parts, and the associated mechanization of the many 
individual elements of production they had isolated.  From the 
invention of the splitting machine in the first decade of the 19th 
century, and continuous work on extracting tan from bark so the 
extract could be shipped instead of the incredibly bulky and delicate 
bark itself the US had been a hot bed of machinery solutions for the 
leather making process.  Mason’s report continues “a leading New 
England manufacturing company, which turns out exclusively high 
class tanning machinery has been compelled to enlarge its plant to meet 
heavy demands from its European agent, who, beginning three years 
ago with an office in Frankfort has now extended his trade throughout 
Germany and into Austria, Italy and Russia.  Leading German tanners 
have visited the United States and being everywhere freely admitted, 
have studied carefully and intelligently American processes and 
machines………What is of especial interest at this time, as an example 
and indication of the policy which is making Germany a great 
manufacturing nation, is the alert readiness and enterprise with which 
the shoe and leather manufacturers of this country are learning the 
lesson set before them at the Columbian Exposition of 1893.  The 
Chrome tanning process was originally invented by a German but it 
was perfected and made industrially successful at Philadelphia. As 
soon as it was recognized that American tanners produced by that 
process soft pliant, and lustrous leather which could not be rivaled in 
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this country, the German tanners hastened to master and adopt the 
new method.”   
 
By 1898 the German shoe and leather trade journals were reporting 
that German tanners had now successfully studied and transferred 
the chrome process to German tanneries and they felt not only equal 
but ready to finally “surpass their efficiency.” It is outside the scope of 
this dissertation to examine that claim but there is no doubt that over 
the next ten years the UK industry was seen to have slipped from a 
number one position in the world through the 19th century to a 
number three position behind both the US and Germany.  This was a 
position that was steadily to deteriorate throughout the 20th century, 
despite the fact that as a British organization the Booths had been 
responsible for a very large part of it. 
 
Figure 7: Chrome Tanning 1898
43 
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It was in 1890 that Booth & Co set up an office in Australia for the 
purchase of kangaroo skins as well as sheepskins.  Frank Miller 
established this office close to the current Sydney Opera House and 
William Cunningham joined to help. Cunningham moved to 
Gloversville in 1898 and later took over the pickled sheepskin 
department in New York. 
 
1900 began with a shock to the system as Surpass leather was 
damaged by fire, but the opportunity was taken to rebuild it using all 
the latest technology and with a layout suited to high volume 
production of the chrome kid skins. 
 
The directories of the times indicated this transformation: 
 
“J.P. Mathieu & Co., Surpass Glazed Kid Works Westmoreland and 
Ninth Streets, Ontario and 10th Streets. Plant covers five acres. All new 
and modern buildings. One of the largest, finest, and most attractive 
leather works of the world. Complete electrical equipment. Produces 
only "Surpass Glazed Kid," used by shoe manufacturers. Sold 
exclusively by Booth & Co., New York, Boston and London." 44 
  
Booths made a double gain as the supplier of the goatskins to 
Mathieu throughout this relationship.   
 
In the late 1890s we began to see the introduction of the younger 
Booths to the business.  Two of Alfred’s sons entered the shipping 
business and Charles took his son George to the US shortly after he 
had finished at School. On his return his mother Mary intervened to 
stop George going into “trade” and persuaded the family that he 
should cram to go to Cambridge Trinity. This he did and he remained 
at Trinity for two years aiming towards a medical qualification. Having 
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decided that this was not for him in 1901 he rejoined the business as 
a “clerk” in London. 
 
1901 turned out to be a momentous year for the company.  George 
was quickly sent on a world tour during which he opened a New 
Zealand office in Christchurch. He was also went on many UK tours 
around shoe factories to sell the American chrome kid. But most 
significantly Julius Kuttner died and George and Charles at once went 
out to the US for a few months after which George was asked to 
remain in charge. Kuttner had been managing the US for fifteen years 
and had run the business for the Booths via extensive 
correspondence, mostly with Charles, and regular visits from one or 
other of the partners. George M. Booth (often known as GMB), a son of 
Charles was just 24 when asked to take his place as manager of the 
US. 
 
This was a significant moment for reflection as the company had 
grown considerably. In 1884 the New York and Boston offices had just 
under twenty staff in total but by 1901 this had grown to around 100. 
These were split into three divisions under the titles of leather, 
sheepskins and steamers and agencies. The leather was the finished 
leather being sold in the US and starting to be exported to Europe, 
while the sheepskins made up the raw material being brought into the 
USA to supply the tanneries. Both the original founders were now 
elderly and not in the best of health so as the children were 
introduced into the management a team of loyal senior staff was built 
around them.  George returned to the UK briefly in July 1902 solely to 
recruit some more English senior management to take out to the US. 
 
Sales agencies were opened in a number of shoes centres, including 
St. Louis as the production of the kid mounted. In 1900 a warehouse 
was opened in Bermondsey, London, to accelerate the sale of chrome 
kid in Europe. At that time the only European makers of chrome kid 
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were the German tanners. Booths decided they would like to get 
involved themselves in 1901 when Charles Wade wanted to own a 
business and moved from Nuneaton, where Booths disengaged 
themselves from the partnership, to Whitemoor works in Nottingham. 
With the help of Booths Charles Wade began to make chrome kid 
amongst other leathers. This joint venture remained until 1956 when 
Booths bought the whole business, although Mr. Max Wade remained 
closely involved for many years after. They had also bought a 
substantial interest in glue and gelatin makers B. Cannon Co Ltd in 
Lincoln. 
 
In 1901 Charles H. Skinner was made manager of Gloversville.  He 
had been sent over by Charles to New York in 1891. He took over a 
diversified business with 450 workers. He stayed in Gloversville until 
1908 and during that period he steadily reduced glove leather 
production so that when he left they were concentrating only on shoe 
leather. In reality the depression of 1893-98 had started to force that 
change as generally the chrome tanned kid continued to grow while 
other areas of their US business struggled and had to be managed 
very carefully. 
 
Also in 1901 Charles began planning to build a proper port in Manáos 
which required a pontoon system to handle the big drops in water 
levels between the high and low water levels.  These big variations 
meant that large ships could not work conveniently in low water 
periods. In 1903 he made his last trip to the Amazon to see the 
completed work in Manáos. It was based on a pontoon they had made 
in the UK and towed up the Amazon. It was this year that the 
Singlehurst family decided to retire from shipping and they sold their 
shipping line to Booths.  
 
An important person came on to the scene at this time by the name of 
Paul Crompton. He had been working in China (probably with the 
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Blue Funnel line from Liverpool) and since 1902 when he was 32 had 
been hired by Charles Booth to look for Chinese goatskin supplies.  
Goat used by Booths had come from Brazil (200 dozen daily in 1901) 
and India (1000 dozen) with the help of the two businesses 
J.H.Rossbach Bros of New York and Cohn Bros & Fuchs.  The latter 
company was based in Calcutta and the goat used was called the 
Patna.  Between 1902 and 1904 Crompton set up new agencies 
replacing these in both Brazil and India. 
 
A major event of the decade, in 1904, required the elderly Charles 
Booth to travel to the US and spend many months commuting 
between New York and Philadelphia in order to formally merge 
Surpass and Booth & Co. The new business, the Surpass Leather 
Company opened on January 1, 1905.  Charles Booth was President, 
J.P. Mathieu was vice-President and the Mathieus family still ran the 
manufacturing.  The kid sorting department was moved from New 
York to Philadelphia and put under Mr. W.W.Hilt and A.G.Grier 
succeeded Charles Becker as sales manager in New York, to be 
followed by George W. Chandler. 
 
Grier had been the original seller of the Mathieus leather before the 
Booth connection and in 1894 he had been asked to go to be in charge 
of the sorting office in New York, which took up the whole of the 6th 
Floor at 90, Gold Street.   
 
In 1904 Paul Crompton, who was then 34, was brought to the USA by 
Charles Booth to be raw stock manager in Philadelphia, working for 
Fred Harrison who became head of the factory office staff.  In 1907 
when the Booths bought out the Mathieus and took 100% owner ship 
of Surpass Paul Crompton took over as Vice President of Surpass 
Leather and General Manager from January 1, 1908.  Charles Skinner 
was brought over from Gloversville to look after the factory 
management and spent 12 months ensuring he understood the 
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chrome tannage system in the handover with the Mathieus. The notes 
from White (p13) indicate while Skinner had been dynamic and 
innovative in Gloversville he was more protective of methods and 
personnel in Philadelphia. In this he was praised for easing the 
change to Booth ownership and all the supervisors stayed and the 
quality was maintained. In 1909 he replaced dog dung with the 
enzyme bate Oropon from Germany – a technology which had been 
discovered ten years earlier by Joseph Turney Wood of Turneys but 
was only now being commercialized. 
 
Further technical development associated with the Booth Company 
was to take place in the USA and was announced at Summerdale 
Station, Philadelphia & Reading R.R.: "One of the greatest and finest 
leather factories in the world, especially equipped for producing "Ideal 
Leather," a non-breakable enamelled leather patented by George S. 
Wolff, founder and president of the company. The entire output is 
handled by Booth & Co., N.Y."45 
 
Acquiring raw materials and distributing finished leather had brought 
the Booths into touch with all parts of the world.  But the hides and 
skins they were bringing to the US were increasingly being used in 
their own plants rather than being sold to others.  They had also 
added interests in glue, gelatine and felt (all bi-products of the raw 
hide and skin trade) on both sides of the Atlantic. They retained 
trading offices in Nigeria, in New Zealand, and in Australia. 
 
But the younger Booths who had become involved in 1901 and 1902 
also helped push through other changes, or at least gave the founding 
partners confidence to further develop the business. The shipping line 
had done very well in the 1890s46  following the invention of the 
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invention of the pneumatic tyre in 1888. The boom in Brazilian rubber 
meant that by 1890 the Booth Line owned 14 vessels. In 1901 the 
Booth Line and their competitor the Red Cross Line had merged under 
the name The Booth Steamship Co. Ltd. Also in 1901 the Booth 
Iquitos Line was established although it was absorbed with its two 
vessels back into the main business in 1913. In 1903 Alfred Booth 
helped formally start the Manáos Harbour Company where they had a 
big holding and a controlling interest for a period. Booths were given 
management rights for the port of Manáos until 1971. 
 
In 1903 they introduced tours to Madeira and Lisbon. So after some 
years of steady growth it was a major change when they had eleven 
ships requisitioned for service in World War I and nine of them were 
lost. After the War they were left with eighteen vessels but the reduced 
fleet came with diminished enthusiasm and after more losses in World 
War II in April 1946 the fleet was sold by George Booth to Lord Vestey 
over lunch in a London Club.47 
 
As indicated Charles did go to the US to help conclude the deal with 
Surpass leather but in the same year, 1904, he was made a Privy 
Councillor by Prime Minister Balfour and was encouraged to further 
his concept of a universal old age pension. This came to fruition with 
the Old Age Pension Act of 1908 so during the decade the younger 
members were clearly taking over. Charles was to have another 
serious bout of illness in 1905 and moved out to his house in 
Leicestershire to rest and recover, pushing the children back into the 
forefront with George who having come back from the US with high 
status for a job well done had effectively become general manager. 
 
The business continued to grow. The children of Albert oriented 
towards managing the shipping and those of Charles the leather side.  
G.M. Booth was the senior leather man moving things forward in the 
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UK and the USA along with all the global agencies. After his marriage 
George decided he needed to understand the shipping business and 
he and his wife sailed to Manáos and on up to Iquitos where Booths 
were now repeating the exercise of Manáos building a new port48. 
George wanted to test the routes over the Andes to the Pacific and 
made the journey successfully despite getting involved in a Peruvian 
Civil War. (The journey was used as the basis of a novel by Virginia 
Woolf). In Lima George Booth declined an offer to manage the 
country’s Pacific port. This unwillingness to get involved in such 
projects matched his father’s decision many years earlier not to get 
drawn into more infrastructure projects in Brazil despite heavy 
pressure. Charles was pleased to do the port work to support his 12 
day shipping service, but did not want to get further involved. 
 
This was a useful journey as both his cousins were to be poached 
from Booth Shipping over the next two years, Alfred to be Chairman of 
Cunard and Charles to Chairman of Midland Railway. The three 
remained great friends throughout their lives, and all had huge 
affection and respect for Charles. It would also appear clear that the 
relationship between George and his father was very close. Even after 
he took effective day to day control in the early 1900s he remained 
working closely with his father right through the war period when he 
and his father are noted as attending many meetings together. 
 
From 1900 until 1970 it became the norm in the company to call the 
Booths by their initials and so Charles’ grandson John Sebastian 
Macaulay Booth who was the last Chairman and Managing Director 
was always known as JSMB and is remembered as such to this day. 
This coincided with the other term for the company’s senior staff 
which was the “Booth Men”. This covered all the senior staff who 
joined the business from about 1885 onwards and continues with a 
few retirees who were still meeting for a monthly lunch in Wandsworth 
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(where JSMB finally retired) in 2010.  The concept of a united culture 
and a high level of trust had begun early in the company and was 
effectively a requirement of the fact that two continents and multiple 
locations were involved. 
 
In 1910 G.M.Booth toured the US market and added sales offices so 
as well as New York, Boston and Philadelphia they had St. Louis, 
Cincinnati and Rochester, providing all senior sales staff with cars in 
1914.  Also around this time they invested in the US in Densten Felt 
and Hair Co and Gardiner-Lucas Glue & Gelatine Corporation.49  
 
War changed matters considerably and temporarily forced the elderly 
Albert and Charles back into more executive action. George offered his 
services to the Government to sort out the supply situation and was 
made Deputy Director General of Munitions Supply and subsequently 
Adviser to the Ministry on Allies Requirements. Booths US interests 
and George’s contacts were used for US sourcing (Booths charged 1% 
for acquisitions made in the US and nothing for their UK activity) and 
access to dollars. George had also been made a Director of the Bank of 
England so this whole period while a stressful wartime experience 
meant that he worked closely with a number of Prime Ministers and 
many Cabinet Ministers as well as building close friendships with top 
Americans including President Hoover. 
 
If the first decade had been the decade of transition the second decade 
of the 20th century was the decade of change in personnel.  Both the 
founder brothers died, Alfred in 1914. Charles returned to the 
business on his brother’s death but was himself attacked by paralysis 
in the summer of 1916 and he died on November 23rd of the same 
year. 
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Tragically Mr. Crompton and his family also died in 1915 when they 
were on the Lusitania.  There is more to this than just the simple 
tragedy as it is fairly clear that the sheepskins that were on the 
manifest were in fact military accoutrements.50 The ship was a 
Cunard boat, and Mr. Charles Booth was Chairman and Booths were 
routinely shipping skins back and forth across the Atlantic, so this 
would have been an easy thing to do. 
 
The same month as Lusitania sank Mr. G.M. Booth had been made a 
full time member of the Armaments Output Committee by Lord 
Kitchener. 
 
In 1917 in the UK Albert Booth and Co. made an investment in a UK 
glove tannery and felmonger in Abingdon, buying it outright in 1921. 
It made fine doeskin glove leather and along with fellmongering it also 
had small production of split grains and chamois. This allowed them 
to close their felmongery and tannery operation in Lincoln (separate 
from B. Cannon and Co the glue size and gelatine business they 
owned) and relocate it to Abingdon, but we have no detail of the 
rationale behind this move. Over the first two decades of the twentieth 
century nearly all the leather side investments had been into 
manufacturing and Booths really had grown on the back of the huge 
success of the chrome tanned kid. 
 
The dynamic which George brought to the business is shown in a 
number of other acquisitions. In 1917 while in the US George bought 
J.G.White and company51  Whilst US owned, much of its business was 
managed out of London. It owned tramways and power companies in 
Para, Manáos and many other Brazilian cities as well as 10 South 
American branches forming an important import and export business 
with South America. George Booth subsequently sold it back to James 
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Gilbert White in 1929, when White wanted to use it to tender for 
business in Ethiopia, but then took it back off White’s hands for 
nothing in 1931. At that time along with a colleague, William Burton 
Balding, with whom he was travelling in New York when the 
repurchase option came up they decided to use it to set up the first 
UK investment trust. This original unit trust, the First British Fixed 
Trust, was launched on 23rd April 1931 by Municipal & General 
Securities, now known as M&G52, in the depths of a nationwide 
recession.  The launch price was 31 shillings and nine pence a unit. 
Between 1931 and 1939 nine more M&G Trusts were launched.  
George remained a Director of the Bank of England until 1946. 
 
Also in 1919 Booths became involved in construction and bought the 
Unit construction company, so that after the sale of the shipping 
business in 1946 Booths were left with two quite separate businesses, 
with almost no overlap, of construction and leather. 
 
For the first half of the 20th century the Booth Group remained one of 
the largest and most geographically spread leather organisations, 
mixing both tanning and trading in its activities but increasingly 
interested in tanning alone. The plants in the US continued and in the 
UK Wades and Turneys came much more closely integrated. Pavlova 
leather in Abingdon was also brought under the umbrella as later was 
Melrose tanners in Beverley.  The company had strong relationships 
throughout the world with a balance of ownership and long term 
partnerships.  John Sebastian Macaulay Booth (JSMB) was at the 
helm at the end of the Second World War and strengthened the 
management with a large number of key executives with whom he had 
served.  The group began to concern itself with the quality of the raw 
material it was importing, part processed for its UK and US tanneries 
and this lead to investments in Africa.  Out of this came a new 
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direction for the group towards investing in tanneries in Africa and 
New Zealand.  Building strong relationships in these “colonial” regions 
was easy for the new management.  The language was English and the 
business environment comfortable.  Through this the Booth Company 
came to effectively be involved in a network from raw material to 
finished goods.   
 
So the company entered the 1960s in quite a strong position seeing 
itself as probably the largest tanning organisation in “The 
Commonwealth”.  However it was in that decade that South Korea 
began to develop the blueprint for making leather and leather 
products very cheaply and exporting to the USA and the EU. This 
model was very successful for Korea and Taiwan and accelerated in 
the 1970s and 1980s the decline of tanning in the UK and the USA.  
 
To fight off this flight of their market place to the third world tanners 
in southern Europe, especially Italy and to a lesser degree Spain 
began to accelerate the development of high fashion leather suited to 
help the better shoe and leather-goods manufacturers in Europe to 
hold a quality and fashion lead over the cheaper importers.  Santa 
Croce in Italy became the world capital for creating the new trends in 
leather and their seasonal ranges were eagerly awaited and much 
copied.  Part of the Italian skill was a capability to make highly 
valuable leather out of lower grade and cheaper raw material.  
Meanwhile US and northern European tanners struggled with the 
closure of their customers as the move of all leather using industries 
overseas accelerated.  At the same time, they experienced diminishing 
access to third-world raw material as those countries started to 
produce their own finished products, or started to sell to the emerging 
markets or the Italians who could pay more. 
 
So the Booth business, largely concentrated in the UK and US 
countries suffered. Their UK tanneries were houses in old buildings 
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which were hard to adapt for modern manufacture, and in town 
centre locations no longer suited for manufacturing of this sort. The 
ventures in Africa had struggled against a background of continuous 
political change and interference and New Zealand and Australian 
manufacture was suffering from Asian competition just as much as 
the EU and the USA. 
 
With Booth’s extensive global alliances and historic goodwill options 
for expansion and repositioning were available but with a relatively 
elderly board and no close family involved in 1981 it was decided to 
sell the business to Sir Kenneth Newton of Garnar Scotblair. Wades 
had just been closed and Turneys was shut as part of the 
arrangement and in the years to follow all the plants were to be closed 
for redevelopment. The only surviving elements remaining into the 21st 
century are Booth and Company in Peabody Massachusetts run as a 
small trading business by Ken Chapman, whose father Kenneth 
Chapman was one of the Booth Men who started with the Booths in 
the days of Surpass Leather in Philadelphia in the 1940s, and a Booth 
International business in Scotland whose activities are small and 
unclear. 
 
This period so real growth in the Booth business as both the Booth 
Men working for the founding managers and the new generation used 
the many relationships established over many years to establish new 
linkages and strengthen many old ones so that the company could 
move into new areas geographically and new areas of business, 
 
4.10 Consideration of Episode 4 1890-1920 and beyond 
 
The outcomes of networking change the characteristics of a network, 
but because of the multiplicity of actors and the complexity of their 
different viewpoints, those outcomes are neither predictable nor 
controllable.  The networking of each actor and their reactions to that 
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of others will depend on their unique network pictures. Each actor will 
bring their own baggage from the past.  The case illustrates clear 
differences in the network pictures of different players the historical 
perspective provides insight into the outcomes of networking and the 
processes of network evolution.  
 
The opportunity to be part of the immense growth of tanning in 
Philadelphia was to lead to a further re-orientation of the business 
albeit over a period of some 15 years. This would be the period when 
Booths moved from being primarily traders to being manufacturers. 
This was not just apparent from the nature of the business but clear 
in many of their letters and diaries (Crow, 1965 and John 1959). By 
1920 the Booth Men, as the partners and senior managers came to be 
called, considered themselves to be tanners and manufacturers first 
and foremost. Other activities were continued but always considered 
more peripheral. 
 
Some would say that the Booths created the boom in Philadelphia 
tanning through their ability to market the new chrome kid whose 
potential value they had identified from the long years of working with 
Dongola. In 1890 the Booth business was still based around being 
middlemen trading in pickled pelts, with a specialty in raw material 
for the Boston market. They had a business in tanning in Gloversville 
which had grown faster than they had expected but which informed 
the business rather than defined it. They also traded in a variety of 
other raw materials from various parts of the world. By 1920 this had 
changed with the purchase of Pavlova, the full ownership of Surpass, 
plants in Lincoln, a 50% share in Wades on top of the large 
Gloversville factory.  
 
The purchase of Booth and Kent was not completed until Kent’s death 
in 1886. Before that they had only provided finance guaranteed by the 
buildings and other assets. The change to being owners had a clear 
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impact on the company’s belief in its ability to make money from 
manufacturing in a market place that was growing rapidly with the 
expansion of the US population and the associated urbanization.  
There is no evidence in the letters that they suddenly felt that control 
of manufacturing via ownership was a requirement. They bought the 
tannery since its business was a significant source of income to them 
via commission on raw material and the sale of finished leather and 
James Kent’s family did not want to be involved after his death.  It is 
clear that their confidence to participate, to comment and to back 
their hunches with investment greatly increased after this experience 
with the Gloversville tannery. A clear impact was that after 1886 the 
Kent relationships had to be managed by the Booths themselves or 
senior Booth’s staff. It was no longer Kent who was interacting in large 
parts of the network it was now Booths. This tightening of 
relationships involved in the manufacturing side of the business 
appeared to coincide with a willingness to use different models of 
working. So in Philadelphia they became quite an aggressive agent for 
the sale of chromium tanned kid leather, getting involved in exclusive 
rights and branding. They were a significant supplier of the raw 
material.  They must also have felt part of the development of the new 
chrome process given their support to Schultz whose patents were the 
foundation of the processing being done. So they moved from being 
only the traders servicing this manufacture into having their own 
skins contract tanning – something which had been common with the 
hide tanners in New York. Around 1894 they began to be drawn into 
supporting Surpass with investment monies, but they did not take full 
ownership until 1907. Nevertheless they made an excellent profit at 
either end. 
 
As well as trading chrome leather from Philadelphia they introduced 
chrome tanning into Gloversville to process goat and kangaroo in 
1894. This was to be the start of regular movements of staff and 
technology between the two cities. This helped them balance capacity 
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and help Gloversville where the glove business was starting to struggle 
with the arrival of difficult economic times. On the other hand the new 
leather was able to continue to steal market share on account of its 
features and benefits. In 1898 they also formalized a relationship with 
George S Wolff to make a modern version of patent leather which he 
made in his Philadelphia tannery and Booths sold under the brand 
“Ideal”. 
 
Around the turn of the century the Mathieus’ Surpass Tannery burnt 
down. This was a catalyst for the younger Booths who were starting to 
get involved. They were helped with the decision to rebuild and 
promoted a major acceleration in activity to strengthen certain 
relations and increase the levels of activity.  
 
The Gloversville tannery stopped making any glove leather in 1902 
and focused only on footwear leather.53 In 1904 Booths invested in a 
new plant with Wolff to create the Wolff Process Leather Company 
near Philadelphia. The Surpass tannery was rebuilt by 1904 as a full 
joint venture and in 1907 they bought it outright.54 Philadelphia was 
then to be the manufacturing powerhouse of the group for four 
decades. This was the largest kidskin tannery in the world at that 
time and working with the most advanced technology. They had 
visitors from all over the world including a most famous one from 
Professor Procter from The University of Leeds in 1896; but they had 
themselves sent Charles Wade over in 1894 for the first of many visits 
and this was eventually to lead to the development of the Wade 
tannery at the old Whitemoor Leather Works in Nottingham. 
Producing chrome tanned leather on a variety of raw materials Wades 
was to remain tightly linked in to the Booth group until its closure in 
1980. 
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They made additional investments in the US and in the UK in glue, 
gelatine and felt manufacture which were all based on bi-products of 
tanning. And immediately after the First World War they bought into 
and eventually acquired Pavlova leather in Abingdon, a felmongery 
and a skin tannery. 
 
It was not just in leather that the business was developing. In 1903 
the Booths established the Manáos Harbour Company, built the 
harbour there and another in Iquitos and expanded their shipping. 55 
 
Charles Booth had written early in the formation of the business that 
he wanted “a widespread but generally inter-connected business 
which provides a well balanced structure”56 and this is what he was 
looking at in 1901 as his son started his participation. 
 
This final period and the years after the war clearly show a very 
confident business: and one with a wide global area of interaction.  
 
Subjective Interpretation 
It becomes clear during this period that the Booths become very 
comfortable with management at a distance. Charles is steeped in 
social research and writing in London and yet is able to take a senior 
partner role in a company that now truly extends across the globe. 
Using modern communications to the full he appears able to keep in 
touch with events from Brazil to New Zealand as well as in the UK and 
the USA. He does make regular trips to the US and maintains a level 
of correspondence with his wife and business colleagues that makes it 
hard to imagine the long work days this makes for. 
 
These letters along with the meetings in London and the USA also 
permit him to keep in very close contact with many key companies 
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and individuals with which Booths are not trading. While they appear 
to have lost contact with Schultz when he went off to research other 
things and did not try to own or commercialise his chromium patents 
they stayed in very close touch with the way the industry was looking 
at chromium leather and how leathers produced from it might fit their 
market. No one in the huge American bovine industry appears to have 
been taking a similar interest.  This implies that Charles Booth was 
choosing to maintain a wide and large network picture and was not 
limiting it to transactional relationships (Henneberg et.al., 2006). He 
also had clear expectations of the other actors whom he was watching 
and corresponding with.  
 
The specific expectations which the key individuals in Booth and 
company held appear to firm as the company grew, and George Booth 
clearly displayed an approach of someone with a clear view of the 
future and quite definitive views of how other actors were most likely 
to react. While the company moved strongly into manufacturing it 
never had a stated policy to do so. The starting moves had been 
accidental and opportunistic.  Booths had been happy to enter into 
joint ventures as with Kent, with Mathieu, with Wade and in 
Nuneaton with Johnson.  Once they had become involved via James 
Kent in technology and seen how their involvement could help get his 
product into a new market, they were keen to see technology that 
satisfied market needs and continued to support it. Yet they did not 
try to own the technology but rather worked on a structure that could 
exploit it. They worked very hard to maintain good relationships with 
all their partners, to treat their workers well, and manage the 
business through difficult times. For although generally speaking the 
company grew well there were many periods in each decade where the 
financial pressures had been very great and many periods of severe 




In fifteen years the order of importance of the Booth leather business 
was beginning to be reversed.  Steadily during the 1990s the 
manufacture of glazed and matt kid from Philadelphia became the 
predominant activity centered on the large factory in Philadelphia with 
Gloversville moving to the role of a sizeable subsidiary. Pickled pelts 
remained but dropped to a quarter of the kid business. Within the 
pickled pelts business the export of grains grew and that of roans 
shrank, relatively and absolutely.  
 
Looking at the leather part of the network in Figure 7 estimated in the 
early years of the 20th century we see the importance of the US 
involvement in manufacture. Management of the US was still in New 
York and the head office did not move to Philadelphia until 1927, but 
the scale of the operations, the associated profit and cash flow must 
have made Philadelphia key. With the shipping of skins from the 
Amazon coming in to East Coast ports and so directly to Philadelphia 
the movement of goods by Booths around the Philadelphia area must 
have been significant. Surpass soon became one of the largest 
tanneries in the world and traded on being the leading pioneer of 
chromium tanning with Booths working on how they could maximise 





Figure 8: The Booth Co Network around 1900 
 
 
Since Professor Procter had not managed to stir the UK tanners to do 
anything significant with chromium it was natural that Booths should 
do it themselves. The close personal relationship they had built up 
with Charles Wade and the money they spent sending him in the mid 
nineties to Surpass was well spent so they backed him to set up his 
own tannery to make this leather in Nottingham.  This was a clear 
case of creation in terms of the 6Cs as would be other moves to bring 
chrome tanning to the UK. We do not know what Turneys thought 
about this happening in their own town but we do know that at this 
time Mr John Turney was hugely involved in his discovery of 
enzymatic materials for bating to replace dog dung, and it was to be 
over a decade before Turneys added a chrome section. 
 
The view of the company, especially George M.Booth and J.S.M.Booth 
later was that this move towards manufacturing had been timely. 
With the establishment of companies like the United States Leather 
Company and the general growth and consolidation worldwide more 


























suppliers. At the other end in places like Australia and New Zealand 
the raw dealers also wanted to deal directly with tanners.  So the role 
of the importer selling to merchants and small tanners out of an office 
in New York steadily declined in the late 19th century and this decline 
accelerated in the first decades of the 20th century. This also coincided 
with a new generation of immigration into the US from Eastern 
Europe and Germany.  These immigrants included a number of fur 
traders who also traded leather and chemicals and they appear to 
have built into that part of the network where the Booth relationships 
had weakened through their becoming tanners.   
 
Relativity 
The outcome of having links into a wide dispersed network, or series 
of networks was clear.  The belief that ownership of factories or 
technologies was not a vital requirement to make success of the 
network was also clear. There is no statement in any correspondence 
examined in this dissertation that the converse was true – that too 
tight an ownership might create problems although there is equally no 
aversion to ownership displayed either. 
 
At the beginning the Booths established many new relationships in 
the business start-up phase.  These then became part of an 
organisational structure covering each of the two areas of 
manufacturing and trading.   In its first fifty years the company never 
lost its strong Liverpool roots despite the rift when Charles moved to 
London. 
 
The company grew in two clear geographic directions. One was to gain 
access to more raw material and the other was to expand into the 
centres where the finished product was distributed.  The former took 
them to Brazil, India, Africa, China, Australia and New Zealand over 
above the European sources they had already opened up.  The latter 
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meant opening in many of the newer US cities as they developed and 
then bringing finished goods back to Europe for sale.  
 
Booths held positions in a very wide range of networks. Whereas at 
the start nearly all the actors were third parties by the 20th century 
many of the actors in the Booth networks were fully or partially 
owned. With all actors in the network being related this level of 
involvement and control was a considerable change on the 1860s 
structure where the steps taken by the Booths were more tentative 
and the subject of a great deal of discussion. They were also involved 
in many networks including leather, shipping, finance, politics, and 
business in general. Charles clearly felt this to be a strength, and his 
letters show that he liked to look at the big picture. “The secret of the 
eventual success of the business lay in the interaction of Charles 
Booth’s long-term considerations with the sound practical judgment of 
his partners. If the tactics were theirs, the strategy was his” mused 
John.57 
 
His hirings and utilisation of people suggest that he decided which 
relationships he wished to strengthen and how he would encourage 
certain repositioning. The work with Wolff58 and Patswosky showed he 
was aware of what others were doing in the market and he was willing 
to get involved. We do not know the full detail of the mechanics of the 
building of these relationships but it is clear that there was a master 
plan. The Booths had an open mind, were watchful for opportunities 
and known to be worth taking a good idea to. Being at the forefront of 
introducing two new technologies they wanted to be sure that they 
missed nothing else that was new. This demonstrates that a 
relationship has a number of parallel and sequential interactions and 
we see with Booth and Co. a pattern emerging of them staying in close 
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contact with all those involved in technical developments in light 
leather (Ford and Håkansson, 2006).  
 
This was summed up in a contemporary view of Booth and Co. in a 
book on New York Leather families:  
 
“This firm are among the largest and richest in the business.  They 
import skins from Brazil and other points, and manufacture at 
Gloversville and Philadelphia.  No house has done more for the trade 
than Booth & Co. They have introduced the dongola and the patent kid 
tannage, and have been active in protecting the interests of the trade in 
tariff litigation”.59   
 
Decisions were made by Charles to stay in close touch with technical 
people in order to understand the options and potential of the new 
technology. Sending Charles Wade to the USA to look at chrome 
tanning in the early 1890s was typical. We also know that Sir John 
Turney was frequently in London on leather industry duties such as 
the building of the new college at Tower Bridge, where he made the 
opening address, so all leather technical matters, as well as raw 
material supply and the like would be part of the meetings they would 
have.  
 
It also appears that they were close with their Banks on both sides of 
the Atlantic.  It is hard to say that this was an equal relationship yet 
the Bank of America lunched Charles and his son on every US visit 
and there was never any discussion on changing banks despite there 
being so many industry specific banks in the US.  Again the close 
relationship they had with banking circles would make the 
relationship of value over and above the trading alone, and this would 
have been emphasised when Charles’ son became a Director of the 
Bank of England. 
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Charles had deliberated expanded the business to give a diverse but 
coherent nature to it, so it could weather storms in different sectors 
and geographies. He had used his personal and company 
relationships to build the company’s position in the networks which 
gave him access to a very wide range of resources, to knowledge and 
to a flexibility to move the business to fit the trends. This had 
successfully led to them transitioning more into the manufacturing 
side of the leather business just as the opportunities in trading for 
their size and type of business were diminishing. They had watched 
their networks evolve and they had reacted over time to try and find 
the best position to meet the future. Since their capabilities had 
increased as they extended the business their interdependence was 
clearly evolving, yet equally many of the other actors were also 
developing additional skills.  These included Turneys, Wade and the 
US customer base where the footwear industry had steadily 
industrialized over the period and become much more sophisticated.  
 
The problems they met were both positive and negative and included 
getting heavy goods speedily across the Atlantic to and from Brazil, 
monitoring the evolution of chrome tanning and deciding the right 
moment to get back into the market, searching for additional raw 
material, and managing economic and currency issues. They were 
generally able to respond quickly, but their ability to react – buying 
sailing ships to do a specific job, getting back into chromium leathers 
when the product was commercially viable – show a company 
watching the bigger picture and knowing where it had access to the 
resources it needed at each moment in time.  
 
This complexity was managed using processes laid down by Charles 




After the investment in Kent and Booth became successful it was 
protected as a major source of cash flow.  When the introduction of 
chromium began the company was alert to the fact they had to get 
involved as this material might eventually take over from Dongola 
leather in the market. With Kent and Booth making good profits it 
might have been easy to overlook this danger and just enjoy the 
income being achieved in Gloversville. 
 
So this was something they were willing to confront despite their own 
network position suggesting that this could do damage to their 
existing structure. The staff in Gloversville will have watched the huge 
and relentless investment in Philadelphia in the 1890s and 1900s 
with some concern.  
 
The search for raw material also had to go on aggressively and many 
business relationships were established in Africa – Nigeria, Kenya – 
and in Australia and New Zealand. Booths offered these areas a 
unique opportunity to open up their raw material to the international 
market and make the most of them, and in return Booths were able to 
feed a demand that was growing quickly.  
 
Frequently the Booths used joint ventures and partnerships to expand 
their activities; to “create” in terms of the Three Network Paradoxes. 
This fits well with their understanding of interdependencies and 
ability to know the actors which had the resources they needed to 
move forward into new areas. The level of “networking” was at all 
times quite intense even although it took over 20 years to take 
chromium to market from the moment Schultz received his patents to 
full ownership of Surpass with quite a number of periods of inactivity 
in between.  
 
The relationships in the developing areas of Australasia and Africa 
meant that they were later to be a good position to develop into 
  
 152 
tanning in many of those countries, but the wholesale move into being 
a major tanning group was eventually to create such a tight network 




It has been clear that jointness was very strong in the Booth group.  
All parties were pleased to be linked in to the company. The terms 
that make for good levels of jointness (Ford and Håkansson, 2006) – 
cooperation, trust, mutuality and goodwill –were very much evident.  
A structure evolved which allowed to Charles to work on his social 
activities yet maintain quite detailed control over the business, and 
later for his son George to become involved in city and political 
matters while still keeping quite tight reins on the business.  
 
It is clear that they worked closely with all their suppliers with many 
adaptations in product and process that tied the two parties together. 
So the activity links amongst their many partners, orchestrated from 
either London or New York, continued to extend. A high level of 
experimentation in terms of both product and markets was evident. 
Jointness can appear to emphasis the dyadic aspect of networking 
(Ford and Håkansson, 2006, p. 14) but the relation between two 
actors is related to interactions with others. The jointness of related 
companies is seen clearly in the supply chain Booths set up where it 
was the interactions amongst actors rather than a major control 
structure which made it so successful.  
 
As the business grew towards the turn of the century and beyond the 
company was too large to be managed even by these carefully chosen 
family members and professional managers were increasingly brought 
in. The culture that created the concept of “Booth Men” was one born 
of great care and attention in this matter. With a business in another 
continent trust levels had to be very high. In every area of 
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correspondence Charles Booth talks about and to individuals to the 
extent it appears that as well as seeing a business network he also 
had in mind a network of individual executives with skills and 
competencies that he had knitted together.  His letters also explained 
his “innate love of system”60 which was as discussed how he was able 
to construct and manage a complex business that from 1880 onwards 
must be seen as a sort of part time activity for him, as he threw 
himself into his social research in London.  
 
The flexibility arising from good staff and an open approach put them 
in a good position to allow the business to evolve to fit the changes in 
the market.  This is visible in two areas. First the company was able to 
survive quite a number of major periods of economic downturn (much 
of the last thirty years of the 19th century the US was in recession) 
and cash flow problems through being able to call on patient capital 
from bank and colleagues with whom they had built up a good 
relationship through previous interactions. Second the balance of the 
business both in industrial segments and in geography worked out 
that the company was able to make adjustments when required, and 
the structure proved quite flexible. So for certain periods some 
relationships were strengthened and others slackened. This was clear 
with raw material supplies with adjustments being made in supplies 
from Africa, India, Brazil and Australia as required and also in their 
ability to move chrome tanned kid into Gloversville when the demand 
for gloving declined. This was first tried in the 1890s when there was a 
recession but when gloving started to move overseas from Gloversville 
from 1910 onwards they were able to give the tannery two more 
decades of life. 
 
In terms of jointness a Booths were in routine discussion with all 
partners on how to adjust to meet every change. As we saw with the 
roans earlier in the life of the company they were willing to put great 
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efforts into adjusting the product and then into later setting up 
different distribution systems  
 
 
Figure 9: Booth Leather in mid 20th century 
 
 
One consideration must be what Booths might have done had they 
not owned the Gloversville business. Figure 8 is an attempt to show 
the company as it moved further into the 20th century as it was 
considering closing Gloversville but getting reading to buy Melrose 
tanneries in the UK.  Some of the US market had slowed for them as 
chrome tanned bovine shoe leather took over from smaller skins, but 
Surpass leather continued in Philadelphia and was still producing the 
large volume of 1800 dozen skins per day in 1946. Surpass closed in 
1954. 
 
From 1860 until about the turn of the century the company continued 
to build many new relationships. In terms of leather one could say 
these were all within the leather industry yet another view would 
recognise that in a fast developing world Booths were in fact searching 
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for relationships in geographically distant locations so they could link 
them into their US or UK business. Their “first-mover” position, high 
levels of loyalty and integrity meant that this stood them in very good 
stead wherever they went for many decades. 
 
This activity was a clear search for additional resources to fit the 
needs of partners and no attempt was made to tie them in other than 
via good business methods, strong personal relationships and regular 
transactions.  While this continued well into the 20th century 
increasingly, as seen in Figure 11 the company network became more 
tightly linked into the UK set up with some significant centralisation 
already happening well before this.  This was partly because more of 
the businesses were wholly owned and partly because the roles of the 
US and the UK began to change as stronger leather industries grew 
up in places like Germany and Italy.  
 
During the early 20th century the company continued to be able to 
create new situations including the quite diverse areas of Unit Trusts, 
management contracts in Brazil and the Building business. At the 
same time it was clear that in the later life of Charles, and much of 
the life of George they had to leave nearly all the day to day 
management to the “Booth Men”.  
 
In this dissertation we have not identified quite why the company 
divested itself of both shipping and building and how it ended only 
with the tanning and leather sector.  As stated the residual leather 
business was not well placed for the late 20th century world being 
trapped by its own ever tighter relationships and ownership, and it 






4.11 The role of technology and innovation 
 
Traders in any technologically-intensive network are likely to have a 
difficult time at first and this was the case for the Booths. When the 
Booths started their trading business a deep involvement in leather 
technology could not have been anticipated. Yet the period was an age 
of discovery and technical advancement and the Booths, shown by 
their interest in steam, were not put off by technology.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
The period between 1860 and 1910 is recognised as one of 
considerable worldwide technical invention so an interest in 
technology from a well educated and wealthy Liverpool family would 
be quite normal. Yet the initial Booth business was put together in 
conventional ways and at first they were distinguished only by their 
integrity and Charles noted love of system.61 They followed the paths 
of others before them. The rather niche specialist agent and trader 
had became increasingly common in the USA in the 1850s and 1860s 
as industry developed. (Porter and Livesay, 1989) 
 
The correspondence indicates that buying the Gloversville tannery 
involved the company in trying to take a wider view of their business 
network and seeing the potential for new technologies.  Although the 
purchase had a tactical element, it had its basis in strategy and the 
Booth belief that they could exploit successfully any invention which 
Kent could make.  At no stage did the Booths pretend to be 
technologists. Rather than seeking to acquire all necessary 
technologies for themselves, they self consciously relied on the 
technologies in the surrounding network.  But they did ensure that in 
all their businesses they understood the implications of the 
technology involved.  
 
                                                 
61
 “with his innate love of system”: John, 1959 p83 
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The leather industry had entered the 19th century with the same 
processes it had used for centuries. The arrival of steam power and 
the need to move to factories to produce higher volumes for city 
dwellers lead to new machinery introductions; some very innovative. 
Yet the underlying technology remained unchanged.  
 
When Booths started to commercialise Dongola leather in the 1880s 
and chrome leather in 1890s the global leather industry was to be 
totally transformed. Both ideas were developed in the United States by 
a medium sized British company. Yet the Booths were only one 
element in this development process which started before them and 
continued outside of their organisation albeit they were an essential 
catalyst and big beneficiary. A major element in this came from the 
fact that their natural network horizon was defined by the area in 
which they were trading and was much larger than the individual 
tanners in the US, or of their other competitors.   The Gloversville 
tanners were just that: specialists in the tanning of leather to be made 
up into gloves.  The shoe centre in Boston could have been in another 
continent in terms of regular contact, but Booths had been selling 
successfully there and had opened an office in Boston in 1870.  So 
Booths had the network links that went beyond the local and regional 




From the start the view that Charles took in shipping and leather was 
one that accepted the importance of technology, and that 
technological changes of all sorts were likely to impact on their 
business. Given that in simple terms the actions of actors will be 
based on their on their individual interpretation of the actions of 
others and of the world around them (Ford and Håkansson, 2006) his 
letters and actions demonstrate an individual with vision and a very 




The Booths’ interest in technology applied not just to shipping but 
also to communications and, it is fairly clear from their early work to 
make UK roans more suited to the US market, to leather also. 
 
Thus in his overview of the networks in which he was part Charles 
was in one part considering where the technologies lay and where and 
how those new technologies, be they a new steam engine, the 
telegraph or a tannage, would start to have their effect. 
 
This meant that the Booths saw many actors in their network who 
had the potential to play a useful part as the company.  At the time of 
the purchase of Kent and the development of Dongola they perhaps 
saw only Kent with his directly related technical resources but we can 
now look back and see also Kuttner as an individual actor with a wide 
range of commercial resources and Booths themselves brought 
additional coincidental technical resources.  
 
Not all interaction is planned or even conscious (Ford and Håkansson, 
2006 p. 15). When Kuttner met Schultz and built up a relationship 
over luncheon meetings in Racky’s restaurant he had by then gained 
some considerable knowledge of the role and detail of technology in 
leather and its importance in end uses as wide as gloves, footwear and 
corsets. Schultz was to become an important actor and it is clear that 
while the initial work was highly speculative Kuttner was able to see 
the potential if a breakthrough were to be found. Equally the Booth 
view of the network was supportive of this relationship with a clever 
scientist and willing to build close links with no guarantee of a 
successful outcome. Booth’s were also in close touch with the 
shoemakers’ need for lighter weight and water-resistance leathers and 
were aware that tanners were having increasing problems with 
supplies of bark for their vegetable processes. Hence they were 
receptive to the inventor, in the belief that their relationships with 
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companies with different problems across the network would provide 
at least one set of interested parties.62 
 
In the 1880s many other actors joined the scene in the introduction of 
chrome tanning as a commercial product. It appears that Booths, via 
Kuttner, made contact with all of them and transacted with many 




In order to stay in touch with new technologies they built 
relationships with some excellent chemists and kept these alive. Kent, 
Wade, Turney, Patswosky and Mathieu were amongst those they 
stayed close to through this period. In Europe a lot of the research 
work was done within the chemicals companies in Germany. In the 
UK chromium business Eglinton Chemical Co. at Irvine 
in Ayrshire was the primary promoter of chromium for tanning. They 
manufactured dichromates and it was logical for them to license the 
German technology and try and make it work. They even built their 
own tannery in the Firhill area of Glasgow.  
 
The Booths did not work in this way. They used internal resources 
and key individuals rather than links to chemical companies; and 
they had many such relationships. Over time it was clear that these 
relationships developed a very high level of trust and confidence.  
 
Booths developed their interdependencies differently with different 
actors. The relationships with Turney and Wade which lasted over a 
century were different from those with Mathieu and Patswosky which 
were much more specific to a period and single products.     
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Shortly after starting the business Booths recognised that they were 
dependent on their suppliers not just for a product to sell but also for 
the details of the technology embedded within the product.  They 
found that they were not selling a commodity but an item with grading 
and technical characteristics which were highly specific and 
sometimes difficult to define and explain. For the suppliers the 
business was clearly significant enough for them to be willing to make 
sizeable changes to ensure that the product was perfected for the US 
market. They were also prepared to spend a great deal of time 
effectively teaching the Booths enough technology to be able to 
properly explain and sell the products to the US customers. Given the 
complexity of the problems and the potential costs of selling badly it is 
not surprising that the Booths took a great interest in understanding 
the technology  
 
Booths first came in to contact with tanning technology in the UK 
when the product was being criticised in the US for various 
inadequacies. Subsequently they needed to develop an adjusted 
product to better fit the footwear market. From their wide distribution 
network they were one of the first companies to try and service the 
growing demand for city footwear.  People living in cities did not need 
the same strong boots and shoes they use to wear on the farm and 
demand quickly grew for better looking softer footwear for both men 
and women.  
 
In the US it is clear from the partners’ letters that they got to know 
James Kent in Gloversville well through a number of years of trading. 
He was outspoken, experimental with raw material and with a 
reputation as a good leather chemist. As such the Kent and Stevens 
tannery in Gloversville was a major customer and the level of 
interaction between the companies was quite high as Booths were one 
of the best sources of reliable imported raw materials for him to work 
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with. Booths could have survived by staying with their banks 
recommendation to accept the loss and move on but both the 
jointness and subjective view they had built up with Kent as an 
individual gave them confidence to confront the situation and take a 
different route. 
 
With Schultz Booths had no position of interdependence and the same 
could be said of most of the subsequent actors in the chromium 
development but it is clear that through the latter part of the 1880s 
they were actively networking in order to see if a better footwear 
leather than Dongola might be possible and to ensure that they were 
in the lead in putting it into their sales and distribution channels. 
Eventually we can identify a clear interdependence with Mathieu but 
by that time they had already established their global lead with the 
product. Although they were not the first to make a commercial 
chrome product their network for distribution was so much stronger 
than their competitors that finding a supplier a little after Foerderer 
launched Vici Kid in 1889 made little difference to their ability to 
prosper and grow faster than the competition.  
 
Jointness 
During the development of Dongola process Booths were in the 
position of ownership of the Kent tannery and being able to control 
the development. Given Kent’s strong personality it seems clear that 
he was left very free technically while Kuttner ensured that the 
commercial and financial situation stabilised.  This was not the case 
with the development of chromium where after Schultz had completed 
his patents they did little in house technical work to further 
commercialise Schultz’s work. The celebrity impact of Sullivan 
wearing Dongola boxing boots had filled their capacity and there was 
little time for such work, and perhaps there was an element of 




While from 1884 to 1889 little was done by Booths with chromium 
leathers what is clear is that they were actively networking and 
increasing their links.  Quite a lot of this was in New York where they 
could easily meet with all the actors, many of whom would be well 
known to them; but it did also involve the start of developing much 
stronger links with Philadelphia where most of the lighter weight shoe 
leather was being made from kid skins.  
 
In this period Booths were extending their linkages in to the footwear 
trade around the burgeoning cities of the USA selling Dongola at the 
same time as increasing their shipments of kidskins from Brazil and 
elsewhere in the world into Philadelphia for the Philadelphian tanners  
to make their standard “Morocco” kid.  The Morocco product and the 
continued attempts to make chromium work on this material in 
Philadelphia were clear competitors to Dongola. This meant that 
Booths were supporting their own competition in building activity 
links with Philadelphia, conceding rather than confronting the 
changes that they saw evolving.  
 
Chrome tanning, like other new technologies depended on a range of 
existing technologies and relationships for its exploitation.  Because of 
this we see it became quickly “embedded” in a number of networks.  
The embeddedness of a technology is multi-dimensional and relates to 
the location of knowledge of the technology, the necessity of bundling 
it with others for its exploitation in different applications, and the 
evolution of the technology itself (Ford and Saren 2001).  The control 
of these processes would have been beyond the control of Booths or 
any other company, especially if further innovation was to occur in 
line with the third Network Paradox (Ford et. al. 2003).   
 
Håkansson and Olsen, (2011, p.2) conclude that “systematic 
managerial action appears to be the main driving force enacting and 
coordinating these complex interactions” where at least one actor is 
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needed is to provide the motion that moves things forward and the 
variety caused by combining elements from different areas. The Booth 
technologies highlight how new ideas come to the point of being 
commercially valuable only when a number of elements combine 
together and often this may take years or decades to happen. Booths 
interest in working at the raw material and the market end made 
them part of the “system of technology” as Cowan (1997) would 
describe it and that technology is not autonomous but resides in a 
system as Lundgren (1995) put it. Dosi (1988) would see a lot of 
support for his argument that “innovation comes from connections 
and an open mind”. Booths displayed patience and maturity in letting 
ideas work themselves out. They facilitated, supported, catalysed and 
exploited ideas and always kept an open mind and an enthusiasm for 
novelty and invention. These innovations show that path dependency 
can be broken by meetings at the intersections (Håkansson and 
Waluszewsk, 2002). Right from 1862 onwards Booths had a high level 




These four episodes provide good examples of the process of 
purposeful networking and of the outcomes of that networking. In 
particular they show how the complex process of innovation works in 
a network context. The next section looks at the general leather 
industry background for the period involved and a specific look at the 
bovine vegetable tanning industry in the USA which permits some 
comparison with the Booth Company in terms of the Three Paradoxes 
and the Three Aspects of Networking.  
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This section serves two roles.  In the first part it provides a simple 
narrative of events in the leather industry and in the second it looks 
at the specific history of the vegetable tanners of North America who 
formed the United States Leather Company. 
 
The narrative of the first section is intended to provide an explanation 
of the business environment in the leather industry into which the 
Booths entered when they started in 1860. It describes the major 
events and issues in the industry covering the run up to 1860 and 
occurring alongside the evolution of the Booth Company.  A 
considerable amount of this material relates to the bovine industry 
which the Booths were not involved in although the technology used 
did overlap.  The vegetable tanners in the bovine sector were slow to 
move over to chromium, not doing so until after the First World War 
when the benefits of chromium tanned leather in boots and shoes was 
proven. 
 
As such the first section provides background material to the 
development of the US bovine leather industry roughly in parallel with 
the early years of Booth and Co. and prior to a radical change in the 
structure of the US bovine vegetable tanning industry. A large number 
of the tanners in the USA combined to form a very large business 
which was to be a founding company of the Dow Jones Average.  This 
forms the second section which is a mini case study based on 
extensive analyses carried out by Donham (1930) and Dewing (1911) 





5.2 The Evolution of the Leather Industry in the Late 19th and 
early 20th century 
 
A complex network has surrounded the production and use of leather 
for many centuries.  Participants in the network included those who 
trapped or farmed animals for their hides or furs.  There were also 
local tanners who processed these and were often forced to cluster 
together by cities to limit the environmental effects of their “noxious” 
trade, or were often ostracised by society because they practiced it.  
Royalty were also closely involved because of their demand for fur and 
leather goods for their courts, and for many vital military needs.  It is 
therefore apparent that historically many tanners and associated 
industries did work in local area networks for environmental reasons, 
as well as to have access to riverbank and other water sources. 
 
Townships also wanted to acquire the technology of leather for 
reasons of industry or prestige and specialist traders operated in wide 
networks of relationships to buy and sell their wares.  Suppliers of a 
wide range of raw materials including bark, alum, dyestuffs and even 
dog faeces were also involved.  Many of these were members of guilds 
that sought to regulate trade, membership and technology.  Every 
country in the world had and retains some form of tanning and 
leather industry. 
 
The origins of leather tanning go far back into antiquity63  and we 
have leather artifacts from the ancient Persians and Egyptians.  The 
Dead Sea scrolls are written on parchment which is actually finely 
tanned leather, the Nubian tombs contained many leather artifacts 
and Otzi the ancient hunter whose body was unearthed in 1991 in the 
snows of the borders between Austria and Italy was clothed and shod 





in well tanned leather items from a variety of animals.  He has been 
dated at just before 3000BC. 
 
The oldest evidence of tanning, a tanning yard with tools, pieces of 
skin and leather, acacia seed pods and fragments of oak bark, was 
discovered by the Italian Egyptologist C. Schiaparelli, and shows that 
the Egyptians used a vegetable tanning process similar to that used 
today. Tanning was depicted in Egyptian tomb paintings from 3000 
BC and was known to the Chinese as early as 1000 BC. The Romans 
tanned with the bark from oak trees and with tannin from 
pomegranates. 
 
The early tannages were primarily based on vegetable materials which 
contain a material called tannin which is extracted in the same way as 
we make tea (which also includes tannin and could be used to make 
leather).  Materials were sought out that had a high concentration of 
tannin and in different regions and countries in the world different 
sources were discovered including oak in the UK, chestnut in France, 
mimosa in parts of the Mediterranean, and ultimately hemlock in the 
USA. The word tanning comes from the Latin “tannum” meaning oak 
bark. 
 
Other tannage methods were discovered over time.  The Inuit chew 
hides and create a mild tannage with enzymes and the American 
Indians used the enzymes and oils in the brain of animals such as 
deer.  Tannages with cod oil – used in chamois – and with alum for 
fine glove leather were also developed during the middle ages. 
 
Leather has in fact been a key technical material at most junctures of 
society until modern materials and plastics became available in the 
20th century. Even in the 21st century leather remains valued in many 




The first clothes, implements and weapons tied together with hide, the 
first boats – coracles, drinking vessels, even some of the first wheels 
were held together with a leather rim. In the last 1000 years leather 
was a vital element in our daily lives and major employer until well 
into the 20th century.  All travel involving horses required huge of 
leather for saddles, harnesses etc, and in the earlier years armour, 
shields etc were leather based.  Chamois leather went under chain 
mail.  It was not possible to go to war without leather and during the 
American civil war demand for leather was part of the reason that the 
US industry began to industrialise. 
 
It is important to grasp the ubiquity of leather and its role in every-
day life during these times. There was always a strong leather 
industry around the royal courts throughout the world as royalty 
wanted the best clothes and furs and finest colours.  Even when the 
house of Orange was established in Holland in the early 19th century 
they persuaded the Laimbock family to move from the Tyrol in Austria 
to be glove suppliers to the Court. They settled in Scheveningen near 
The Hague which is traditionally the domicile of the Dutch monarchs 
and nobility, and set up their own shop near the famous Kurhaus. 
When the first European settlers moved to the USA the need for 
leather, largely imported at first, was a major issue with each town 
searching to find a way to set up a tannery. 
 
In 1664 England purchased New York from The Netherlands.  At that 
time some tanners from London came to the USA and began making 
leather and footwear introducing a seven years apprentice system.   
 
In 1669 the first leather patent in the USA was granted for a mill to 
grind oak bark to be used in tanning. At that time in the US the 
potential of hemlock had not been discovered. Tanning occurred in 
small towns and villages throughout colonial America and the first 
tannery (detached from a house) was thought to be that built in Lynn, 
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Mass by a tanner called Miller in 1630.64 A major area of tanning was 
to be found in New York. 
 
It may also be difficult for us to grasp that leather was a necessity the 
European settlers had to produce for themselves. Yet that is precisely 
why tanners were among the first tradesmen sent by the Dutch to 
New Amsterdam. Because tanning was then a foul-smelling process, 
tanneries had been banished in 1676 from the little colony at 
Manhattan's southern tip outside of the city wall (Wall Street). 
Tanning requires fresh water, making the Swamp a natural site for 
leather manufacturers to gather. Related crafts within the industry 
also gravitated there, lowering transportation costs and making trade 
between leather firms easier. (MCNY)65 
 
The Swamp lay just south of the Brooklyn Bridge, where the 
Southbridge Towers now stand, bordered by Frankfort, Pearl, 
Beekman, and Gold Streets. Two tiny lanes, Jacob Street and Ferry 
Street, as well as three blocks of Cliff Street, also ran through the 
district, but were subsumed into the Southbridge superblock. The old 
neighbourhood came by its nickname honestly, occupying the site of a 
swamp shown variously on early maps as "Kreuplebusch" (a 
corruption of an old word for a dense thicket in swampy ground), 
"Beekman's Swamp," or simply "the Swamp." Though it may now be 
impossible to imagine, it was a favourite spot for berry picking, duck, 
and turkey hunting. 
 
Here only upper leather for footwear was tanned initially with all sole 
leather coming from London. Cattle hides, calf skins and deerskins 
were processed.  The Swamp was an important area.  George 
Washington lived there in 1798 with many of his cabinet nearby. His 
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house in No 3 Cherry Street was close to Frankfort Street in which all 
the first tanneries were located or in contiguous streets. 
 
By 1800 New York tanners were adopting the use of agents in the 
hinterland to increase their access to low-cost hides and skins. 
Traditionally, the city's butchers had brought their hides to tanning 
establishments conveniently located between the slaughter houses in 
the Out Ward and the markets down town in a region in the fourth 
ward bordered by Roosevelt, Beekman and Chatham Streets. With its 
water courses to the East River, the area provided tanners with the 
necessary water for tanning as well as a ready stream to carry away 
the pernicious toxic wastes. In the heart of the Swamp was Cliff Street 
with dozens of tanners. Originally called Skinner Street, it was the 
place where hides and skins (often with horns and tail still on them) 
were offered for sale by butchers. The hides were collected all over the 
city, brought to the Swamp and trimmed and salted down in the 
merchants' cellars. Along with the Collect Pond, later the Five Points 
slum, and the Bowery, the olfactory miasma of row upon row of open-
air, oblong tanning vats in the Swamp became a well-known New York 
sensation. (Day 2001, Norcross 1901) 
 
No tannery had a roof and the hair was removed in pits in the ground 
and the tanning was done in long wooden boxes. To make good upper 
leather it was thought necessary to leave the leather in the tanning 
vats for a year. 
 
The Swamp became a place in political history at the start of the 19th 
century with Groups such as the “Swamp Clique”, the “Democrats” – 
otherwise known as the “Loco Focos” – and the “Equal Rights Party” 
became active in the early part of the century and famous names such 
as the Astors became involved in the area66.  This coincided with a 
more serious separation of trade and manufacture.  Tanners had 





dabbled in selling “hides, leather and oil” according to Norcross (p15) 
especially bringing sole leather into New York from oak tanneries in 
Baltimore and Philadelphia.  Now the industry started to find a class 
of merchants who dealt in buying hides and selling leather. They 
became well established over 25 years in the early 1800s and were the 
pattern for all the USA.  Quite often this involved having the hides 
“contract tanned” by the tanners and this is a system which survives 
into the 21st century. 
 
In 1810 the streets of this area of New York began to take on an 
“elegant”` look and the rich merchants travelled to Boston (38 hours, 
US $15) Washington daily (US $24) and Philadelphia overnight (US 
$10.50) to link the industry together. 
 
In terms of trying to understand the connections that were built up in 
the 19th century leather business transportation was a major element.  
Before the railroad was built to Albany no leather came to New York 
from upstate after the North River froze in the winter.  Massachusetts 
shoe makers bought the leather in towns such as Albany and Troy 
and it was taken on sleds towards Boston to be made into boots.67  
 
There were quality issues when tanners tried to beat the freeze by 
shipping before the leather had been fully processed and occasionally 
Catskill tanners would move tanned hides down the river on sleds.  In 
general there was little business done by merchants in winter in New 
York and they often shipped leather to Boston by schooner without 
even bothering to properly roll or lay it out.  Norcross thought that 
Long Wharf harbour in winter often held higher stocks of New York 
companies’ leather than New York itself. The completion of the Erie 
Canal in 1825 made New York the crossroads of transatlantic, coastal, 
and internal U.S. trade. It nourished the city with a rich diet of goods 
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and capital as well as being of specific importance for the location of 
tanning. 
 
Trade in finished goods started to accelerate about this time.  In 1818 
the sloop Delight with a shoe consignment from Haverhill, Mass 
started the Massachusetts to New York footwear export.  The footwear 
industry in the US was changing in the early 19th century in the US. 
In general craftsmen often worked from home and Mintz (2007) 
explains that urban artisans did not draw a separation between home 
and work. “A master shoemaker might make shoes in a 10-foot square 
shed located immediately in the back of house.”  The changes of the 
1820s and 1830s which were a little behind Massachusetts are 
described for Rochester, New York.  “Instead of producing an entire 
shoe, a master would fit a customer, rough cut the leather uppers, 
and then send the uppers and soles to a boarding house, where a 
journeyman would shape the leather. Then the journeyman would 
send the pieces to a binder, a woman who worked in her home, who 
would sew the shoes together. Finally, the binder would send the shoe 
to a store for sale to the customer.” 
 
An important leather of the time was “Morocco” a hard grain goat skin 
developed in North Africa and Spain largely on Nigerian goatskins 
traded across the Sahara from the 5th to the 13th centuries. It was 
suited for footwear production as well as leather goods and other 
items. Moroccan leather manufacture came to the Swamp in 1790 and 
grew well until the war with England in 1812-15 when the British 
blockade of New York stopped the import of goatskins.  Instead the 
tanners turned to making a similar product on US domestic sheep 
skins. Because of the war induced scarcity these skins sold at a high 
price and the industry of Morocco from sheep grew and thrived for 
many years.  In 1832 New York was badly hit by Asiatic Cholera and 
business largely ceased for a while, except in the Moroccan leather 
tanneries where it was discovered that few workers got sick.  The 
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negative environmental view of tanneries receded at that time, in a not 
dissimilar way to the tanners in Nottingham during the Black Death 
some centuries earlier. 
 
It was also between 1820 and 1850 that tanneries grew up in the 
Catskills and other up-state New York destinations as according to 
Norcross “every owner of a thousand acre or ten thousand acre track 
of hemlock land could build a tannery, get a few skilled workmen from 
Massachusetts and find a Swamp merchant who would stock him 
with hides”68. 
 
This move to put tanneries away from the city came about in large 
part as a result of the gentrification of New York society and a desire 
to avoid the smell of the tannery while enjoying the smell of the 
leather and the money it made.  Tanning with oak and hemlock 
required bringing in bark to the city so why not take the hides to the 
forest? Indeed so much hemlock bark was required to tan each hide – 
a cord of bark was needed for four hides – that it was cheaper to bring 
the hides to the forests and mountains than to bring the tannin to the 
hides.  
 
There were many other day to day pressures on the tanners. Day 
(2001) explains it nicely: “One (industrial trajectory), as experienced 
by the tanners, was towards regional specialization with many of the 
most noisome elements of tanning exported to the rural hinterlands of 
Pennsylvania and upstate New York. Led by Jacob Lorillard, Gideon 
Lee, and Henry and John Jacob Astor, many successful tanners were 
gradually shifting their roles from traditional tanners to emergent 
commodities brokers and real estate speculators - one hesitates to call 
them burghers. Tanned hides were well-suited commodities for this 
transition because salted hides lasted better than salted meat, and 
the salting did little to alter the commodity's ultimate value. A final 
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barrier inhibiting transition was the overhead of transportation; with 
the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825, costs had plummeted. These 
infrastructure changes made it possible for New York City merchants 
to have tanning done completely in the Hudson Valley or Eastern 
Pennsylvania, leaving Swamp denizens such as Astor and Lorillard to 
act more as merchants, financiers, and commodity and real estate 
brokers. While tanning continued in New York City through the 
1840s, its prevalence declined noticeably.” 
 
After the Revolution most of the oak and hemlock supplies near to the 
major towns in New England and along the Hudson were exhausted69.  
As the country grew and as the hemlock supplies vanished several 
tanners set up huge factories in the Catskills. By the 1860s the 
industry then started to move to the Adirondacks and Fulton County, 
but this era ended almost as quickly as it began. By 1880 most of the 
hemlock tanners were moving to the southern tier of the Midwest 
where forests remained.  
 
It was realised that if one salted a hide – which kept it in a good state 
– it would be just as easy to ship the hides to the hemlock and oak 
forests.  One New York tanner by the name of Gideon Lee who had 
learned his tanning in Amherst and Northampton in Western 
Massachusetts set this in motion. In 1817 ten years after he had come 
to work in the New York leather trade he set up the first US joint stock 
company to tan leather named the New York Tannery Co.  With his 
partners they bought land in Greene County, NY and built a hemlock 
sole leather plant able to produce 5000 hides a year which they did in 
1818 using hides from the Argentine.  Gideon Lee was mayor of New 
York in 1833-4. 
 
The American classic “Two Years Before the Mast” tells the story of a 
two year trip to Mexico and California from Boston to collect raw hides 
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there in 1834. In New York the firm of Willets were the primary 
dealers in Californian hides in New York from 1840. 
 
This meant that the New York dealers in domestic hides moved 
towards salted hides bought at auction for delivery to distant 
tanneries and little fresh trade was done.  In 1837 Norcross tells us 
that the price had dropped so low that butchers refused to sell and 
instead formed the successful “Butchers’ Hide and Melt Association”, 
which presumably means a gelatine works. 
 
The need for good bark to tan leather and the idea that it would be 
better to bring the hides to the bark created a wandering leather 
industry.  The tanners followed the forests (McMartin 1999) through 
Delaware and the Virginias, west across Massachusetts north along 
the Hudson.  From 1822 on the Catskills became a key destination 
and from about mid century further movements were made upstate to 
the Adirondacks and on to Pennsylvania.  By the end of the century 
locations in Michigan and Wisconsin were being sought out. 
 
In 1827 the Lafayette tannery removed to New York and was owned by 
Mr Abraham Schultz and a colleague.  Mr Schultz and his family were 
to become major players in the industry for over a century and some 
of his plants were subsequently to form part of the United States 
Leather Company.  One of their tanneries, Young and Schultz, 
founded in 1838 was the first of what was to become known as union 
sole leather plants which used a combined tannage of hemlock and 
oak. For 25 years it had a near monopoly of the “union” market. 
 
Schultz was keen to push technology forward and offered prizes for 
improvement in the manufacture of vegetable tanning methods using 
hemlock and the combined hemlock and oak tannage known as the 




Perhaps at this stage it is valid to examine the US leather industry at 
the mid century stage to clarify the business that the Booths saw and 
decided to enter. A detailed report on the industry appeared in the 
New York Times of March 31, 1856.  First it noted that the nature of 
the tanning industry was such that traders could only turn over their 
money twice a year and three types of trade were normal.  In the most 
common the trader bought the hide and owned it through the tanning 
process which he did on contract, in a second the dealer bought the 
hides and sold the finished leather on behalf of the tanner and paying 
the total to the tanner less five per cent for tanning and six per cent 
for selling.  The third was to work on a fifty-fifty basis with the tanner. 
 
By this time what was called upper leather for shoes had largely 
moved to Boston and its satellite towns such as Lynn and Salem. 
Newark, NJ was at that time the major source of patent leather which 
was important for carriage trimming and carpet bags.  New York 
remained the headquarters for sole leather.  This is not just the case 
for the USA but on a world-wide basis where it was estimated that the 
New York trade was double that of Antwerp which was the principal 
leather market in Europe at that time. 
 
The bovine raw material used had two main sources.  Domestic hides 
were largely used for oak bark leather and tanned in Pennsylvania, 
Maryland and New Jersey. Hemlock tanning which gives a distinctive 
red brown colour as opposed to the whiter oak was mostly carried out 
in New York with the location of this having moved from the city now 
wandering around the State in search of new forests. For these foreign 
hides were used mostly from Latin America and imported dried or wet 
salted.   
 
A tannery “of the largest class” used nearly a square mile of hemlock 
trees per annum, measured as not less than 6000 cords. Tanneries 
were always set beside streams to obtain motive power but in the 
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1850s steam engines had been widely introduced, especially after it 
was realised that spent bark, with the vegetable tannins removed, in 
its wet state was an excellent fuel. 
 
In noting that the tanneries had moved to the bark rather than 
bringing the bark to the tanneries the Swamp had been steadily 
rebuilt with spacious leather warehouses.  Initially the tanners had 
moved not too far from New York but the Eire Canal and adjacent 
railroads had meant that tanneries had been able to move even 
further away in search of bark. The “celebrated” tannery at Prattsville 
“was abandoned a few years since, owing to the failure of the supply of 
bark in the vicinity.”  
 
Prices had been held low throughout the 1840s and this is explained 
as a consequence of the improvement in efficiency and output of the 
tanners who had managed to reduce the tanning time down to five 
months and were able to achieve a better result with 25-30% less 
tannin.  
 
The need for small skins was identified in a curious way – the 
shortage in Europe of rat skins for gloving.  Gloving leather was at 
that time mostly tanned with alum as vegetable materials made a 
leather that was too thick and hard. Kid skin tanned with alum had 
become the foundation of the glove industry and the world retail 
centre for them was in Paris.  A variety of skins were used for gloves 
including dogs, rats (most likely actually kangaroo), deer, pig and kid.  
Because of a scarcity of rats in Paris the price of imported kid gloves 
had risen strongly and there was pressure in the US to exclude these 
finished gloves from high duties but to encourage the US domestic 
industry to import raw skins of all sorts to develop a stronger 
domestic industry.  This created the backdrop which the Booths found 
when they went to New York mid-century, and a good potential 




It is said that the 1860s to 1920 period was a golden age of invention 
(Smil, 2005) as well as of globalisation (Friedmann, 2000) but big 
technological changes in the leather industry began towards the end 
of the 18th century with the Royal Society of Arts (RSA) and the Royal 
Society both promoting improvements in quality, time utilisation, and 
methodology in leather manufacture. 
 
Early in the 19th century some important developments took place.  
1805 saw the discovery of catechu by Humphrey Davy. This was a 
cheaper alternate tannage to oak whose usage was causing 
environmental issues because of the damage to forests in places like 
Wales and the South West of England. Davy did not patent his 
inventions or technology but viewed them as a donation to the benefit 
of mankind. There then began a much more fundamental search for 
alternate tanning materials and methods.  Davy’s text book on 
tanning became a definitive guide to tanning by vegetable methods. 
Another key invention of the period took place in 1808 with the 
invention of the splitting machine by Samuel Parker. Mr. Parker was 
from Billerica, MA, USA. Splitting allowed thick cattle hide of up to 
4mm thickness to be separated horizontally into two layers. This 
allowed the bottom part to be used as suede rather than being thrown 
away as previously.  The first mention of splitting in the UK is in a 
House of Commons Select Committee report of 1816. On the 
processing side a Revenue Commission report of 1824 described “a 
rapid process of tanning with hot liquor.”  By 1837 McCulloch (1837, 
118) noted that process time had halved since the start of the century. 
 
Despite this the general view of the industry in the United States in 
the first half of the 18th century was quite negative. Quoted by 
Rotenstein (1998) Welsh describes tanning up to 1850 as a "craft that 
resisted change." In1900, U.S. Census Special Agent George Houghton 
observed, “It is a curious feature of the business that, while in nearly 
  
 178 
every other industry advantage has been taken of labor-saving devices 
as they are perfected, leather manufacturers were inclined, until 
about 1880, to discourage any attempt to supersede manual labor 
with machinery. They preferred, also, to adhere to the formulas and 
tanning processes which had been handed down for generations from 
father to son ...” 
 
Around 1809 Talmadge Edwards began the manufacture of leather 
gloves in Johnstown, NY.  This town along with Stump City nearby (to 
be renamed Gloversville in 1888) soon became the major area of glove 
making in the USA.  Leather tanning had been carried out there using 
local hemlock bark and then changed towards oil tanned buckskin 
leather. Glove making was then set up to make use of this buckskin 
leather and the tanners began over time to make large quantities of 
sheepskin glove leather, for which they needed imported skins (White, 
1956).  
 
In the winter of 1847-1848 when the Mexican war began to push up 
demand and records show that leather from up state was brought 
down the Hudson River to the Swamp on sleds.  For two years 
demand was very strong after a long period of low prices. 
 
In the south Boston area the footwear capital of the world developed 
in Brockton in the latter half of the 19th century.  This came after 
developments on the north shore in the earlier decades of the 19th 
century as shoe making moved out of the farmhouse and into the 
factory. A feature of this was that well breed young ladies came into 
the town to work in the factories.  Except that the ladies were better 
educated and went into Boston to the theatre 150 years ago, this 
process of employees, often young ladies, coming off the farms to work 
in factories is identical to what happened in South Korea in the mid 




Prior to the 19th century the leather industry in the US had been craft-
based.  Farmers tanned hides and turned them into shoes and other 
goods on their own farms.  Itinerant shoemakers traveled around and 
helped farmers with a lot of animals make shoes from them.  They 
would also help farmers to trade products and a small export trade 
took place with the southern colonies that preferred to focus land and 
time on cash crops. 
 
Three sources are used by Hoover (1937) to explain the look of 
tanning in the early Colonial days: 
 
- Cattle were slaughtered locally, and every community soon had 
at least one man who sank his vats in the stream running 
through his back yard, and tanned hides in the crude fashion of 
the day. (Donham, 1930 p.474) 
- A tannery or two seem to have been uniformly a part of the 
economic outfit of the inland town.  The working dress of the 
people was largely composed of leather garments and a large 
part of the material came from the hides of animals slaughtered 
on the farms and prepared at the village tannery (Bidwell 1916, 
p. 261) 
- Leather manufacture began with the first generation of settlers 
in the colonies. In accord with the policy of government 
supervision of industry, Virginia, in 1661, required each county 
to provide for at least one tanner, currier, and shoemaker (Keir, 
1920) 
 
Continued immigration from Europe, urbanization and rapid 
population all lead to the creation of centres for shoemaking. These 
were established, particularly around Boston and other growing cities.  
Young ladies began to leave their farms and work in these shoe 
factories, returning home after a year or two in order to get married 




In February 1859 the tanners of America held a banquet at the 
Metropolitan Hotel70 and both the guest list and the speeches 
indicated the breadth and depth of the industry at that time.  The 
industry had many national and global linkages.   
 
There were 340 guests and the names included key people such as 
Schultz, Miles, Hoyt, Healy, Armstrong, Thorne, Fraser, Palen, 
Buckley, McCoy, Bailey, Kumbel and Butman and tanners came from 
Baltimore, Boston, Lynn, and Philadelphia. 
 
Norcross tells us that speeches were given on Cuba and the Suez 
canal (which finally opened in 1869) predicting factories being built 
using steam power, of labour saving machinery, and about the 
potential for future leather trade with Europe. 
 
A Mr. John Armstrong discussed some of the items involved in 
shoemaking and their origins.  His talk was based on the fact that 
increasingly the US was becoming more self-sufficient and with new 
machinery in the shoe factories more efficient.  This latter to the 
extent that while leather continued to rise in price the cost of footwear 
continued to decline. He praised international commerce.  “The cattle 
of South America, the kips of India, the calves of Europe, the sheep of 
England, the goats of Mexico, the seals of the northern coasts and 
isles, the horses of the great Southern plains, the cattle grazing on a 
thousand hills, all have to contribute their coats to shelter our feet. 
We send to England for lastings, thread, and tools; to France and 
Germany for fine leather; to Italy for silks; to Russia for leather and 
bristles; to the Straits for oil.  Vessels take long voyages to bring us 
hides from the Golden West, from Africa, or to transport Japonica 
from India, the Sumach from Sicily or cochineal from Honduras.”71 
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Some of these developments were to come unexpectedly quickly.  The 
civil war in 1862-5 created an unprecedented demand for leather and 
catalysed the leather industry network.  Multi story tannery mills 
started to be built with lines of new machines driven by steam power 
offering significant levels of mass production never before imagined. 
 
After the civil war the leather industry went largely into depression as 
the government stopped purchases of boots, shoes and saddlery of all 
types.  However the top tanners in saddlery noted a demand for the 
finer qualities of harness leather in and near the large cities and that 
footwear upper supply and demand remained in good balance. The 
clever shoe makers had reduced their making of military footwear and 
had limited stocks left.  Instead they found steady and increasing 
demand as citizens in the north and the south returned to normal 
living.  Sole leather did suffer a bit, declining from a peak of 45 cents 
a pound for hemlock to 35 and from 60 to 45 for oak. 
 
Rapid expansion of the urban centres created new environmental 
pressures and in 1866 the New York State legislature set up the 
Metropolitan Board of Health.72  
 
As Day explains: “By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, with significant population increase, members of the 
Common Council acted with affluent butchers and tanners, focusing 
on what they viewed as their most important task: providing a 
dependable and secure supply of meat products to the city's 
carnivorous population. At a time when public health warnings were 
viewed with scepticism, civic leaders continued long-standing patterns 
of resource allocation. Moreover, given the influence of wealthy 
butchers and tanners, members of the Common Council were caught 
in almost irreconcilable conflicts of interest. Until the mid-nineteenth 
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century, municipal authorities failed to adopt meaningful reforms of 
the nuisance trades because they were wedded to ancient regulatory 
regimes dating from colonial New York which maintained valuable, 
exclusive rights and privileges for all concerned but also gave city 
officials a clear, vested interest in allowing the nuisance trades 
unimpeded production.” 
 
Members of the Bayard and Varian families had figured prominently 
among the butchers since the early 1700s. Among tanners, the 
Beekmans and later the Astors and the Lorillards significantly 
influenced the course of the nuisance trades in New York City.   
 
By the late nineteenth century, the leather industry had grown into 
one of New York's largest. Though little leather was still tanned in the 
Swamp, the district had become the centre of the American leather 
market.73  
 
This period up until about 1880 is what Hoover (1937) calls the 
tanbark period.  Over most of that time tan bark was much more 
available than hides so the tanning industry gravitated towards the 
urban areas where the animals were slaughtered for meat for the 
growing communities.  Thus by 1879 the states of New York, 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts tanned 60% of the hides and 80% of 
the calf, goat and sheep produced in the USA.74 For major tanners of 
hides the process time was twelve to eighteen months and access to 
water and trees was needed, so the movement away from the cities as 
they become more crowded and concerned about odoriferous 
industries was natural. Salt preserved hides well so the moves to 
places like the Catskills had great logic. To tan 200 pounds of leather 
– the traditional vegetable tanned leather is still today sold by weight – 




 Whitten, 1990. 
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requires 1 ton of bark so as Norcross stated a location on a river in 
oak or hemlock forests was the best place. 
 
The tanners had three occurrences to deal with after 1880. Before that 
there had been some mechanical introductions but few real advances 
other perhaps than steam being used to drive the old equipment.  So 
the industry fundamentally had changed little over 1000 years other 
than both the tanneries and shoe making had started to move towards 
proper factories rather than continuing with home craft production. 
The changes after 1880 form an important section of Hoover’s (1937) 
location analysis and are carefully analysed by Whitten (1990).75  
 
- Around 1880 tanbark extract was developed. This involved 
extracting the active ingredient from the bark. As a result the 
weight to be transported reduced to less than 10% of the 
original bark. This type of extract was especially good for heavy 
cattle hides and meant that tanneries could be located where 
the hides were being produced rather than near the bark 
production centres. 
- With the introduction of the railroad refrigerator car the meat 
packers started to move to the mid west. The ready supply of 
large numbers of hides induced many tanneries to relocate to 
Milwaukee, Chicago and St Louis 
- The introduction of inorganic tanning (chrome) commercially in 
the 1880s. As the Booths were the first to discover when it was 
developed in the Gloversville plant is was most effective to treat 
lighter skins and not until around World War I and after was it 
used for heavier hides and skins.  
 
The timing of the start of meat packing in the USA is often overlooked. 
Their large strong businesses were to be a major influence not just 
through until the early 20th century but to the present day, where 
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they remain large and dominant industry forces. It was actually in 
1867 that Philip D. Armour started in Chicago and this town and 
Milwaukee were destined to become major industry centres.76 More 
significant, perhaps, was the later introduction of the use of ice to 
keep the meat cool allowing shipping across the nation. 
 
In 1873 Jackson Schultz of the New York Swamp became Chief 
Commissioner of the United States at the World Fair in Vienna and 
his work there initiated US leather exports to Germany raising them 
from a paltry US$100,000 to US$4m with exports to the rest of 
Europe quickly rising to over US$8m alongside. Records show that 
sole leather exports to the UK rose rapidly and the Union League Club 
in New York had a dinner for him which was attended by fifty 
members of the trade representing “leading houses in this and other 
cities”77.  At this dinner Schultz noted that forty years ago in the 
1830s “it was the custom for ships to buy hides for ballasting, and sell 
them at a large profit on the other side.”  He considered that currently 
(1873) US tanning was still behind the UK but ahead of France and 
Germany. One major belief coming through in the US industry was 
that labour saving machinery and managerial approaches to 
production were giving a real USP to the US tanning industry in the 
international market.  This is a distinct change in approach from what 
Welsh had written about 1800-1850. 
 
 In 1876 Schultz wrote a definitive text on the manufacture of leather 
and in 1880 he offered three gold medals for technological 
advancement related to tanning with hemlock and the “union” 
method.  He died in 1891 at the age of 75. 
 
Nearly all of the issues that we read about today related to China can 
be identified in 19th century USA as the industry moved through the 
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region.  Unfair price undercutting based on cheap labour was the 
loudest complaint. There was exceptional price pressure on the 
shoemakers in the original tanning and shoemaking towns just north 
of Boston in the face of cheap labour from the western states.  Lynn 
used to sell shoes to the west at US $2 a pair but as shoemaking 
began in mid west towns this price could be achieved locally, and so 
the price from Lynn had to be reduced to US $1.75 and before long it 
dropped more. “They do not want to see a shoe over US $1.25 and 
soon there will be no place for a shoe above US $1.00”.  Lynn could 
not compete with these prices as the labour in the mid west was so 
much cheaper.  Lynn demanded a 60% tariff on all shoes from the 
“west or south” imported into New England and nearby regions.  They 
did not get it78.  
 
The UK leather industry had also seen many changes in the 19th 
century. Having had a good few centuries of growth it had developed 
more strongly than its European counterparts79 despite being more 
heavily regulated and more fragmented.  In 1813 the average tannery 
workforce according to a Select Committee enquiry into Excise Duty 
on leather was only six or seven80 and these they reported were the 
largest plants.  At the start of the 19th century only 0.2% by value of 
British production was exported. This was far less than was the case 
in Europe where competition between tanners in different countries 
was much greater and lead to greater demands and needs for 
modernisation to which their governments responded. By contrast the 
UK tanners remained largely complacent and there was little pressure 
for integration. As Rimmer81 states “no one currier wanted the whole 
of a tanner’s output, any more than a single shoe-maker or harness-
maker wanted the whole of a currier’s output. Variety of product and 
the extent of the market limited the scale of operations more 
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effectively than excise regulations.”  UK production is thought to have 
grown very slowly in the later part of the eighteenth century and not 
at all in the first decade of the nineteenth century. But after the 
Napoleonic Wars ended growth, spurred by domestic demand, it grew 
by a steady 3% per annum up to 1850. This is interesting as the 
population only grew by 1.5% so the per capita consumption of 
leather was rising.  This meant that industry volumes grew four fold in 
just one generation increasing the demand for hides and oak-bark. By 
the 1840s the UK tanners used more foreign than domestic hides – a 
situation which was to remain until the 1980s.  
 
As in the USA there were a limited number of technical improvements 
in tanning in the first half of the eighteenth century with rapid 
processing and crude splitting machines being introduced but 
shoemaking remained an unchanged craft largely done at home or in 
very small workshops. 
 
McCulloch (1837) suggests that the time of vegetable tanning “had 
halved in recent years”. Although most tanneries remained small in 
the UK a few by 1850 had emerged employing more than 100 people. 
In Leeds in 1857 a new plant was built with one block seven stories 
high with a steam engine and splitting machine. Called the Sheepscar 
Spanish Leather Works it produced sheep, goat and calf for furniture, 
hat linings and textile rollers. 
 
In discussing the tanners in Leeds Rimmer (1971)82 gives us some 
evidence of the reasons for location.  “Their location was dictated in 
part by water requirements and sometimes by proximity to woods, and 
in part it arose from the offensive nature of the trade which made it 
unwelcome in a densely packed residential and commercial district.” 
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The UK industry received a boost in demand during the Napoleonic 
wars but then promptly collapsed to such a degree that Parliament 
intervened and progressively removed all duties and regulatory 
legislation by 1830 in the hope of getting it back on its feet.  Some 
major centres such as Nottingham had lost all their tanneries by this 
time. This was a shock to the nation as tanning ranked as a major 
industry and at the start of the century leather was the second most 
important manufacturing industry in the UK.83 After these changes 
the industry began to expand again and this coincided with increasing 
foreign trade offering new sources for raw materials and the chance to 
look wider for exports. In 1937 this had changed and McCulloch 
(1837)84  maintained that “the leather industry ranks either third or 
fourth amongst those carried on in the country, being inferior only, in 
point of value or extent to those of cotton, wool and iron, if it not be 
superior to the latter.” 
 
In Leeds tanneries numbered 108 in 1831, 477 in 1861 and 925 in 
1891.  Many of these would have been very small doing only one part 
of the process, but the numbers are compelling nevertheless.  
Gomershall (2000,)85 notes that during the 19th century there was a 
strong trend towards certain urban areas in the UK to develop large 
tanning areas.  Most towns of any size retained a few tanneries but by 
the end of the century “some cities and most major towns in Great 
Britain were entirely without tanneries.”86 
 
McCulloch (1837) was already noting an element of concentration and 
talked of the number of tanners in the UK congregating near large 
towns, especially ports. Bermondsey and Enfield had been important 
centres for tanning.  Already in the early 19th century Worcester and 
Yeovil had been noted for gloves, and since the early eighteenth 
                                                 
83
 Rimmer 1960, p.2. 
84
 McCulloch 1837, p. 118 
85
 Gomershall 2000, p.3 
86
 Gomershall, 2000 quoting from Kelly’s Directory of the Leather Trades 1896 
  
 188 
century Northampton, Kettering, Wellington and Stafford had supplied 
London shopkeepers with footwear and supplied small quantities to 
the West Indies and North America.87 The high cost of using the port 
of London and difficulties with water supply in a fast growing city 
began to make the bigger tanneries look north to the Mersey and 
Humberside where these were more easily managed.88 As the demand 
for leather grew the need to import hides rose. Rent costs, the costs of 
transporting oak bark, were all cited as reasons for a trend to move 
away from London from 1870 on. Liverpool steadily became the centre 
for the UK’s specialist heavy leather tanning, although the Booth 
Group, who worked mostly with lighter leathers from sheep and goat, 
were not involved. 
 
As factories grew in size so labour issues began to surface in the UK. 
The Leather Trades Review of November 189689 reports on Messrs. 
William Paul, and oak bark tannery in Leeds. Mr. Paul had visited the 
USA and seen much higher levels of productivity. In order to compete 
with imports from the USA undercutting his market he changed the 
booking system for the work force and was faced with a walk out. 
After discussion eighty men returned to work but we are told a 
considerable number did not and were dismissed. It would be “utterly 
impossible to carry on his extensive development if he should allow 
the men to dictate in and on what conditions they would work for 
him” Mr Paul was quoted as saying.90  This was clearly an 
exceptionally large plant for the time. 
 
In the rest of Europe tanneries were not so small and Clapham 
(1930)91 blamed fiscal regulations for this.  He compared the UK to 
France and Prussia where tanners worked on a much larger scale, 
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although Rimmer (1960)92 considers this not to be a complete answer 
to the lack of organisational growth of the UK industry in the 18th 
century. His view was that little export was done and using hides and 
skins produced by butchering livestock in towns and villages most 
leather workers simply catered for the needs of their immediate 
neighbourhood.  “So long as the market remained limited, there was 
no pressure for integration in view of the range of products produced 
at each stage.  No one currier wanted the whole of a tanner’s output, 
any more than a single shoemaker or harness-maker wanted the 
whole of a currier’s output. Variety of product and extent of the 
market limited the scale of operations more effectively than excise 
regulations.” 
 
The development of the early twentieth century leather industry were 
characterised by the continued, indeed accelerated, development of 
the use of chrome tanning and other new technologies, the 
introduction of better synthetic and textile matters to substitute for 
leathers coinciding with reductions in certain end uses as motorised 
transport became more important, and labour issues associated with 
the production system in towns like Gloversville. 
 
Most of these issues were fully played out in the US Leather Company 
and with Booths. A New York Times item from April 13, 1924 
headlined: 
 
“What is wrong with the leather industry? What reason is there to 
believe that there will be a recovery in the next few years? What 
scientific developments warrant faith in the future of leather? What 
about the substitutes, rubber for sole leather, fabrics for upper leather 
and for upholstery leather the installing of motor trucks and tractors for 
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horse drawn vehicles and farm implements which require leather 
harness; rubber and textiles for leather belts?”93 
 
This same point is very well made by Rotenstein (2001)94 in his 
discussion of the Pittsburgh tanners, who had stayed out of the 
United States Leather Company. “Pennsylvania’s once bountiful bark 
lands were disappearing and new technologies were emerging that 
would make the world much less dependent upon leather than before. 
As the automobile replaced the horse and gears replaced leather belts, 
Pittsburgh’s tanners began to disappear. Bankruptcy, shattered 
markets, dried up supply sources, and better prospects in industries 
less stigmatized than the noisome leather and meat by-products 
industries all contributed to the demise of Pittsburgh’s leather 
industry.” Reading this both the Booths and the United States Leather 
Company were actually doing a good job to adjust to new technologies 
and societal changes.  Many of their competitors chose to close, and 
this seemed to be most true at the moment of generational change. 
Parents would warn children of the low margins and uncertain future 
and children would themselves see long hours in difficult working 
conditions at a time where other business areas offered higher 
security and profits. 
 
As the industry exited from New York we lose any indication that the 
bovine tanners were talking to the skin tanners.  Except for lunching 
together in the Swamp they had little reason to communicate. 
Chromium and other light tannages such as Dongola did not require 
access to forests but they did need small skins. Gloversville in upstate 
New York did hang on as it had a large local glove trade to supply and 
many glove factories were commercially linked to tanneries under the 
same ownership. Yet most of the small skin business required 
imported skins and there was a movement to the coast first - to 
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Philadelphia, Newark and Boston. Goatskins from Brazil and other 
parts of the world were imported into Philadelphia and the tanneries 
there steadily perfected chrome tanning and grew to enormous sizes. 
 
The discovery of how to produce extract meant that oak tanners could 
mix in hemlock and vice versa if they wished.  They started to do so 
and a new Union tannage became popular. Location was less 
important and they could look to advantages of building larger plants 
benefiting from scale and the use of steam. What they did need was 
large steady supplies of hides so moving close to the meat packing 
industry in Milwaukee and Chicago seemed logical and steadily this 
was what happened.  There had not been a big skin industry so it was 
the vegetable hide producers who had the legacy issues to deal with. 
Overcapacity, geographical inertia, and plants and property in the 
wrong places all became issues for the traditional bovine vegetable 
tanners. As we will see the two networks appear to have diverged and 
largely lost contact, only meeting each other in competition for the 
shoe upper market.  
5.3 The United States Leather Company 
 
In both the USA and the UK the Booths were embedded in the leather 
industry, and indeed were for most of the 19th century the major link 
between the industries in the two countries. The Booth area of activity 
had been developed essentially around small skins especially semi-
processed sheep.  
 
Yet the biggest volume raw material source used by the leather 
industry is actually bovine and this was used for saddlery and all 
aspects of what might be called horse furniture such as reins and 
bridles plus seats for carriages, as well as sole leather and some 
footwear uppers. There was overlap between the smaller and larger 
skins in the areas of clothing and in shoe uppers. With full vegetable 
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tanning (hemlock and oak mainly) the bovine leathers produced 
tended to be thick and hard for both uses, albeit very durable. 
 
At the start of the 1890s sole leather tanners in the USA were losing 
money and could not see a way to change this without a change in 
industry structure.  Attempts were made to improve things by 
introducing reductions in input for limited periods but this did not 
help. 
 
In 1893 sixty American leather businesses involved primarily in sole 
leather production combined to form a consolidated business.  
Together they owned one hundred and ten tanneries and with it over 
70% of the US output tanned with hemlock, about half of those who 
used a mixed tannage, and a third of the oak tanned leather output.  
The corporation also acquired four hundred thousand acres of bark 
land and the bark rights of a hundred thousand more. Dewing (1911) 
indicates that this coming together came about after observation of 
similar and successful combinations in the oil and sugar industries. 
He also thought certain of the older tanners saw this as the best route 
to administer their business affairs in case of their death. 
 
Dewing also considered that the best hemlock tanners joined the 
combination but the best of the others stayed out, having demanded 
and failed to get a bonus for joining. 
 
One external view of this arrangement came from the Pittsburg tanner 
Callery, who had been renting additional premises as needed to access 
tanbark, his most expensive raw material: 
 
“Nearly two decades after Callery’s expansion into the Alleghenies and 
four decades after many upstate New York counties had been 
deforested by barkpeelers, in 1893 a cartel of mostly Catskill tanners 
incorporated the United States Leather Company. With 150 tanneries 
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and hundreds of thousands of acres of bark lands, U.S. Leather – 
through its Pennsylvania subsidiaries – moved across the Mason-Dixon 
Line into West Virginia (and other Southern Appalachian states) as 
Pennsylvania’s forests disappeared.  Once described in a leather 
industry trade journal as an “Eden for Tanners,” Pennsylvania’s 
hemlock and oak forests were suffering the same fate as those in the 
Catskills a generation earlier.”95  
 
At formation the US $128 million United States Leather Company had 
the largest capitalisation of any US industrial business.  The Standard 
Oil Trust was valued at US $102 million and the American Sugar 
refining Company US $75 million with the US Rubber Company and 
American Tobacco much smaller. Watson estimated that the 
corporation represented 60% of the total sole leather tanned in the US 
at the time.96 The key players at the founding were Proctor, Rice, Hoyt, 
Horton, Lapham, Ladew, Schultz, Lee, Costello, Healy, and Bullant.   
 
In 1893 the tanners in the new group found they were getting little 
benefit from the reorganisation and had lost US$1.3 m dollars.  
Things were little better in 1894 but in 1895 they were able to pay 
part of the promised dividend to preference shareholders only, but at 
no time did they ever manage to earn enough to pay the 8% on the 
preferred stock set out in the formation agreement.  The six percent 
paid in 1895 appears to be the largest pay out the company ever 
made. The company had a peculiar set up giving rights to the 
preference shareholders to accumulated but unpaid dividends and 
with rights to both dividends and assets in case of closure.  The actual 
figures for the first decade in operation are below.97  
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Figure 3 US Leather Earnings 1893-1905 
 
Not all opinions of the business were as negative as Dewing came to 
be.  Norcross (1901) writing earlier in 1901 said “the management is 
now at its best, the expenses are small, and the stockholders have 
every reason to be satisfied with the returns made for the investment.”  
Certainly the period between 1893 and 1898 was one of general 
business depression, which was a big issue for all businesses, and 
was particularly felt by the US Leather Company.  Steadily throughout 
this period the chrome tannage carried out on goat skins created a 
product for footwear uppers that was preferred over vegetable tanned 
calf. It was softer, lighter and much more water resistant. Textiles 
were also being used for some shoe uppers so much so that raw hides 
in stock in New York that would normally have been tanned in the US 




Watson noted that “the tendency in industry generally at that time to 
merge….acted to spur certain developments in backward and forward 
integration in tanning.”98 
 
One of the major shoe companies Endicott-Johnson decided to start 
tanning in 1896 since “the increase in the differential between the 
price of raw hides and finished leather was too heavy a burden for 
shoe manufacturers to carry”.99 Their tannery was eventually to 
become the largest in the USA. Unlike the packers who mostly bought 
existing tanneries Endicott-Johnson built their own. They built a new 
sole leather tannery in 1901 and subsequently began making various 
types of shoe upper leather.  They manufactured for their own use 
and also sold surplus leather elsewhere. 
 
In 1895 the trade in the US was particularly difficult and fear of first 
shortages of hides and then of excess caused big fluctuations in raw 
material prices in Europe. The United States Leather Co. ceased 
production for 60 days to stop the value of sole declining too far and 
planned a further 30 day shut down in 1896100. 
 
It will have been seen in the evolution of the Swamp that as the 
tanners moved their tanneries out of town and became merchants 
they also began to realise the value of their property and became in 
part at least developers in property. Some become full time property 
developers and indeed many of the famous Newport Cottages are 
linked to this strategic change. This was to become a characteristic of 
the trade for the next 150 years as tanners in the western world 
evacuated from unsuitable city centre sites and moved out of town or 
out of business.  In some parts of Europe this hidden realisable asset 
ran in to trouble in the late 20th century when tougher environmental 
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standards checked the ground and found old tanneries to be 
contaminated with solvents, anthrax or other toxic materials. 
Nevertheless the continued acceleration of urbanisation often means 
that even relatively modern tanneries can soon become surrounded by 
housing and feel obliged to move. 
 
The creation of the US Leather Company was followed in 1899 by the 
shoe upper leather tanners to form the American Hide and Leather Co 
which had 75% of the market in the US. 
 
By the turn of the century the United States Leather Company had 
offices in Ferry Street, New York, Essex Street in Boston, and in 
Chicago and Cincinnati. Yet increasingly they worried about the value 
of their assets, in particular their lands. For the land revaluation they 
were initially interested in was the forest land from which they 
obtained their bark for tanning and in 1903 that was revalued at US 
$13m dollars more than the 1893 valuation.  Attempts were made to 
restructure the business based on this revaluation but appeared to 
have failed mostly because of the tension between the preference and 
non-preference shareholders. The United States Leather Company had 
become a stock market “play”. 
 
In the autumn of 1904 vice-president Healy of the United States 
Leather Company suggested that Armour & Company – a major hide 
supplier based in Chicago - should become involved. Mr. P.A. 
Valentine appears to have been a shareholder in both companies and 
key to the arrangement suggested by Healy.  An agreement was signed 
and the business reorganised to give Armour managerial control and a 
10% stake of the common stock of the business.  The peculiar aspect 
to the agreement was that while the ordinary members of the 
company imagined that the idea would be that Armour would sell 
their hides to the business at a preferred rate no such agreement was 
actually made.  Indeed the Armour staff were fully entitled to run the 
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United States Leather Company for the benefit of Armour & Company 
rather than anyone else.  Notwithstanding the plan went ahead and in 
1905 the business was re-incorporated as the Central Leather 
Company despite continued legal battles as to who owned what and at 
what valuation.  In fact the Central Leather Company and the United 
States Leather Company were two separate entities with the latter 
owning 95% of the former.  The idea was to merge the two but this 
was opposed legally by a shareholder group led by a Mr Colgate. The 
situation was not resolved until a settlement was agreed in late 1909. 
Meanwhile the business continued to produce and indeed to acquire 
some of their smaller competitors.  The Armour managerial 
involvement ended in 1908 and Mr. J. Ogden Armour resigned in 
1909 from the Board of Central Leather. 
 
The legal battle that took place over these five years reflected minority 
shareholders concerned that they were being squeezed into giving up 
their claims on the surplus of the United States Leather Company, 
and the fact that there was concern that the new business had terms 
that allowed it to undertake activities far beyond just making leather.  
These included running lumber businesses and railroads which the 
company felt important to develop its hemlock forests.  Associated 
with this was another group of shareholders who were purely 
speculators who bought their shares after the reorganisation had been 
made public and according to Dewing were only trying to make a short 
term profit by opposing the merger. 
 
On the way through this process the United States Leather Company 
set up the Central Pennsylvania Lumber Company in 1908. 
 
As this was going on Armour decided to enter tanning directly and in 
1907 they started to make tanning contracts prior to acquiring 
companies directly. Another packer, Swift & Co, set up the Ashland 
Leather Co, took an interest in A.C.Lawrence Leather Company at the 
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time of its incorporation in 1897, and bought a number of tanneries 
between 1908 and 1911 to become a big producer of cattle hide 
leather as well as calf and sheep.  Swift had earlier started to send 
hides out for contract tanning perhaps as early as 1892. 
 
Morris and Co, another larger packing house began putting hides out 
for contract tanning in 1898 and then bought and ran the three 
tanneries of William P. Mosser and Co., Boston in 1908, selling them 
to Armour in 1918. By 1917 US Leather had only 31% of the sole 
leather business, while the “big four” packers – Armour, Swift, Morris, 
and Wilson had 22%.  Looking at the cattle hide business as a whole 
including sole, harness, belting and strap leather the packers had just 
over 15% against the US Leather’s 14%. 
 
Dewing’s opinion of the company is a distinctly pessimistic one, as is 
the analysis of Donham (1930).  There are a number of points which 
Dewing makes that are further analysed by Donham.  First is that in 
the manufacture of sole leather there are few benefits of scale, and 
that a large group bringing hides in from South America and tanning 
them in the USA gave no financial advantage over a small well 
equipped tanner making leather from local hides in his own hemlock 
forest. The idea that combining the 100 companies would create a 
monopoly and thus remove competition did not work out. In fact the 
price competition after the formation was no less than before. 
 
This was particularly the case because of the long time involved in 
making this form of vegetable tannage, during which any fall in hide 
prices lagged behind the fall in the price of leather.  The hemlock 
tannage made largely from Argentine hides involved considerable 
export to Europe where the leather had to compete with high quality 
European tanners from places such as Leeds and London in the UK 




The long time involved for tanning was also a reason that tanners 
suffered what Dewing called a “chronic lack of working capital.”101   
For domestic hides tanned with the vegetable process in the 19th 
century a year would pass from the purchase of the hides to the sale 
of the leather. For those using Argentine hides this time would be 
extended by at least another six months.  This meant that the United 
States Leather Company suffered from the cost of large floating debts 
and these along with the steady low value of the share price damaged 
their credit. 
 
Dewing is also very willing to put a lot of the blame on the skills of 
management.  
 
“In surveying this protracted reorganisation (1903-1909) one must 
recognise that inadequate business foresight and managerial power lay 
at the bottom of the failure of the sole leather combination.  It was this 
lack of entrepreneur ability rather the keenness of competition that 
prevented success. The management of a corporation worth over sixty 
millions in assets demands a business skill greater than that 
possessed by the old leather interests.  They chose the wrong time to 
promote their enterprise, they burdened it with fictitious capitalization, 
and choked its life by excessive fixed charges.”102 
 
Nevertheless the company did manage to continue to pay dividends at 
the level of 7% until after the war. Indeed during the 1st World War the 
then named Central Leather Company did very well, albeit the 
unpredictability in global transportation made the management 
cautious in all statements. In 1918 the company announced a profit 
for the year which had dropped from US$8.5m in 1917 to just 
US$1.3m. This was blamed by Edward Hoyt, President at the time on 
the Price Fixing Committee of the Government.  As an example the 
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Committee had raised the price of hides from 13 to 35% between May 
and July and then from August to October reduced them by 4-10% at 
the same timing fixing an arbitrary maximum selling price for 
leather103.  
 
Watson considers the 1910 to 1920 decade to have been very 
successful for the company, spurred on by war demand.  “The war 
period brought huge sales and profits”.104  
 
Hoyt, a Yale graduate, died of pneumonia at the age of 47 in July 
1920. 
 
After the war matters began to deteriorate and in 1920 a loss of 
US$25m was recorded. 1920 was a year in which the leather market 
slumped. The New York Times105 reported that the losses included a 
stock write down so great that the surplus built up during the war 
was entirely lost. The 1921 loss of US$9.2m came with a notice of a 
year-end upturn. 
 
According to Watson (1950)106 demand for cattle hide leather declined 
considerably after 1920 as a consequence of: 
- technological change 
- the appearance of substitutes 
- new modes of living 
- the great depression of the thirties 
 
“As far as is known, this was the most important shrinkage in demand 
ever experienced in the industry.” 
 
                                                 
103
 NYT Feb 25, 1919 
104
 Watson, 1950 p. 28.   
105
 NYT May 25, 1921 
106
 Watson  1950, p 15 
  
 201 
Many elements were involved including the reduction in the use of 
harness leathers as motorised transport became more prevalent, 
especially in farming.  Rubber was replacing some leather soles in 
footwear and pyroxylin fabrics replaced leather upholstery and 
luggage.  Rubber was also replacing leather in industrial belting. At 
the same time European tanners continued to grow and US exports to 
Europe in US Leather type products declined. Indeed European 
tanners began to penetrate the US market with finished product to a 
level that lead to duties being put on cattle hide leather imports in 
1930. 
 
The start of the twenties had not been good as a result of post war 
order cancellations in both the US and Europe that meant that the 
heavy leather sector in the US had built up large stocks of high priced 
finished leather so that the position was that for many large inventory 
or paper profits were made but were lost when the crash came in 
1920. Judging from Donham e107ach year up to 1927 the sole leather 
industry sold six to seven per cent more leather than it processed as it 
reduced the accumulated stocks built up in 1918 and 1919.   
 
US Leather entered 1920 with a surplus of US$30m and inventories of 
leather, timber, hides, bark, and extracts totalled US$75m. In 
addition to the write off already mentioned in 1920 by 1926 the 
surplus had declined to a deficit of US$19.6m. 
 
Sadly the tanners do not appear to have learned from the past and 
they bid the price up as they anticipated a shortage and tried to 
corner more world hides.108 They were successful in doubling their 
share in foreign hides but this just left them with excess over-valued 
inventory as the world entered the 1930s recession.  US Leather was 
successful between 1927 and 1929 and rebuilt some of the value lost 
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in the business, but they entered 1929 with inventories over US$30m.  
Large inventory losses occurred every year through to 1933. 
 
The company reorganised again between 1925-1927 changing its 
capital structure and recognising it was a smaller business. No 
dividends had been paid since the first quarter of 1921. 
 
After the re-organisation of 1907 some additional tanneries were 
bought, working in the same field. In the good years other acquisitions 
were made. In 1917 Griess Pfleger Tanning Company, a shoe upper 
tannery was bought (it was later sold at a loss of US $2m) and a few 
years later Hilliard and Merrill which cut soles was also purchased.  
 
By 1925 the number of tanneries had been drastically reduced down 
to just 38, with 5 extract plants, lumber yards, mills, and a small 
railroad.  The company had 5308 employees and a 30% market share 
of US sole leather.109  
 
After a share capital adjustment in 1926 in 1927 the Central Leather 
Company and United States Leather Company were finally merged 
and the business renamed as the United States Leather Company 
 
By then the companies United States Leather Co., Howes Brothers 
Co., and Proctor Ellison Co. had a 75% share of the sole leather 
market in the late 1930s. There was a post recession revival in general 
business in 1933 and in 1934 the trade got a boost from low priced 
hides resulting from a drought slaughter. 
 
Meanwhile the activities of shoe companies in the leather industry 
continued with International Shoe Co. building a tannery near St. 
Louis in 1916 to make side leather (for shoe uppers). They made 
further movements with acquisition of three more tanneries – upper, 
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welting and sole leather – in 1921 and another sole leather tannery in 
1924. In 1925 they built a sheepskin tannery, then a split tannery in 
1926, and another upper leather plant in 1929.  In 1930 they built a 
refrigerated hide warehouse to hold 150,000 hides. 
 
Brown shoe bought Moench Tanning Co in 1926 which had two 
tanneries making sole leather and upper leather. All these 
developments by shoe companies and by meat packers into the 
leather industry, the general change towards lighter chrome tanned 
bovine leather, along with the relentless decline in the traditional 
markets of saddlery, sole leather, and upholstery meant that the 
company struggled for future growth. The United States Leather Co. 
had a spurt of protection as a strategic industry in World War II but 
not long after the New York Times110 published a final message on 
Thursday, January 10, 1952: 
 
DISSOLUTION VOTED FOR U. S. LEATHER; Stockholders Approve 
Action and Will Get Late in Month 1st Payment of $10 a Share 
The United States Leather Company, which was an outgrowth of the 
original company organized in 1893, will be dissolved and liquidated. 
Stockholders overwhelmingly approved the action at a special meeting 
held here yesterday.   
 
A complex and quite difficult business had come to an end after nearly 
60 tumultuous years of steady decline. 
 
5.4 Discussion of the United States Leather Company 
 
The creation of the United States Leather Company was a deliberate 
outcome of interactions which consolidated some sixty leather 
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companies representing around one hundred and ten tanneries. The 
ones to join were the most prosperous hemlock tanners while the oak 
and union tanners mostly stayed out, demanding more favourable 
treatment. The new business owned 400,000 acres of bark forest land 
and the bark rights to 100,000. Some of the difficulties the company 
encountered were no doubt exacerbated by the fact that they 
launched into four stagnant years in the USA economy.  Yet they also 
had clear interpretations of the network within which they worked 
 
Subjective Interpretation 
There were clearly a number of issues running in the minds of the key 
decision makers who drove the creation of this large business. One 
minor, but not unimportant element was that some of the owners 
were reluctant to pass control to their sons, or their sons were not 
interested in the business. The major factor was without doubt the 
view taken about the price of hides and their negotiating position with 
the very large meat packers who supplied the hides.  
 
The view taken of the business reads very much as one concerned 
only with the US market largely appearing to put aside both raw 
material imports and finished leather exports at the time. It also 
appears that they felt that small tanners not in the combination would 
not be effective competitors. Although the tanners were aware of the 
smaller plants and involved in imports and exports their network 
horizons as indentified from all the material written by and about 
them appear to be based on a narrow view of the companies in relative 
close geographic proximity to them. If all the companies held similar 
views of the network than it is not surprising that they came fairly 
readily to an agreement to unite into one organisation.  
 
Relativity 
The companies involved did know each other very well and had traded 
together over many decades. Most had headquarters in New York and 
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all had close association with the old New York trade. Many had 
family ties on top of this. In addition they were all making similar 
products and serving the same markets. They regularly interacted at 
trade events in the City. It is likely from this that they had a well 
defined structure in terms of knowing how they all were placed in 
their notional “networks” and that after decades of working alongside 
each other they had many shared beliefs. 
 
One consequence of the interactions they undertook was that the 
number of external actors with which they individual interacted 
reduced as many matters were centralised.  
 
Interdependence 
Prior to the periods of thin or negative margins as a result of 
depression and the high price of hides the companies were 
competitors and did not work closely together except in areas such as 
shared bark lands or shared representation in certain geographic 
areas and overseas. Although competitors they would help each other 
ought and we have no evidence of aggressive competition taking place; 
this appears to be a balanced slow moving sector.  
 
What is clear that that they thought that if they created clear 
interdependence by coming together they would be able to confront 
other parts of the network and defeat the issues which were 
preventing them from prospering. That is to say that while functioning 
independently they did not need resources from each other for their 
main stream activity, but they thought that the combined resource of 
scale would give them greater symmetry to fight the meat packers and 
the power to dominate smaller players in the market.  
 
Actors may try to avoid depending on others but on the other hand if 
they face a problem they may have to accept new levels of 
interdependence in order to deal with the problem. This fits with the 
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first Network Paradox in that if the actor is dependent on a resource 
the relationship needed for access to that resource both create and 
empowerment and a constraint. The combined business should be 
able to confront the meat packers but in combining to do so the actor 
loses the flexibility of being an independent business. 
 
An outcome her was that the companies became closely 
interdependent on each other and had reduced interdependence on 
external companies.  
 
Jointness 
By combining interdependencies and relativities jointness creates the 
opportunity for collective action. Relatedness is not well defined term 
and is often used loosely. All actors in a network are directly or 
indirectly connected with each other so can be said to have 
relationships with each other.  This means that while some 
relationships will be obvious other might not be so apparent to the 
actors involved. Actors do, however, choose when to interact and have 
relations with each other and this is what happened in this case. The 
relatedness of the companies was made explicit by them uniting into 
one company. 
 
The United States Leather Company foundation was an example of 
multilateral interaction as many companies came together, albeit 
there were a number of lead parties who mediated the events.   
 
The Network Paradoxes are very apparent here in terms of outcomes 
in that as per the First Network Paradox once they had united into 
one business they had little opportunity to change the way they 
operated despite finding the competition more flexible and sprightly 
than had been anticipated and the meat packers to be able to side 
step their pressure. The Third Network Paradox became important 
once the company had settled and needed to move forward where we 
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see that the more it had tried to achieve control via tightening its 
internal links and reducing the number of external ones the less 





















Figure 10: United States Leather Company post 1893 
 
This can be seen in Figure 9 where the many tanneries in the 
business were required to manage hide purchases and sales via the 




The United States Leather Company gives us a simple example which 
is well documented of a large number of companies in the Leather 
Network coming together to tighten their links so closely as to form 
one company. With that most functions became centralised and 




In doing this the company had mis-read the flexibility of the smaller 
competitors and were to discover that there were few benefits of scale 
in vegetable tanning.  And according to Dewing111 they also 
misunderstood the scale of their exports of hemlock leather where the 
international market was ferociously competitive.  The meat packers 
who had been expected to reduce hide prices managed to work around 
the company. This was a typical network outcome where a company is 
unable to control interactions elsewhere in the network, however 
tightly it might bring together some sectors.  The meat packers did not 
weaken their ties to the United States leather company, but they did 
move quickly to build relationships elsewhere. Through these 
relationships they were able to sell their hides to the more profitable 
and flexible oak bark tanners and eventually to start up their 
tanneries. The influence the United States Leather was able to have 
over the meat packers was minimal and indeed at one stage they 
actually asked for managerial help. 
 
So instead of increasing the strength of their position in the market 
the purposeful networking undertaken by the US hemlock tanners 
had the outcome of reducing their competitive position and to limit 
their future ability to be innovative.   
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In this section the episodes are analysed in detail looking at 
randomness, combining resources, dyadic networking, networking to 
change position, network reaction and innovation. 
 
The section covers the in depth analysis of the Booth Company, 
looking at the four episodes, plus the more anecdotal limited analysis 
of the United States Leather Company. 
 
6.2 The evolution of the network 
 
The Booths started a new business from scratch with two distinct 
elements of trading and shipping and made it a company of 
formidable size and reputation over the period of the sixty years 
examined.  The management structure was sufficiently robust for 
Charles Booth to recuperate from illness in Switzerland for two years 
early in the history of the company and later for him to spend huge 
amounts of time on his social studies and pushing for a national old 
age pension.  
 
The structure covered the UK, the USA and Brazil in particular but 
increasingly linkages took them to all continents.  In both sides of the 
business they worked with leading edge technology although they 
never set out to be other than effective and up to date traders and 
ship-owners.  They tested and withdrew from a number of smaller 
ventures in the earlier years and again they entered into additional 




A view of the innovations in leather technology would cast Booths as 
accidental pioneers.  Nevertheless their impact was astounding. They 
were deeply involved in the two most important innovations of all time 
in leather manufacture: fatliquoring and chrome tanning. The third 
invention - the Dongola tannage - survived as quite an important 
leather making process for sixty years and may today be considered a 
“forgotten technology” (Parsons and Rose 2003) that is likely to be 
updated and reintroduced in the near future. One element of 
innovation has always been serendipity, the unexpected discovery of 
new things by chance.  Yet serendipity and randomness might not 
always be considered discovery by luck. There is perhaps an element 
of system which might be considered in this approach.  Being willing 
to maintain an openness to accept new external links and to 
encourage ideas from external actors would be examples of this 
approach (Håkansson et. al. 2009).  In Internet times this might be 
considered outsourcing, or even crowd-sourcing and done largely on-
line but 150 years ago a good trading house new that much of its 
value lay in the quality of its relationships. As has been stated Booths 
were known112 to be keen to look amongst their connections for new 
business opportunities. Indeed in 1883 Charles Booth wrote about 
both Dongola and chrome tanning saying “working up of new 
business (which) is the life of any concern such as ours”.113 By 
maintaining so many intersectional linkages the Booth approach fits 
with this in terms of the potential for innovation discussed by Dosi 
(1988).  
 
What today we would call macro and micro environmental analysis, 
placing the business in its context and trying to have some vision of 
what might happen in the future comes across quite clearly from the 
partners letters. From the comments they make in these it is possible 
to estimate how they viewed their network pictures at that time, and 
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to envisage that Charles and Alfred were looking at their business in 



































Figure 11: Evolution of the Booth Group 
 
The company grew in complexity towards the end of the century and 
beyond. Figure 10 demonstrates in part at least how the company 
evolved through a variety of stages in terms of ownership while Figure 
11 highlights some of the locations involved to show how wide the 
geographical spread of the business became in only a few decades of 
steady growth.  Together we see a progression logically building as 
skills and competencies developed. We could also add further Latin 
American links in 1917 via the purchase of J.G.White which built 
upon the company’s confidence with its Amazon trade and harbour 
management. This reversed a decision in 1902 when Charles and 
George declined an invitation to be more involved in Brazilian 
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infrastructure projects indicating that George’s confidence to manage 
complexity had increased and he was willing to Create rather than 
Consolidate (Ford et.al., 2003; Ford, 2002). 
 
There is clear activity throughout both sides of the business to ensure 
access to skills and resources. It can be seen that the business 
continued to expand contacts in different networks using personal 
relationships, work experience, and business relationships to develop 
new links on a regular basis. The interactions involved brought these 
links within different networks together in a unique and evolving 
configuration. There was little static about the Booth network, 
however it is viewed. Thus when Charles and Alfred examined their 
network and network position it would have been like no other leather 
merchant or any other shipping company. While all network pictures 
will be unique to the individuals drawing them Alfred Booth and 
Company would had a fascinating complexity of overlapping and 
integrating networks.  It sits well with Håkansson and Olsen (2011) 
who suggest that interdependencies – along with motion and variety – 
are prerequisites of innovation. 
 
 
Randomness as a Strategy 
While we have some evidence that this complexity irked them, as it 
was quite difficult to manage, they never seriously attempted any 
simplification. From 1860 until 1920 the business only grew large and 
more complicated adding on activities in Brazil and in the UK. A 
characteristic is that they built links not just with new companies but 
also with significant individuals and kept a very complex mix of 
individuals and businesses loosely connected over long periods of time 
in an almost random way. 
 
This “randomness” appeared to be a characteristic of the Booth 
business. It was allied to a willingness to take an interest in 
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individuals they considered creative or who might offer value in some 
way in the future. Amongst these were Charles Wade, Augustus 
Schultz, John Turney and James Kent.  
 
Booths built many connections in the UK into tanning regions around 
Liverpool and Stockport, around Nottingham and Lincoln and in 
London. In the US they had strong industry links to Boston, 
Philadelphia and Gloversville as well as many international 
connections throughout the British Commonwealth and into Latin 
America. In their first decade in business much of their networking 
activity related to making new contacts and developing relationships 
throughout the world. 
 
Whatever way they viewed their network and whatever limits they put 
on their network horizon their active connections meant that Booths 
were observing and interacting with a very large number of actors 
compared to the vast majority of others in the network. At a time 
when many individuals and companies were looking for new 
inventions making it known that they were open to new ideas 
inevitably put them in a position where innovation would become part 
of their portfolio. This gave them the landscape of variety, motion and 
interdependency discussed by Håkansson and Olsen (2011). It was 
distinctly different from what we see with the United States Leather 
Company whose interactions lead it to reduce variety and 
opportunities to find innovations at the cross roads with other 
networks (Dosi, 1988; Lundgren, 1995; Håkansson and Waluszewski; 
2002). 
 
This needs to be seen in terms of not just giving Booths the potential 
to oversee new technical innovations but also to create new industry 
linkages for trade such as kangaroo from Australia to Gloversville, kid 
skins from Brazil to Philadelphia, sheep skins from France to 
Gloversville and leather from Gloversville into the footwear industry. 
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As each evolution of their part of the leather industry surfaced Booths 
appeared able to react via their wide-ranging contacts and 
relationships. The Booths were dynamic in this and were content to 
see the networks as structures that were continuously organising and 
re-organising (Håkansson et.al. 2009) 
 
 
Networking to combine different resources 
We know from earlier studies such as Lundgren (1995) that 
technologies can take decades before being successfully 
commercialised and that often success comes through the novel 
combining of a number of technologies, of which only one element 
might be completely new.  Meeting at new interfaces combines 
knowledge to meet the challenges identified by the relationships in the 
networks the business has developed. (Dosi, 1988)  All these aspects 
can be found with the Booths involvement in leather manufacturing 
technology.  
 
Even with knowledge of the need for a faster way of making leather 
and of changing consumer needs finding a commercially viable 
chrome leather took 60 years and getting the process near to what we 
can call stable took an additional ten. A simple social interaction with 
Schultz Kuttner brought together knowledge from the textile dyestuff 
industry to the leather industry. 
 
The role of previous knowledge being edged forward in fits and starts 
with no clearly defined beginning and end (Håkansson and 
Waluszewski, 2002) is quite apparent in the development of the 
chromium story.  Booths perhaps considered the chrome processing 
over when the Schultz patents were issued but not immediately 
exploitable, yet five years later they started to test merchandising one 
of the first versions being produced by others, and a decade later they 
were the global leader in its commercialisation. So not only was the 
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process hard to define in terms of time it was loaded with periods of 
inactivity and others of intense action. (Ford, et. al. 2009, p 91).  This 
also demonstrates that Booths continued to network with multiple 
partners, adjusting their position in the networks of which they were 
part in order to always be aware as far as possible of new 
developments they could help to exploit. 
 
Waluszewski (2004) demonstrates that resources and network 
outcomes have different values for different actors and often 
innovation finds its success in unexpected uses. With Dongola it is 
likely that Kent on his own would have failed with this product as 
although usable for glove leather it was far from ideal. Equally his idea 
had been to make glove leather from a Brazilian hair sheep or a 
domestic deer but the process initially worked much better on goat 
and kangaroo. Håkansson and Waluszewski (2002) explain how path 
dependency would be likely to stop Kent going beyond his existing 
market boundaries and how this limits the potential for discovering 
where the real market might exist. Creating the crossroads between 
established paths, as Booths were able to, made for new supply and 
demand interfaces (Håkansson and Olsen, 2011) which allowed for 
rapid expansion in unexpected directions for Kent. 
 
Embedding ideas in a commercial setting is the moment when the 
majority of inventions fail. (Wagrel and Waluszewski, 2008) While 
James Kent was trying to make better gloving leather that would be 
cheaper than that being imported from France, Schultz was working 
in the very narrow niche of corset leathers. Yet the pent up demand 
that was growing, and of which Booths were aware, was for thinner, 
softer, better performing leathers for footwear uppers that could be 
made more quickly than the traditional methods. Both the Dongola 
and the chromium leathers actually found their role in meeting this 
demand for shoe upper leather as their key profitable outlet.  For the 
Dongola it was the Booths who created the direct contact between the 
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new product and the trade and created the huge boom for the 
product.  
 
We also see with Booths’ relationship with technology an 
understanding of their recognition that their successful role would be 
more as a facilitator than an inventor. As different actors interact their 
tangible and intangible resources are likely to be adapted to mutual 
advantage. “The systematic confrontation of resources also underlies 
the development of new joint resource combinations in the process of 
innovation” (Ford, et.al. 2009). In this way they were a mix of a 
systems integrator and instigator. They brought connections, 
knowledge and finance to situations in a way likely to stimulate 
creative evolution of ideas. They were deliberately networking with 
multiple partners to find the right raw material that best suited each 
process and the right spots in the market to suit the articles 
characteristics. 
 
Dosi (1988) outlines the importance of an “industrial web” which he 
argues is needed to diffuse new ideas into the market place and this 
was one major resource the Booths offered.  They were able to identify 
the best markets for new leathers and had the network links to 
provide access and outlets. They were also excellent at sourcing 
alternate raw materials – kangaroo, deer, and kidskins – from any part 
of the world. For this they had their connections in the major ports 
and trading houses in Liverpool, New York and London.  
 
Despite the importance of Dongola, fatliquoring and chrome tanning 
the Booths are rarely mentioned in texts discussing the history and 
technological development of leather. While they facilitated and 
funded much of the research and were the global force behind 
commercialising the new leather, including helping people like Wade 
start to making chrome leather  in Europe, they never tried to own the 
  
 217 
technology or to claim any responsibility for it. They did, however, 




One element that is used to identify the evolution of networks and the 
outcomes of interaction is when companies make adaptations in order 
to allow both partners to progress. Booths asked their UK suppliers to 
do this in the middle 1860s after they had observed how the financing 
of the business was working out.114 Trade financing skill was one of 
the most important resources the Booths brought to the business via 
their early training and family connections and their judgement was 
likely to be correct.  In these situations when companies are 
interacting outcomes they have been examined by way of the Three 
Aspects and 6Cs (Ford et.al., 2003; Ford, 2002). 
 
Confront or Conform,  
Consolidate or Create,  
Coerce or Concede 
 
In this instance Booths were in reality coercing their suppliers into 
agreeing the new changes which involved delayed payment and 
agreement to a 5% commission.  While “coerce” or “concede” implies a 
battle the Booth approach was clearly argued and they succeeded with 
all their suppliers.  Without question their perceived status moved 
from one of weakness to strength quickly as they grew (Corsaro et. al. 
2011, p. 923). They had built up just enough credibility and jointness 
with their suppliers to have the trust needed for them to accept the 
request for new terms (Ford and Mouzas, 2008).   The outcome did 
lead to better sales and profits and their relationships with suppliers 
were to last many years. That with Turneys of Nottingham remained 
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 John, 1959, p. 36.   
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close for nearly 130 years until the tannery in Nottingham was finally 
shut for redevelopment into housing. 
 
When Kent and Booth collapsed with huge debts the Booth approach 
might be expected to avoid conforming or conceding but rather to 
search for an alternate. They indicated that they considered James 
Kent a clever technician with a good potential to develop new 
processes and that they thought the factory well run could be viable, 
so instead of writing off their losses they paid everyone off and bought 
in to the plant.  This was a networking approach of confrontation and 
in confronting the relationship in the way in which they did Booths 
had to accept that this changed their network position and the roles 
within it. It is clear that Booths saw Kent as a resource (Harrison and 
Håkansson, 2006), which would be useful more tightly involved in 
their network, and one which would be a loss if they accepted closure.  
 
The Kent situation also exhibits the role that time plays. (Ford and 
Håkansson, 2006; Mouzas, 2009) Since the Booths had worked with 
the company for some time they had got to know him and it was that 
knowledge which encouraged them to support him when they might 
otherwise have been expected to take the first loss as the least loss 
and walk away. High levels of trust are an outcome of long term 
relationships (Ford and Mouzas, 2008). 
 
Networking allows a company to consciously change its position 
A lot of attention is paid to the fact that an unwary company can find 
its network position fatally damaged by a failure to watch how events 
are changing the nature of relationships in the network and hence the 
position of their own business in relation to others (Ford et al., 2003). 
 
Alternatively by positively networking a company may be able to alter 
its position in the network. A new network position might be created 
by the development of a technology within the business and within a 
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few years this was to happen for Booths. Their investment in Kent had 
initially meant that they had consolidated their network by taking a 
tighter hold of manufacturing within it. This meant they would start to 
think more closely about how the products of Kent’s tannery could 
relate to the needs of all the markets that Booths worked in rather 
than just the narrow range of Kent’s local glove customers. This 
moved Booths further back in the value chain (Dose, 1988; Duruflé, 
G., et. al., 1988) and also allowed Kent to interact with an entirely new 
group of clients that he otherwise had no access to (Ford et.al. 2009) 
 
There was no attempt to create a secret “skunk works” at any stage; 
the Booths approached this on the basis that if solutions could be 
found to identified market needs Booths and their associates would 
benefit. While we do not know the reasoning no correspondence has 
been found to date indicating any desire to “own” technology only the 
relentless interest to keep on developing new business areas. Paradox 
Three (Håkansson and Ford, 2002, p. 254) suggests that companies 
may try to manage their relationships and control the network that 
surrounds, but that the more successful they are the less effective and 
innovative the network will be. The Booth approach was to avoid 
control, unless forced (as with the purchase of Kent’s tannery) and 
even with control to trust the individuals to be able to act 
independently.    
 
One element worthy of consideration is that Booths had other 
business and personal interests which forced them into looking at 
their networks and network relationships in a different way from other 
tanners. When the Schultz patents were ready Booths were still busy 
with the Dongola tannage which was doing exceptionally well. It 
required a great deal of work in the search for raw materials and in 
servicing the growing market in footwear leather, which was new to 
Gloversville tanners but well known to Booths via their activities in 
New York and Boston.  They had bought the neighbouring tannery to 
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expand production and used their own shipping line to introduce a 
direct shipping route from Para to New York primarily to import goat 
and hair sheep skins. 
 
At about the same time in the UK they had invested to set up a new 
plant in Nuneaton to make a product from roans (another type of part 
processed sheepskin) more suited to the US market. Charles had also 
personally been making trips, such as one to Bordeaux in 1881, to 
look for better quality raw material. 
 
With shipping, trading, tanning and a global perspective the Booths at 
that time were themselves a unique organisation. They worked on 
many interfaces and within a number of networks that were very 
different to other leather traders or, for example, an individual tannery 
in Nottingham or Gloversville. With their network position and 
naturally wider network horizon were in a better position to assess the 
potential and requirements of a new development in leather than most 
other actors in the network. In this regard, looking at the Three 
Aspects (Ford, 2003), in the main the Booths tried to create rather 
than consolidate when making choices about their network position. 
 
Networking also changes a company’s position 
So while we lack, based on the papers available to date, any clear 
definition of why Booths did not want to control the technology tightly 
we do know they were exceptionally busy in many other areas within 
and without the leather industry.  They might have been just 
“conveniently” diverted by other matters. At that time they saw 
themselves as business people first and tanners second or third. Their 
letters always describe a love of the industry, not a romance with the 
product. So their orientation and their network assessment was much 
more about the markets – for raw and finished leather – than the finer 
details of the product itself. When the market demanded a new 
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product, or as with the roans their product was not suited for the 
market, then they made changes. 
 
Paradox Two (Håkansson & Ford, 2002, p. 252) states that while a 
company’s relationships are the outcome of its own actions and 
decisions; the company itself is equally the outcome of its relationship 
and what has happened within these relationships.  Thus we see the 
nature of trade and manufacture changing throughout the period as 
better communications, new technologies and global expansion 
changed the world of business. For the United States Leather 
Company the value of ownership of bark forests, and the location of 
tanneries within them soon became outdated when it became possible 
to extract the tannin from bark at source and the slaughter of cattle 
took the hides to the mid-west as a result of the railways and 
refrigeration. In both networks new relationships were established and 
the networks changed steadily, but the Booth approach made it easier 
for them to adapt whereas the United states Leather Company were 
entrapped in the negative side of Paradox 6 (Håkansson and Ford 
2002). 
 
While Booths’ intensive networking and bringing together of different 
actors did change their position in the network it is not clear that they 
fully realised until later that they were moving from being traders to 
manufacturers. Within a few years they would not be seen as 
suppliers of raw material but as tanners and others in New York and 
Boston entered the market to fill the spot of raw material suppliers to 
the industry. Certainly by 1920 with tanneries in the UK and the USA 
they were to be one of the biggest, if not the biggest, tanning 
organisations in the world. Growth in the US slowed but they 
continued to acquire and build in the UK and added plants in Africa 
and New Zealand. The one small move to support James Kent at a 






What we do not know is why the traditional vegetable tanners did not 
react when Booths began selling goatskin and kangaroo Dongola 
leather into the footwear industry. This was after all a vegetable 
process (with some adaptations) which they could have used on their 
own raw material. Indeed in the 1930s we have many records of 
Dongola still being used on bovine material long after goat and kid 
tannages had moved on to chromium.  Yet at the time we have no 
evidence of any form of retaliation or moves to defend their market 
share. For ten years Booths worked extremely hard to strengthen their 
links into the footwear sector of the US leather network. Did the 
vegetable tanning sector not notice, or was their response to push 
more into sole leather, saddlery and upholstery? In this dissertation 
we have not discovered the answer to this, other than knowing that 
Booths were successful in penetrating the market to the extent that 
their Philadelphia tannery Surpass Leather grew to be one of the 
largest tanneries in the world and certainly the largest ever kidskin 
plant. 
 
We do of course know that the US vegetable tanners were preoccupied 
with the supply situation, including their fear of the growing power of 
the meat packers. In 1893 they grouped together (a major 
consolidation in terms of the Second Aspect of Networking) in the 
hope that their combined buying power would make them more equal 
to the meat companies and better able to negotiate prices.  For the 
next fifteen years nearly all the written materials about this new 
company relates to internal problems in the organisation of the 
business and the revaluation of assets, in particular forests, in order 
to pay dividends.  
 
As a consequence the US Leather Company management did feel they 
were embracing change and that they were making a bold move to 
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advance their industry, yet their network pictures were narrowed 
towards the domestic scene and their traditional markets. For this 
research the equivalent of partners letters for the United States 
Leather Company are lacking so any network pictures tend to be 
based on transactions rather than the expressed views of senior 
individuals. They did use Argentine hides and export a little to 
Europe, so were not without international contacts and expert 
commercial knowledge. Yet when looking at what correspondence and 
contemporary papers a restriction on the boundaries, a heavy 
emphasis on power, and a focus on besting the abattoirs to reduce 
hide prices dominated their network pictures (Henneberg, 2006, 
p.416). 
 
So while the move from trader to tanner was for Booths a gradual 
process over 25 years or more, and they never actually gave up 
trading, this was quite different from the abrupt Confrontation of the 
network position undertaken by the members of the US Leather 
Company in 1893. In just a few months the vegetable tanners 
interrupted hundreds of long standing network relationships and 
reduced them to just a few tightly centralised ones. 
 
At no stage in the Booth business were relationships interrupted on 
this scale. Where ties weakened with Booths the relationship often 
remained for years or decades in a non transactional form, with the 
parties continuing to meet and correspondence. They retained a high 
level of social capital (Easton, 2004) throughout the network which 
they could call on as needs arose. 
 
On the shipping side of Booths relationships were developed, 
resources expanded and the business grew in the same way as did 
leather. The initial trip to the Amazon allowed them to come away with 
the mail contract – after a lot of negotiation to meet the needs of both 
sides - and an associated knowledge of how to deal in that country 
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and obtain access to other materials worthy of export. When they 
much later in 1879 purchased two fast sailing craft115, without steam 
power, to take bulk cargo on direct routes, they indicated that they 
had perfectly understood the import and export requirements from 
that zone and how best to harness technology to service them. The 
negotiation with Singlehursts and the Red Cross line show that they 
were willing to confront competition but also to work with them in the 
finding of mutually workable solutions. The networking and 
discussions with all stakeholders in that period was clearly intense. 
 
It might be said that the Booths managed this by being better at 
looking at the bigger picture than their competitors – that their 
network horizons were wider and they better understood global 
development and the relative values of steam and sail. Charles in 
1869 wrote “as we approach the Singlehurst opposition it seems more 
and more likely that it will be only competition which in some senses 
will prove to be a combination”116.  In setting up in Brazil the Booths 
had connected with older trading houses, especially Gunston, Wilson 
and Company the most significant. GWC withdrew some of its sailing 
ships from the route and invested £10000 to help Booths commission 
two more steamers. Some of their contemporaries were quoted in 1869 
as seeing the Singlehurst move as “the end of their venture”117 
whereas the actual outcome was to be that early in the 1900s Booths 
acquired the entire Singlehurst Company. It is curious how often this 
aspect of a long relationship ending in 100% ownership features in the 
company business – Kent, Wade, Surpass, Turneys being typical.  
 
Booths also signed an agreement to manage the port of Manáos until 
1971 which lead to them transforming the harbour with a pontoon in 
1903. 
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 John, 1959 p. 59 
  
 225 
So in the sixty year period from 1860 to 1920 it is clear that Booth 
and Company took an interest in acquiring access to resources to 
allow them to expand and develop the business. A large part of this 
took place via building on relationships and acquiring new ones. They 
were then able to combine these resources in new ways – to sell 
Dongola, designed as a glove tannage, to the footwear industry for 
example – to create a unique configuration in the world’s leather 
industry. They “networked” aggressively to build new relationships 
and to adjust the nature of existing relationships so that they and 
those close to them could work together for mutual gain. This 
develops the thinking laid out in Araujo and Easton (2012) where 
history and existing structures can constrain activities now and in the 
future unless the company is active.   
 
We have seen that companies build on their previous interactions and 
these create both opportunities for future moves but also obstacles. 
Yet while the network position decides what a company is capable of 
doing certain positions clearly give it more flexibility than others. It is 
a fair conclusion that the Booth Company of 1860-1920 had far more 
options than did the United States Leather Company of 1893-1920.  
And during that period Booths steadily developed the shipping into a 
sizeable business, strengthened the Brazilian connection so that they 
could take on other elements such as a complex company such as 
J.G.White, and moved from traders to tanners. In these moves their 
network positions generally aided them rather than impeded them. So 
this dissertation shows that companies can build on their history yet 
their actual next steps depend very much on the relationships they 
have and how accessible the resources and technologies they require 
are within those relationships.  So there is a somewhat bigger picture 
to consider which a network approach can help with. 
 
The dissertation shows how over time a business can gain access to 
new resources and quite separately relationships which allowed them 
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to exploit those resources. In looking back in this way at events over a 
number of decades the adaptations that took place become apparent. 
Changes in interdependence, relativity and jointness are identifiable 
and many relationships started in the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s lasted 
well over 50 years. In those instances where we have good information 
it appears that the company choose its partners with care. The 
developments with James Kent and Charles Wade were typical.  
 
These periods to some might look ridiculously long, and of course the 
Booths developed good, close relationships with both these men in 
much shorter periods. Yet the truly meaningful adjustments can only 
be seen over the longer period.  Booths worked with James Kent for 
over ten years until he unexpectedly died and then carried on the Kent 
business until the 1940s. With Wade a relationship started in the 
early 1880s stayed strong until the closure of the Wade business in 
1979.  
 
This underlines the importance of looking at networks over long 
periods of time. We have seen that it can take many decades for some 
technological developments to work their way into a successful 
product, while business goes on in the meantime. Dongola ran as a 
key element for Booths for 15-20 years and chromium tanning 
impacted the business for nearer seventy five years. At a dinner in 
New York held in his honour and organised by Paul Cravath, the 
famous US corporate lawyer and anglophile, and all his banking 
friends George Booth found himself sitting next to Rockefeller who had 
just bought the bank in America which Booths used. George Booth 
rose to his feet and said “Is there anybody else in the room who can 
say that he has been operating the same bank account with the same 
bank under the same name for 59 years.” (Crow, 1965. p163) Booth 





As the company gathered more resources it had the capability to 
expand on a global basis. While figure 10 attempted to show a limited 
picture of the business area development over time Figure 11 shows 
some of the extensive geographical evolution.  
 
 
Figure 12: Location development 
 
The “Booth men” were part of these long term relationships. Booth 
men rarely moved on and if they did invariably remained friends. 
Managers were given their head and allowed to show their initiative.  
The letters and the constant visits appear to have created quite a 
uniform approach to issues, without reducing the creativity. It was 
expected that new ideas would be brought to the attention of the 
partners and that problems would be discussed along with potential 
solutions, however radical. 
 
Any network pictures which they drew physically or mentally 
apparently started with the big picture, a global one with many loose 
























decisions.  They started with a small trade between the UK and New 
York and soon in both countries they had become significantly 
embedded in the leather industries in both locations. Then they went 
further into the by-products side with glue and gelatine. Then they 
began to get involved in new technology, mostly by luck – although 
they took a certain risk with Kent.   
 
The idea had always been that the shipping line would service the 
leather side but their development showed that this only partly 
worked.  They were the first to exploit the Brazilian goat in the USA 
but the export of rubber from Brazil was a much bigger and more 
profitable business.  So also was shipping mail, gunpowder, nuts, iron 
and passengers. So the two businesses never fully integrated but did 
offer a means of finding separate very senior jobs for their children 
which was perhaps a consideration.   
 
The general move from trading to tanning looks, in hindsight, to have 
been a clever move. We do have comments from George Booth that 
they were aware that from the USA to Australia more hide suppliers 
and meat packers were dealing directly with major tanners rather 
than via traders and they would consider that as both a direct 
customer and a trader they could take a privileged position in such 
dealings. 
 
On the other hand it is perhaps worthy of speculation as to whether 
for a company with a network position such as Booths with links to so 
many industry sectors and geographical regions the global trends 
would not naturally present themselves to Booths via the actions and 
ongoing interactions of the many actors in the network. Might it be 
that if you have a large and broad network position and do not try and 
control it with over tight dyadic interactions there is a better chance 





Long term and less seen was the way this moving from trader to 
tanner led gradually to a change in the culture of the business.   
 
As the world entered the 20th century an external observer with some 
knowledge examining the leather industry would have recognised two 
large groups involved in the leather industry. Curiously for those 
sitting on the ground within the industry the importance of both of 
these two groups was not always apparent in the small world of 
leather.  The United States Leather Company was much talked about 
in the US but much less overseas, and while the Booth Group was 
recognised as important in each of the US and England their 
international scale was never picked up in the trade magazines and 
journals of the time. Perhaps was because the interactions which the 
Booths considered to be important lay not in the trade bodies of the 
leather industry but elsewhere in the city, the shipping business and 
trading circles. 
 
Reading the available formal and informal documents of the period 
neither company refers to the other.  Both dealt in different raw 
materials from different origins.  The United States Leather Company 
worked on US, Canadian and Argentine cattle hides and The Booth 
Group on small skins from sheep, goat and kangaroo from Europe, 
Brazil and Australasia.  The United States Leather Company made 
leather mostly for footwear soles, with some leathers also being used 
industrial belting, leather goods and equine uses while the Booth 
Group had more of a focus on glove leathers, clothing and footwear 
uppers. Both were involved in exporting leather to the European 
footwear industry. 
 
The period from 1860 to 1920 was one of significant technical and 
industrial change.  Rapid urbanisation allowed the industry first to 
use steam power to permit multi-story “mills” or factories to take 
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advantage of increasing invention in terms of machinery for all stages 
of the leather chain.  Splitting machines, fleshing machines and 
drums (as opposed to the traditional pits) for tanning and sewing 
machines for those using the leather for a variety of end-uses were 
amongst a plethora of new ideas developed in the 19th century. 
 
 
The two companies arrived at the end of the 19th century via quite 
different routes and their structure, industry linkages, capabilities 
and relationships were remarkably diverse.  The fortunes of both were 
to be entirely different also in the 20th century.  From the beginning 
any Booth network picture spanned the world, while that of the 
members of US Leather Company even before formation were much 
more focused only on the east coast of the US. They had occasional 
linkages to Latin America for some raw material and to Europe, 
especially Germany, but these were limited. So while the Booths kept 
expanding their network building on relationships and resources the 
US Leather Company and its members grew ever more insular. Both 
companies appear to be guided by their prior interactions and 
relationships. 
 
One very distinct area is that of network control. Early and 
subsequent studies of networks demonstrate that the actors’ views on 
how much they can “control”, “create” or “manage” a network are 
important. Ford (2003) makes it clear that it is better to talk about 
managing within networks than actually managing them as the 
network complexity makes attempts at control almost certain to fail. 
The foundation of the United States Leather Company gives every 
impression of a business that tried to dominate and control its 
network. It felt that its size gave it power and authority for control. 
The US Leather Company executives assumed an interdependence 
with the meat packers which was not in fact present. The meat 
packers they felt they could dominate  
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- Did not like the thought of being controlled by one tanning 
group 
- Had enough alternate network relationships to sell their hides  
- Had appropriate network connections and resources within the 
network to go into tanning themselves 
As a consequence the meat packers chose to strengthen the other 
relationships they had and lessen those with the US Leather 
Company. At the end of the first ten years of its existence the 
relationships and network position of the US Leather Company were 
very different from that which had been anticipated when it was 
founded, and not for the better. 
 
By comparison Booth’s strategy in the early years relates closely to the 
issues raised by the third network paradox.  There is little evidence 
that the Booths tried to tightly control their network in the early 
years.  Both the establishment in New York and the first trip to Brazil 
had a significant element of experimentation about them and allowed 
for flexibility and innovation by others.   That is not to say there were 
not thought out, or that no business plan had been written.  John 
(1959) describes a process of analysis for each business in a clear 
search for a network position where competition was less likely to be 
intensive and retaliation from incumbents was unlikely.   
 
Many linkages were made, both formal and informal. The Booths 
positioned themselves within both the shipping and leather networks 
in a way that gave them very many contacts, creating the likelihood 
that they would see many new situations and be faced with innovative 
options, as turned out to be the case. 
 
Booths found their long term network outcomes very different from 
their anticipations but appear comfortable to live with that.  The 
Booths recognized their own skills and utilized heavily the resources, 
creativity and capabilities of others. They do give every indication of 
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managing “within networks”. Many linkages were made, both formal 
and informal. The Booths positioned themselves within both the 
shipping and leather networks in a way that gave them very many 
contacts, creating the likelihood that they would see many new 
situations and be faced with innovative options, as turned out to be 
the case. 
 
The UK material suppliers they chose were mostly young businesses 
which were keen to export and willing to adapt in order to enter new 
markets.  The overriding impression given from the correspondence is 
one of avoiding rigidity, and maintaining a flexible approach, able to 
adjust to the conditions as they were uncovered.  They moved to Brazil 
and the USA with specific linkage spots in the network to be filled, but 
only approximate ideas about with whom they would become 
attached. 
 
One element of managing within networks is the gathering and 
sharing of ideas within the business.  The Booth business was always 
involved in great distances and during the period we have examined 
partners’ letters moving initially between the two founder brothers but 
later shared with the top key executives were the chosen method to 
make explicit and clear different members views of the relationships, 
actors and interdependencies at work. We never saw a formal audit as 
might be recommended today but these judgments were clearly as well 
informed and as perceptive as anything we might hope for today. One 
consideration must be that the United States Leather Company 
founders, living adjacent to each other in New York did not have the 
same need to think things through and put pen to paper, nor the 
opportunity for regular long journeys across the Atlantic interfacing 
with a wide variety of people and consequently did not have, and did 
not think they needed, the same requirement to analyse their 




Connectedness impacts on the level of freedom a company has in 
defining its supply network and its other relationships (Bocconcelli 
and Tunisini, 2009, p24, Blankenberg and Johannson, 1992). In its 
first 60 years Booths had a great deal of flexibility although it had 
many relationships, but in its final years this flexibility had 
diminished greatly as the company looked at a much narrower 
network horizon: a network with fewer relationships. 
 
This latter contrasts with the findings of Ford et. al. (2003) that 
identifies the substantial variety and dynamism in the substance and 
the structure as characteristic of networks. (Bocconcelli and Tunisini, 
2009)  
 
In Figure 12 some of the major areas of the development of Booths in 
terms of the Three Paradoxes are laid out. In many instances there is 
quite a fine line in some of the outcomes. A company’s options are 
both created and constrained by its resources, its future moves are 
made possible by its previous actions but also constrained by them 
and the more tightly it tries to manage things which are not it’s to 




PARADOX 1:   
 
A COMPANY’S RELATIONSHIPS ARE THE 




THESE RELATIONSHIPS MAY ALSO TIE IT TO 
ITS CURRENT WAYS OF OPERATING AND 
RESTRICT ITS ABILITY TO CHANGE. 
 
The partners built many relationships in diverse 
fields which allowed them to move effectively into 
network positions in their chosen areas  
Some of the relationships limited the options for 
the business at start up: the choice of the leather 
industry and the ports in Brazil for the shipping 
Their international, merchant house, and 
financial relationships extended their leather 
network well beyond the norms for the leather 
As they moved more into tanning and selling 
finished leather, others began to fill the network 
space in raw hide trading as the Booth links 
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industry in the US or the UK. This enabled them 
to identify and exploit new opportunities 
weakened 
Over the sixty years their partners saw them 
increasingly as tanners and less as traders 
Once interdependencies had been established 
with Kent it would have been hard for them not to 
buy the company on his death 
  
PARADOX 2:  
 
A COMPANY’S RELATIONSHIPS ARE THE 




THE COMPANY ITSELF IS EQUALLY THE 
OUTCOME OF ITS RELATIONSHIPS AND WHAT 
HAS HAPPENED WITHIN THEM. 
 
They had a coherent approach to developing 
strong relationships even before trading, creating 
a sound base for quick development when they 
started. 
The tannery involvement in Gloversville came as a 
result of a customer failing, so they had a choice 
of investment or a big loss. 
Their relationship with tannery chemists came as 
a result of the decision to invest in tanning in 
Gloversville. 
Their ultimate network position within the British 
Empire meant that they were unable to spot, or 
respond to, changes in the wider network. 
The decision to exploit the new technologies lead 
it to build new relationships for international raw 
material collecting and for worldwide customers. 
These relationships led to the company regarding 
itself as primarily tanners rather than an 
international leather group. 
Having succeeded with Dongola and created the 
possibility for Schultz to invent chrome tanning 
they were recognised as a company to talk to 
about all new developments 
They stimulated Schultz to invent chrome tanning 
and then had to react to it creating competition 
for Dongola leather 
PARADOX 3:  
 
COMPANIES TRY TO MANAGE THEIR 
RELATIONSHIPS AND CONTROL THE 
NETWORK THAT SURROUNDS THEM TO 
ACHIEVE THEIR OWN AIMS.   
 
BUT  
THE MORE THAT A COMPANY ACHIEVES THIS 
AMBITION OF CONTROL, THE LESS 
EFFECTIVE AND INNOVATIVE THE NETWORK 
WILL BE. 
 
Booths never tried to control the network at first 
and it was hard to separate owned actors and 
independent assets with whom they had strong 
relations. 
In the 20th century Booths felt ownership of 
tanneries equalled success and the trading 
businesses were allowed to decline in importance 
and voice.  
The approach in the early years was one of great 
flexibility, with a focus on innovation, and 
preparation 
As the 20th century progressed Booths were 
increasingly preoccupied with maintaining their 
existing tannery network. 
Their success in chromium tanning came from a 
positive decision not to control the technology 
Booths struggled to build a position in the Italian 
and Asian networks which developed strongly in 
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developed in their own tannery, but to exploit it 
when others had perfected what they had started 
the 1960s and 1970s because these were outside 
“their” network. 
They associated themselves with new technology 
and sponsored it in the early years without trying 
to own it. They saw more value in having a 
network position to exploit new technologies than 
having ownership of those technologies 
For the first 75 years they were closely involved in 
all leading leather industry technical 
developments, while in their latter 50 years when 
they owned all the tanneries no meaningful 
developments came from the Booth Group. They 
became more interested in ownership of 
technology in the 20th century rather than in its 
exploitation 
Figure 13: Booths and the 3 Paradoxes 
 
 
We have identified the value of weak ties, the value of “randomness” 
and the benefits to be gained from looking at the big picture before 
rushing into detail. Equally it has been clear that the Booths were 
able to catalyse great innovations and profit greatly from them without 
tight ownership of all the intellectual property. Yet when they did try 
to manage with a tighter rein on factories and ideas their ability to 




When looking at both the way the Booths networked evolved and that 
of the United States Leather Company the importance of thoroughly 
understanding the context in which they working is clear (Araujo and 
Easton, 2012). Both companies reacted in according to their 
assessment of their relationships and potential for improving their 
business position through network interaction.  
 
Booths chose, throughout this period, to maintain and further develop 
many relationships in their key markets and to use these to help them 
build more links into other countries to support the business 
development.  The Booth approach greatly aided innovation and they 
found themselves having moved from basic importers to tanners 
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benefiting hugely from the greatest advances in leather technology for 







This section looks at the conclusions to be drawn from this 
dissertation, the implications for both the academic and the 
practitioner and the practitioner, the limitations of the research, and 
the possibilities for future work in the area.  
 
Longitudinal studies made of networks using relatively short time 
spans has meant that can be difficult to see the overall picture as it 
develops. Looking at network evolution in this way is always likely to 
create some problems in not being able to truly identify outcomes and 
the beginning and end of periods of purposeful networking. Looking 
instead at a very long period allows the use of all the main tools 
available for analysing and looking at networks and an opportunity to 
identify and associate the networking process with the outcomes. It is 
particularly useful when looking at innovation which can involve 
many years with periods of intense activity interspersed with periods 
of little or no activity and the utilisation of knowledge from a wide 




This dissertation has used historical records to examine the evolution 
of a single company within a changing network.  This case illustrates 
clearly that networks are neither recent inventions, nor indeed 
inventions at all.  The case also illustrates that many supposedly 
modern phenomena such as rapid technological change and intense 
competition, “globalization”, network position, networking and the 
associated Network Paradoxes may in fact be intrinsic to the nature of 




The case also illustrates the role of the different aspects of networking 
in business practice and in Booth’s evolution (Ford et. al. 2003).  Thus 
Booths provides clear examples of the First Aspect of Networking; 
working within existing relationships.  Key questions for both 
companies in a dyadic relationship concern which elements of the 
relationship to seek to change or confront and with which to conform.  
The case also shows clear examples of the Second Aspect involving 
choices for Booths between attempting to create a new network 
position for itself or consolidate its existing position.  It is clear that 
there was a pronounced difference in the company’s approach to this 
during the nineteenth century, when it was constantly creating and 
recreating its position as opposed to its consolidation in the latter 
years of the study which at least in this instance was to prove 
disastrous.  The case also illustrates the company’s choices in the 
Third Aspect of Networking.  These choices are between when to 
attempt to coerce others based on the company’s views and when to 
concede to their knowledge or competence.  Booth operated with a 
clear view of the network and its approach to it and sought to direct 
others to its own ends.  But it was also prepared to follow the 
initiatives of others based on their expertise.  However during the later 
stages of the company, its network position and the absence of 
relationships with innovative actors in the network, combined with the 
extent of its control over “its” part of that network meant that it was 
dependent on its own skills alone and was unable to take advantage of 
those of others.  This illustrates strongly the value of trying to deduce 
the network pictures of various actors as the basis of their 
networking. 
 
The case also illustrates some of the apparent ingredients for success 
and for failure for companies operating in complex networks 
irrespective of their historical location.  In the establishment of their 




1. The Booths planned well in advance and were conscious 
of the importance of relationships as a basis for building 
business and of the time and resources needed to develop 
them.  They built these relationships before they actually 
started to trade in their own right.  They had many strong 
actor bonds capable of further development and worked 
well within those relationships. How they perceived these 
relationships is an important part of the decisions they 
subsequently made (Ford et. al., 2003, Henneberg et. al. 
2006, Ramos, et. al. 2005). 
 
2. They chose to develop a network position with a pattern of 
relationships that was both broad and dense, 
(Waluszeski, 2004) giving them the capability to observe 
potential opportunities and threats.  They saw network 
position in evolutionary terms, but acknowledged that the 
evolution of the network and of their own position within 
it was not wholly within their control.  They successfully 
balanced coercion based on their own skills and network 
picture against conceding to the knowledge of others.  
 
3. They maintained a high level of flexibility in their 
relationships and accepted and provoked changes readily. 
This appeared at time to be very random, but if 
randomness is viewed as a strategy it is effective in terms 
of managing within networks.    
 
4. They did not try and own the technologies they helped to 
create but rather worked to ensure they had the 
relationships in place to see what was happening, to 
influence the process and to exploit it, with both suppliers 





5. Unlike the vegetable tanners of the US, they didn’t have a 
limited network horizon.  A restricted network picture 
may not be problematic in some circumstances, but 
would have limited the company’s ability to spot 
important trends and innovations. 
 
However, just as political careers are all said to end in ultimate 
failure, so the Booth success story came to an end.  The ultimate 
decline of the company illustrates clearly the obverse of its earlier 
success.  It attempted to control that portion of the network that it 
saw as its “own” whether for geographical, cultural or historical 
reasons.  This meant that it neither had nor was able to develop the 
new relationships that were necessary to capitalize on changing 
circumstances or the actions of others, in line with the third network 
paradox (Håkansson and Ford 2002).  It was just like its earlier, 
localised competitors who were unable to see what was happening 
because of the narrowness of their relationship structure.  Even 
though it had an apparently global spread, its network position meant 
that it was myopic to change, with fatal results.   
 
This dissertation also illustrates a number of network features of 
innovation.  What is conventionally referred to as innovation might be 
classed as a subset of the general process of network evolution that is 
marked by some combination of radical shifts in individual resources, 
resource combination or activity structure.  Also, innovation is always 
likely to involve major change in particular actors, in their network 
pictures and in the relationships between them.  Innovation is an 
interactive process and as such it involves combinations of new and 
existing resources and activities that stretch widely across the 
network.  These resources and activities and the processes of change 
are outside the complete control of any one actor.  The dissertation 
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illustrates that innovation is both a temporal process and one that 
encompasses many sequential and parallel strands.   
 
The success of an innovation, like any outcome of business 
networking is specific to time and to the position in network space 
from which it is viewed.  But success always seems to be based on 
combining ideas from a number of sources with a curious blending of 
old and new concepts.  This process of combination is both random 
and uncontrolled but can be strongly affected by the linking and 
encouragement of others that was part of the Booth culture. 
 
The direction which an innovation takes is often quite different from 
the initial objectives of the actors involved in it. The leathers that 
Booths helped to develop all had success in quite different 
applications than their developers had planned.  It is also clear from a 
number of studies (Lundgren, 1995; Håkansson and Waluszewski, 
2002) that an innovation may take decades before its value is 
recognised or exploited. Chrome tanning was typical of this with a 
number of failed attempts to commercialise it before Schultz and 
those in the decade following worked it into a commercial success.   
 
The case study also demonstrates how companies can effectively 
network with multiple counterparts to widen their access to activities 
and resources and influence the direction of innovation. It also shows 
how changes in resource ties and activity links change the overall 
topography of the network in ways that a single actor cannot 
anticipate.  Perhaps the genius of the Booth Company was in their 
appreciation of the dynamics of business networks, their 
understanding of their own limitations, their ability to scan across 
apparently discrete networks, to build relationships and to develop 




The concept of re-examining company records, when more than just 
the basic company reports are available, is shown here to be a 
valuable tool to observe companies over long periods of time.   
 
Examination of the episodes via the areas of subjective interpretation, 
relativity, jointness and interdependence proved useful. When Ford 
and Mouzas (2008) look at episodes and scale it is clear that decisions 
about interaction are heavily weighted by experiences in previous 
episodes and the relativity, jointness and interdependence they 
interpret from these prior episodes. This is clearly the case with the 
Booth Co. Done in this way the findings are likely to be transferable to 
other network evolutions in different sectors and times. 
 
The subjective interpretation that was gained from the Booth partners 
letters highlight the role played by what might be termed managed 
randomness, of controlled networking to obtain access to resources 
and of carefully managed dyadic relationships that built long term 
trust.  
 
The letters we have analysed both directly and indirectly evidence the 
difficulty of drawing network pictures in two dimensions as 
highlighted in the extremely variable examples shown by Henneberg 
(2006). The highly descriptive letters give much more of a feeling of 
three dimensions, of an understanding that shipping, leather and 
finance might appear separate but in the Booths’ mind were 
overlapping areas which came together relatively seamlessly and 
where they would be able to utilise resources and knowledge in one 
are for the benefit of another.  
 
In particular the dissertation has highlighted the importance of non-
transactional relationships in terms of keeping thinking fresh and 
being prepared to move to capitalise on changes in wider environment. 
In the period studied Booths managed major technical changes, 
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changes in currency and the gold standard, long term recession in the 
US and big changes in customer needs in the US. 
 
The Booths had a huge number of relationships and at any one point 
of time many, if not most of these, were non transactional. Sometimes 
contact was maintained by luncheons in the different cities they 
travelled to or by correspondence. Many were personal to the partners 
or most senior managers. Yet they clearly viewed all these as 
important relationships which would give them access to resources 
that they might need in the future. Many were the doors the George 
Booth was to find so easy to open when he started in the business.  
 
In the generational change George was introduced as an actor into the 
network and soon built up his own specific relationships. He did have 
over fifteen years of working with his father while his father was 
mostly involved in his social science activities in London.  Action was 
taken to ensure that he did not try and hold too many connections by 
limiting to the leather side of the business but given that he added a 
Directorship of the Bank of England, involvement in the unit trusts 
and so many active roles in Brazil his life was just as complicated as 
his father’s had been. 
 
When Booth and Co was small they only had partners’ letters but as 
they grew they separated the correspondence into high level partners’ 
letters and everyday office correspondence. The partners’ letters 
continued to cover business matters but also more general bigger 
picture issues related to the gold standard, legislation, political 
developments and incidental meetings with important individuals. In 
some respects this may be taken as expertise in routine macro-
environmental analysis and an ability to keep the business in context.  
 
A final comment would be that during the late 1970s the leather 
company renamed Booth International struggled to identify a policy to 
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deal with the global restructuring in the leather industry. The work of 
John Booth in the 1950s and 1960s was to develop the business into 
the Commonwealth areas of East Africa, New Zealand and Nigeria. 
Given the success of the company with the USA at an early stage of its 
development and with Brazil there was logic to this approach.  
 
Yet the work in the Commonwealth involved a lot more central control 
from the UK than was the case in the 19th century. By tightening its 
control on its activities the group diminished the external links it 
needed to be able to transition into the geographies, technologies and 
economics that were then developing in the global leather industries. 
It found itself without the position or resources to keep up with the 
changes.  So while managing geography was part of the success of 
Booths in the early years it appears to have became a weakness in the 
final ones. 
 
7.3 Limitations of the study 
 
Although this research did have access to a very large amount of 
primary and secondary data related to the Booth Company and the 
key individuals involved there are two areas where it could now be 
improved. The major one is the discovery of largely un-indexed boxes 
of material at the University of Liverpool which were, due to building 
reconstruction, not fully accessible for this research project. Secondly 
on-line access to national and regional newspapers in the USA has 
been quite dramatically increasing over the last three years and now 
makes possible the discovery of highly pertinent and detailed material 
about the industry, the companies and the individuals involved. 
 
Both these sources now offer considerable improvement in fully 
understanding the views of key actors in the leather network and of 




7.4 Implications of the Study 
 
This dissertation demonstrates that there is value in examining 
networks over time and that the insights gained do help to understand 
the processes individuals and companies undertake to stabilise and 
improve their business performance in ever changing business 
environments. The process of assessing where a business stands in 
relationship with others with whom it is transacting and with others 
who, even without direct transactions, have the power to influence 
events around it is identified as very valuable.  The tools of analysing 
both network outcomes and purposeful networking are useful for this 
purpose. 
 
The dissertation also aids with understanding the dynamics of the 
networking process as a company tries to improve its position. 
Purposeful networking is of great relevance when innovation is 
concerned as are the gains to be obtained from what might be called 
the serendipitous outcomes arising from an open structure and 
watchful activity, as opposed to a tightly managed set up.   
 
The usefulness of a given resource entirely depends on how it is 
combined with other resources at any given point in time and it is how 
the companies interact that will change the value of a given resource 
(Ford et.al., 2009) and move that resource geographically or 
technologically.  The networking approaches of “randomness” and 
“combining resources” are helpful in understanding the processes 
involved. 
 
The dissertation also highlights the value of the rich material available 
from the correspondence of the period which allows for an 
understanding of how actors viewed their networks, other actors in 




For those in business a network picture with a limited horizon might 
be manageable for some situations. However, if a company is 
considering the longer term a wide network picture and the 
maintenance of many relationships would appear to be essential. In a 
world of fast communications and increasing globalisation, both of 
which were characteristics of the period studied, this is even more 
likely to be the case. The concepts of “randomness as a strategy”, 
“networking to combine resources” and maintaining a flexible 
structure to be able to quickly adapt to changes would appear to be of 
great value, particularly if the business works in a sector where 
innovation is important. 
 
7.5 Directions for future research 
 
Further studies of the United States Leather Company would permit 
analysis in greater depth of how the Three Paradoxes truly impacted 
upon that business over the 20 years before the merge plus the 
following 30 years. The research carried out to date makes it clear 
that an outcome for the United States Leather Company from the 
Third Paradox of Networking was that the company became too tightly 
bound to move away from its vegetable, heavy leather routes into new 
leathers. These would have allowed it to avoid following the demand 
for leathers for horse transport and footwear soling into steady decline 
as the 20th century progressed.  
 
Such in depth study of the United States Leather Company with 
access to additional sources in the USA and newly accessible press 
material would allow an assessment of whether this was in fact the 
whole picture or whether additional matters impacted upon their 




With regard to the Booths the implication from this research is that in 
the period after 1920 until the company’s final decline in 1979 was 
characterised by moving steadily to a tighter, less responsive, 
structure that was not able to deal with new emerging competitors in 
Asia, while at the same time the traditional empire locations in which 
they had become involved fell into decline. While there can be some 
confidence in this conclusion there are likely to be additional elements 
which need to be interpreted within this period. The sale of the 
shipping business after war time depletions can be understood but 
the splitting up of the other two parts of the company into standalone 
leather and building businesses is not clearly explained. Indeed it has 
been identified that the unique overlap of shipping, trading and 
leather making allowed the company to maintain their broad and 
dense network with the potential for many innovative overlaps. 
 
Equally although the leather side did show consolidation back to the 
UK and into tannery ownership it held on to many relationships in all 
parts of the world. Understanding why it could not use these to 
network effectively in order to reposition itself to match what the 
Italian leather industry did in the period from 1960-1990 would offer 
some invaluable network insights.  
 
It was not just Booths whose leather business declined. From 1960 
until 1990 both the UK and the USA saw unprecedented closures in 
the tanning and leather using industries while at the same time 
Italian tanners stabilised or grew somewhat. This has never been fully 
explained. During this period Italian tanners are accepted by the 
industry as having shown excellent skills of innovation in product, 
process and marketing.  
 
In recent times a lot has been made of the high cost in owning “legacy” 
properties such as the copper cable owned by BT on the grounds that 
this makes companies inflexible. The final outcome for Booths appears 
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to support this in that they were left with aging factories in the UK 
and the US which proved to be the wrong locations for the way the 
industry was developing.  Other questions might be asked that have 
not been answered in this dissertation.  
 
Did the company become too diverse for loose management? After 
adding ports and railways activities in Brazil, the banking and Unit 
Trust activities of George and the construction business was the 
diversity so great that splitting up became inevitable. When the 
company did start to split up was it correct for it to separate into its 
individual components so that each element had to stand alone in the 
second half of the 20th century? 
 
These questions have not been fully covered in this dissertation and 
must await further examination. 
 
 
7.6 Concluding Observations 
 
The dissertation looked at the value of using a network analysis to 
analyse long term business evolution, providing insights into how the 
networks evolve.  The dissertation also contributes to understanding 
the value of networks as managerial processes, while filling a gap in 
the literature in the study of long term outcomes in networks.  
 
Some lessons are able to be taken from this work and can be 
summarized.  
1.  Implications for working within networks in terms of the process of 
purposeful networking and its association with how actors build 
pictures of the network based on experiences from previous episodes. 
Concepts such as randomness and openness have been detailed. 
2. Choices for companies between creating new networks or 
consolidating existing ones. 
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3. Choices related to using the company’s strengths to force a 
conclusion or concede to the wisdom of other actors. 
4. The value of maintaining many flexible relationships. 
5. The benefits from constantly looking at the wider picture in network 
terms. 
6. The value of understanding the dynamics of networks when it 
comes to innovation. 
 
The IMP network approach has shown itself well suited to long term 
analysis of business evolution with great value where product or 
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8.1 Journals and archives 
 
 
London University London School of Economics Library holds papers 
relating to Life and Labour dating from (1886-1903) and 




London University Library holds correspondence and papers dating 
from 1870-1916. The Charles Booth Online Archive contains details of 
the archive collections from LSE and London University Library 
collections at: http://booth.lse.ac.uk/    This includes all the copies of 




Shoe and Leather Reporter 
 
Hides Trades Review 
 






(These 5 trade magazines above, some of which go back to 1875, are 
available in the University Library at the University of Northampton) 
 
Booth News and Views, About 20 of the bulletins were produced by 
the company in the late 1940s and in the 1950s. This dissertation has 
had access to 12 of them which are in private hands. It is anticipated 
that one copy of these will be gifted to the Museum of Leathercraft 
Library within the next five years. 
 
The National Archive holds extensive records of the Booth Steamship 






The University of Liverpool Library have established a special section 
(http://sca.lib.liv.ac.uk/collections/colldescs/booth.html) related 
mostly to the social work of Charles Booth with papers from 1887-
1903. The library, along with the Liverpool Record office, holds large 
amounts of other papers related to the business which include 75 
boxes of the 1863-1935 correspondence with New York office. 
   
 
  
9.0 Appendices: The Booth Group 
9.1 Timeline 
 




 century Booth family moved to 
Liverpool from Warrington 
Liverpool was a fast growing city with lots 
of overseas trade 
1812-1815 Napoleonic War of 1812 After the war Commodity prices fell and 
stayed low for a long time 
1820-1940 Unitarian Society became 
very important in the UK 
 
1837 Grand Junction Railway 
completed 
London, Birmingham, Manchester and 
Liverpool linked together by train 
1847 Friedrich Knapp first 
published his ideas on 
chromium 
In the Textbook of Chemical Technology 
1850 Alfred apprenticed to 
Lamport and Holt, well 




1850s  Liverpool merchants began to replace 
sailing ships with small steam ones 
1857 Alfred Booth went to New 
York 
Worked for Liverpool merchants Rathbone 
& Co 
1858 Friedrich Knapp published 
details of the tanning effect 
of chromium 
The German Chemist published his treatise 
On the Nature and Essential Character of 
the Tanning Process and of Leather 
1859 Origin of the Species Darwin’s quietly spoken but influential 
book was published. Charles interpreted this 
to mean that man must accept responsibility 
for the mess made of the world (Norman-
Butler) 
1859-1862  Bad harvests in UK lead to food imports 
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from US through to 65 
1860 Elder Mr Charles Booth died  
1860 Partnership set up with Mr 
Walden:  Walden and Booth  
57 Broad Street, New York 
1860-62 Charles Booth travels in 
Turkey and Europe 
Had finished his apprenticeship. After this 
trip he joined his brother in New York at 
time Walden became ill 
1861-1865 US Civil War  
1863 Walden becomes unwell and 
enters mental hospital In 
January 
New Booth partnership formed, shipping 
light leather to US.  Two products: Sumac 
tanned sheep from Bermondsey for shoe 
uppers, and pickled grains and fleshes from 
Turneys of Trent Bridge, Boots of Leicester, 
and Johnston at Bootle 
1863 Issue of confederate loan  
1863 Open office in Liverpool 5 India Buildings 
1864 Decided to enter the 
steamship business 
Plan to sail to North Brazil ports, Ceara, 
Maranham, Para (now called Fortaleza, Sao 
Luiz, and Belem): return cargoes would be 
cotton, sugar and coffee 
1865 Booth US trade had a good 
year 
 
1865 Turneys agreed to ship to US 
on consignment 
 
1865 Contracts placed for first 2 
Booth ships, Augustine 
launched 
 
1865 Charles Booth campaigned 
unsuccessfully for the 
Liberal parliamentary 





 first Augustine 
voyage to Brazil 
Voyage lost GBP3 but obtained 10k annual 
contract for mail from the Brazilians 
1867 Brazil/Paraguay War ends  
1867 Alfred Booth married Lydia 
Butler 
After his marriage he returned to the UK 
1867 Thomas Fletcher joined as 
partner 
Appears to have worked in New York. 
Cousin and close friend of the brothers. 
Trained as an engineer before joining Booth 
& Co 
1860-1890 US population doubled  
1869-1871 Alfred Booth stayed in the 
US 
Last prolonged stay 
1869  In 1869 R. Singlehurst & Co. Ltd., of 
Liverpool who had traded sailing ships for 
many years to northern Brazil, founded the 
Red Cross Line. This was in direct 
competition to Alfred Booth & Co., but in 
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1870 agreement was reached to share the 
trade. A fortnightly service being instigated 
1869 Charles Herbert Wade joins 
Shaw’s Tannery in 
Grantham, UK (predecessor 
of Bjorlows) 
He was 13 years old but soon moved to 
Edward Turney & Co at Whitemoor Leather 
Works, which in 1901 was to become 
Wades.  
1870 Franco-Prussian war breaks 
out 
 
1870 The Honourable Henry 
Romilly joined as partner 
Son of first Lord Romilly and grandson of 
Sir Samuel Romilly. His sister married 
Henry, second son of Mr Justice Crompton 
and first cousin of Alfred and Charles 
Booth. Spent the 70s in the USA, financial 
side of business, who was unwell much of 
the time and not hugely active. 
1870 Office opened in Boston to 
build on success of Roan 
business (pickled foreign 
sheepskins) 
141 Purchase Street, Boston. Mr Gaenslen 
went to be manager 
1871  Charles married Mary 
Macaulay 
On 29 April 1871 Booth married Mary 
Macaulay, daughter of Charles Zachary 
Macaulay and Mary Potter, and niece of the 
historian Thomas Babington Macaulay. 
1872 Free hides in the US Tariff on imported raw material into the US 
removed 
1873-1879 The Long Depression in the 
USA 
Thousands of businesses close in the US. 
Also occurred in Europe. Some consider the 
depression continued until 1896 (The Great 
Depression) 
1873 Charles goes with family to 
Bex in Switzerland 
Due to ill health he takes a break from 
work. Decided to live on 5% of his savings 
per annum until able to work 
James Kuttner starts work in New York for 
Booths on a temporary job 
1875 Charles returns to UK in the 
summer, although not yet in 
full health 
 
1876 Charles takes his wife on 3 
month trip to Brazil to test 
new pressurised engine 
One of few trips he makes with his wife; his 
health recovers considerably during this trip 
1875/76 Break with Liverpool for 
Charles. He was unhappy 
about the family’s traditional 
Unitarianism and their 
contentment with Liverpool 
Decides to set up home and office in 
London to manage Booth trading. Causes 
major family rift and break with Philip Holt 
1877 Office opened in London to 
deal with French and Belgian 
sheep suppliers 
Fenchurch Street: or perhaps 84 King 
William Street 
1875-80 Without fail he wrote a 




state of the business 
1877 Kent and Stevens tannery in 
Gloversville hit by Stevens 
fraud.   Booths were owed 
$70,000.  Booths pay off 
creditors and back James 
Kent. A mortgage on the 
building was held by James 
Kuttner and his wife on 
behalf of Booth and Co 
James Kent is the leather scientist who 
developed fatliquoring and the Dongola 
tannage.  Worked with his assistant Joe 
Hunt (who later became superintendent) 
James Kent described as one of the 
“outstanding pioneers of the American 
Leather Industry: both innovations forming 
part of a long search for a method of 
producing cheap kid leather to replace the 
expensive products imported from France 
and used in the Gloversville glove trade” 
John, 1959 p 50 
1878 Charles again in the USA  Reorganised the business with Kent tannery 
now included. Spent three months a year in 
the US for many years 
1879 Problem of unsold stocks of 
roans lead to opening of  
separate showroom in New 
York 
Frankfurt Street 
1879 Dongola tannage successful 
and Booths began buying 
dried goat and kangaroo 
skins for it 
Did not work for gloves but excellent for 
footwear 
Booths took a share in the Kent business 
and James Kuttner moved to Gloversville to 
supervise the commercial side 
1879 Liverpool offices moved  From 5 India Buildings to 14 Castle Street 
1879 Charles Booth bought two 
sailing ships the Bessie Dodd 
and the Carrie Dodd 
To take gunpowder and other bulk cargo to 
Pará and return direct to London with 
rubber and nuts 
1880 New-York to Pará direct 
service introduced by Booth 
Line 
 
1880 Booths picnic in Gloversville 
begin in Sacandaga Park, 
sometimes leasing several 
railroad cars for its 
employees and families 
In the Park they quickly became the 
highlight of the summer season. Open to all 
citizens of Johnstown, Gloversville and 
surrounding communities they drew 
exceptionally large crowds. (1891 over 
5000 people) from Larner, Paul, Our 
Railroad: The History of the Fonda, 
Johnstown & Gloversville Railroad 2009 
1880 Launch of Daisy Kid Ceara goat tanned with Dongola Tannage to 
make an imitation kid 
1880 Booths buy Dodge factory 
next to Booth and Kent 
Paid $30,000 to be able to expand the 
Gloversville tannery and use Dongola on 
dried raw including kangaroo 
1880 Charles becomes senior 
partner 
Charles becomes senior partner at the 
request of Alfred. Tom Fletcher’s letters say 
“Alfred is a silent indecisive person” 
1880-1884 Augustus Schultz worked 




Gloversville on perfecting 
chrome tanning 
1881 Booth Steamship Co Ltd 
formally incorporated,  
Capital of £200,000 in £10 shares. £81500 
issued in first instance largely to existing 
partners in original four ships and to friends. 
1881 Charles trip to Bordeaux Looking for quality sheepskins 
1882 Nuneaton Leather Co 
founded 
Booths needed to make something out of 
the roans. Charles Wade left Whitemoor 
and set up the small tannery at Nuneaton for 
Charles Booth.  A Mr Johnson owned 50% 
and Booths 50%.  Mr Johnson supplies 
sheepskins and Nuneaton Leather split them 
sending the grains, salted to the US and 
splits were sold for chamois production in 
the UK. The plan was to make heavy grains 
better suited for the New York market sold 
as ABC. 
1882  Charles Booth elected President of the 
Royal Statistical Society (82-84) and 
awarded their Guy Medal 
1884 Augustus Schultz had two 
chrome tanning patents 
issued 
He sold these for $25000 and they were 
eventually sold to Patent Tanning Co of 
Philadelphia. Schultz went on to develop 
patents for central heating. See technical 
timeline 
1885 Charles began The Enquiry 
He wrote the Life and 
Labour of the People of 
London between 1886 and 
1903 
Had one clerk put into the Mansion House 
but otherwise this work was done in Alfred 
Booth offices until moving into its own 
premises in 1888 
1886 James C Kent died on June 
6
th
 aged about 55 leaving a 
widow and two children 
Of malaria contracted during a visit to St 
Augustine in Florida. He died at his summer 
home in Ocean Grove, New Jersey said in 
his NYT obituary to be worth about $1m. 
He was named as a member of  
- Booth & Kent of London 
- Kent & Booth of Gloversville 
- Kent & Co of New York 
Booth & Co became outright owners of the 
Gloversville tannery 
1886 Henry Romilly, a partner, 
dies 
He had become unwell in about 1883 and 
returned to the UK 
1887 Alfred Booth retired Although he remained in touch for many 
years 
1887 Mr Miller employed in 
Sydney to buy kangaroo 
In conjunction with Richard Young and Co 
1889 Schultz’ two chrome patents 
passed to Franco-American 
company Messrs Blumenthal 
Blumenthal then passed patents to Marcus 
Beebe and R.Foederer & Co in Philadelphia 




1889    Life and Labour of the People published 
1889 Robert H. Foederer began 
making “Vici” kid with 
chrome tannage 
Backed financially by Abe Steen of New 
York and Marcus Beebe of Boston 
Getting the fatliquor right appears to have 
been key 
1890 Booths opened office in 
Australia to source 
kangaroos as well as sheep 
Run by Frank Millar and later helped by 
William Cunningham 
1891 Richard Patswosky of New 
York produced “Bonafide” 
Kid for Booths 
Thought to be a chrome product used by 
Booth to replace Dongola glazed kid 
1891  Labour and Life of the People was 
published 
1892-1894 Booth started to market their 
Brazilian goatskins chrome 
tanned and finished in 
Philadelphia by tanner 
J.P.Mathieu 
Called Surpass it was a chrome tanned 
black glazed kid. 
In 1894 Booths gave up Bonafide kid 
1892 J.P.Mathieu bought land in 
Allegheny Avenue, 
Philadelphia for a new 
tannery 
 
1893  Martin Dennis patented 
single bath chrome tanning 
An attempt to circumvent the Schultz/Booth 
patents 
1893 1893 “bastard boom” of 
great demand but shortage of 
skin supply 
Led to Mr Miller in Australia buying 
sheepskins as well as wallaby an kangaroo 
1894-97 Four years of depression in 
America 
High unemployment, war with Spain, issues 
related to tariffs and currency 
1894 Booth Gloversville tannery 
started chrome tanning for 
goat and kangaroo 
Charles Wade made first trip to US to 
understand selling arrangements 
1896 Daily output at J.P.Mathieu 
rose to 600-700 doz 
 
1896 Partner Thomas Fletcher dies George went to USA (New York and 
Boston) shared cabin with Cecil Baring of 
Baring Bank 
1896 Professor Procter tours US Observed the new chrome tanning 
1897 CB published nine volumes 
between 1892 and 1897 
Life and Labour of the People in London 
1897 New partnership agreement 
for Alfred Booth and Co 
Charles makes new partnership agreement 
with his nephew  
1898 Daily output at J.P.Mathieu 
rose to 1000-1200 doz 
 
1898 Introduction of enamel 
process by George S Wolff 
to copy patent leather 
Sold by Booths as “Ideal” 
1898  George goes to US with his father Charles, 
after giving up at Trinity, Cambridge and in 
  
 281 
1899 starts a Clerk in London Office 
1899  Charles Booth made a Fellow of the Royal 
Society 
1899 Charles Booth published 
“Old Age Pensions and the 
Aged Poor – A Proposal” 
In which he advocated 7 shillings per week, 
available from the Post Office, for all those 
over seventy years old.   
1899 Office in Christchurch, New 
Zealand 
George makes round the world trip during 
which he opens office in New Zealand and 
catches dysentery in India 
1900 Surpass tannery, built in 
1892, burnt down 
Allegheny Avenue site was rebuilt as  a 
modern factory for large production of 
chrome tanned kid 
1901/1902 Julius Kuttner died on 8
th
 
October. George sailed out 
on 30
th
 October and took 
charge of US for two years 
The younger Booths began to take over: 
George Macaulay Booth (24), Alfred Allen 
Booth, Enfield Fletcher. 
No Booth partner lived in New York from 
1883 to 1901. 
1901  Charles Booth starts work on Harbour 
concept for Manáos 
Charles Booth portrait painted by G.F.Watts 
(now in National Portrait Gallery) 
1901  .In 1901 the Singlehurst family decided to 
withdraw from operating their own fleet. 
The two companies amalgamated under the 
name of The Booth Steamship Co. (1901) 
Ltd. From the amalgamation of the Booth 
Iquitos Steamship Co, Ltd. and the Red 
Cross Iquitos Steamship Co, Ltd. was born 
The Iquitos Steamship Co. Ltd. In 1911 The 
Iquitos Steamship Company was absorbed 
into the main Booth fleet. 
1901 Charles Wade and Co 
founded in Nottingham 
Joint venture buys Whitemoor Leather 
Works in Nottingham where Edward 
Turney had gone bankrupt. Initial capital 
was Wade £2000 and Booths £5000 with an 
arrangement that any profit coming to 
Charles would be put back into the business 
until the capital was equal 
1902 Booth & Co Gloversville 
stopped making glove leather 
and transferred to shoe 
leather only 
From McMartin book on Gloversville 
1902 George hires CWJ (Sir 
Clement Jones) 
Sailed to London in July “I wanted to get 
one or two Englishmen out to join me” 
1903 Manáos Harbour Limited 
established 
Charles travels to Manáos to see the new 
harbour on the Obidense 
1903 Daily output at J.P.Mathieu 
rose to 1500 doz 
Thought to be the largest kid skin tannery in 
the world at that time 
1903  August Charles and Mary 
made 3 week visit to New 
September Cousin Alfred came to New 
York, and asked to stay a year. So in 
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York January 1904 George returned to UK 
1904 Charles Booth made a Privy 
Councillor 
Charles Booth given 
honorary D.Sc. at Oxford 







1904 Booths buy into Surpass 
forming Surpass Leather 
Company as a JV with 
Mathieu from Jan 1 2005 
Charles Booth went to US for extended trip 
with many trips from NY to Philadelphia; 
took John Crompton who had been working 
on raw material in China and other places 
since 1902  
1904 Booths supported building 
Wolff Process Leather 
Company 
In Summerdale near Philadelphia. The 
process was not too successful and 
subsequently discontinued 
  “When the Surpass tannery was running 
kangaroo, they regularly consumed about 
150 to 200 dozen per day- everything that 
was available from Booth Australia, which 
was centred in Sydney, with agents in 
Brisbane, Rockingham, Adelaide and 
Freemantle.  I believe that for many years, 
starting at the very beginning of the 20
th
 
century, Booth was the dominant collector 
of kangaroo skins and therefore had a very 
large influence on prices.”  KC elder 
 
1905-6 Charles Booth had major 
breakdown in health 
This was his second breakdown and now 
required him to spend much of his time at 
his home in Leicestershire, Gracedieu 
Manor, and hand more of the business to the 
second generation 
George spent most of 1905 in the USA but 
returned finally to UK in January 1906 
leaving US to be managed by Paul 
Crompton, Clement Jones and Franklyn 
Kirkbride 
1906 George marries Margaret 
(Margy) Meinertzhagen 
Sets up home at 48 Great Cumberland 
Street (near family home (Cumbersome) at 
24). Marries Margy 6
th
 October and goes on 
5 months honeymoon to Italy, Egypt, 
Jerusalem and other places in the Middle 
East 
1907 Booths buy out the 
Mathieus’ share in Surpass 
From Jan 1 Paul Crompton took over from 
Mathieu as VP and GM or Surpass 
1907 Over supply in kid market 
led Booths to off load 
Surpass stock 
Caused upset in Philadelphia with other 
tanners but seems to have worked well – 
defined as “healthy readjustment” with all 
tanners back on full production shortly after 
1908   Universal Old Age Pension introduced in 
the UK 
1908 George and Margy sail to Looked at Pacific route from Iquitos and 
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Brazil to understand the 
shipping business 
implications of the booming rubber trade 
from Manáos 
Got caught up in a revolution in Peru. 
Declined offer to manage all harbours on 
Peruvian coast. Sailed back via Panama, 
Jamaica and New York (on Lusitania) 
Material from Margy’s diaries and George’s 
lecture used by Virginia Woolf in The 
Voyage Out (Crow, p55) 
1908 Will Rothenstein paints 
portraits of both Charles and 
Mary Booth 
 




The part played by Charles Booth in 
drawing the attention of Parliament to the 
plight of the poor and for his persistence in 
fighting for the passing of the “Old Age 
Pensions Bill”, was acknowledged in the 
House of Commons, in November 1909, 
when an illuminated address was presented 
to him in the House. 
1909 Alfred Booth made 
Chairman of Cunard, 
October 1909 
Alfred’s brother Charles was Chairman of 
the Booth Steamship but also went on 
Board of Midland Railway where he 
became Chairman.  
So from1908/9 George was effectively left 
to run the whole business 
1910 By this time Booths offices 
in London were the 
Headquarters in 11 Adelphi 
Terrace and with an office in 
Railway Approach, London 
Bridge that looked after 
export of hides and skins 
Up to 1910 they had used No 8 Adelphi 
Terrace which had been Head office of the 
Manáos Harbour Limited. In 1903 a 
passenger office was opened for the Booth 
Line 
1912 Early in 1912 Charles Booth 
handed over the 
chairmanship of Alfred 
Booth and Company to his 
nephew Charles 
But still sailed to Brazil that year with his 
son George. In 1915 returned fully to work 
under wartime exigencies despite growing 
evidence of heart disease 
1912 George Booth commissions 
new house in Campden Hill 
The New House was built in Airlie Gardens 
at the top of Campden Hill. Architect was 
his cousin Harry Fletcher. The house 
opened in June 1914 and they sold it to 
South Africa in 1928 as a residence for their 
Ambassador. The New House was 
frequently used to entertain Cabinet 
Ministers, Prime Ministers and Hoover 
before he became President of the USA 
along with infinite literary and musical 
figures 
1914 The partnership moves into a June 1914, Alfred Booth and Company 
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private limited company Limited was formed with a share capital of 
£1m in ordinary shares of £1 
1914 Alfred Booth dies November 
2
nd
 at age of 80 
Son Charles was Chairman of the Booth 
Steamship Company and the other Alfred 
Allen Booth was Chairman of the Cunard 
Steamship Company. One of his four 
daughters married Prof Godfrey Lloyd of 
Toronto. 
1915 George Booth spent five 
months working unpaid at 
the foreign office trying to 
sort out military supply 
situation 
 
1915 Booth and Company 
becomes a legal entity under 
US law 
Held interests in Gardiner-Lucas Candy and 
Glue Company and the Densten Felt and 
Hair Company 
1915 In May Lusitania is sunk 
Mr and Mrs Paul Crompton 
and their 6 children plus their 
nurse, travelling first class all 
perished. Ship carrying 
accoutrements for army, put 
on manifest by Booths as 
sheepskins. 
Carried armaments classed in the manifest 
as sheepskin. Mr. Paul Crompton was an 
Englishman returning home to England. He 
was the Vice President of Surpass Leather 
Company at St. Martin’s and Hartwell 
Lanes. Mr. Crompton was described as a 
partner in the firm of Alfred Booth and 
Company and a director of the Booth 
Steamship Company. The bodies of 
Stephen, John and Peter were recovered 
later. All 6 children, their parents and nurse 
died. NY Times 
1915 Despite heart problems 
Charles Booth returned to 
work “under war exigencies” 
From LSE on line archives 
1915 George Booth invited to be a 
Director of the Bank of 
England 
 
1916 Charles Booth died on 23rd 
November, 1916 
On 23 November 1916 he died following a 
stroke, at his country home of Gracedieu in 
Thringstone, Leicestershire. 
 
1917 GMB travels to the US Buys J.G.White (Brazilian tram/train/power 
companies plus Latin American trading) 
1919 The various US holdings 
were put into a trust 
The Battery Company 
1919 Booths bought The Unit 
Construction Company  
from Crittalls 
1919 In January letter from 
Winston Churchill to George 
Ended War work for George Booth and 
thanked him “personally for the service you 
have rendered especially in the connection 
with the organisation of the original Supply 
Departments of the Ministry, when you 
were Deputy Director General of Munitions 
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Supply and subsequently as Adviser to the 
Ministry on Allies Requirements.” (Crow p 
161) 
1920 Jasper Bentley helped open 
up the big goatskin market in 
Nigeria 
 
1920 Walter Kidde and Company 
engineers 
Erected a $1.5m plant in Gloversville for 
Surpass Leather Company. 
1921 Booths buy Pavlova Leather, 
Abingdon 
Having bought a share in 1917 
1924 Gloversville shuts  Temporarily 
1926 George Booth buys The 
Lodge, Funtington 
A village5 miles from Chichester 
1927 US head office moves to 
Philadelphia 
 
1929 Sale of J.G.White back to Mr 
White 
 
1929 Gloversville reopens 
 
Booths sell part of Abingdon 
site for the building of the 
MG car factory 
Felmongering stops in Abingdon as they 
concentrate on gloving and chamois/skiver 
production 
1931 GMB in the US Buys J.G.White back for nothing with idea 
for Unit Trusts in mind 
1931 GMB sets up M&G Trust 
with William Burton Balding 
First ever Unit Trusts 23
rd
 April at 31/9d a 
unit. J.G.White and Co was put in 
1937 US Battery Company wound 
up and US assets put back to 
direct relation to parent 
company in UK 
Consequence of changes in US tax law 
1938 Gloversville closed, after 
serious strike 
September 28, 1938, Wednesday 
“A decision to close the Gloversville 
tannery of the Surpass Leather Company 
permanently was announced today by 
Harold Connett, President. In revealing that 
the closing order would be effective Oct. 5, 
Mr. Connett said the company would 
transfer its operations to its Philadelphia 
plant because it could "no longer afford to 
divide its production between two 
tanneries."  
 
1939 Mary Booth died In Gracedieu Cottage of the Booth country 
home Gracedieu Manor in Thringstone 
Leicester. The Manor was taken over by the 
Prep School of Radcliffe College 
1940s Booths began to get involved 
in bovine production 
- as dealer in East Africa 
- via purchase of Melrose  
- manufacture of bovine at Wades 
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- manufacture of bovine at Surpass 
- the production at Bulleys of Kip, 
Side and Sole Leather 
1942 Gloversville buildings sold  
1946 Charles Tanneries founded Charles Wade, Charles Booth, Charles 
Wade jnr. Everyone involved called 
Charles, hence Charles tannery. UK sales 
had been via Kohnstamm which Charles 
Tanneries replaced. 
1946 Lord Vestey buys shipping The Booth Steamship Line consisted of a 
fleet of steamers plying between Liverpool 
and Manáos (1,000 miles up the Amazon 
river).  A number of these vessels were lost 
during World War II, and rather than try to 
rebuild with the reparations, Booth sold to 
Vestey.  The story is that George Booth 
(Chairman) met Lord Vestey for lunch.  The 
latter asked what George felt the Line was 
worth.  The reply was “oh, a million 
pounds”. “Alright” said Vestey, they shook 
hands, and that was that. KC senior 
1946 Surpass tanning 1800 doz 
skins per day 
“When I joined the Booth Group in 1946, 
Surpass was regularly tanning a total of 
1,800 dozen skins a day, employing about 
1,000 men.  Skin supplies came from their 
own exclusive agents in Brazil, Argentina, 
China, India (which included today’s 
Pakistan) and Nigeria”  KC senior 
1948 Melrose Tanners Ltd bought “A heavy leather tannery at Beverley which 
has enlarged its sole leather production and 
plans to make motor-car upholstery hides” 
Company Newsletter 1956  
  The Surpass tannery was closed in the 
1950s and contract tanning at other peoples’ 
facilities was tried for a time, until 
operations were ceased in the mid 1960s.  
-KC senior 
  In the 1950’s, Booth established an 
extensive skin gathering organization in 
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika; they took 
over a tannery in Thika, Kenya, and 
managed one in Kano, Nigeria, and one in 
New Zealand in the 50’s and 60’s. KC 
senior 
 
1950s OFRO (Booths African 
Rawstock procurement arm) 
formed) 
Paddy O’Flynn & John Rozemulder (Dutch) 
combined in East Africa  
1954 Last input at Surpass Watched by some of the original employees 
from 1900, when the new factory had been 
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rebuilt after a fire 
1956 Charles Wade retires as 
Chairman of Wades 
(Nottingham) Ltd at the age 
of 73 
Replaced by John S.M. Booth. Booth’s 
bought Wades’ 50% of the business at the 
request of the family. Charles Wade died 
shortly after 
Late 50’s Tombooth formed around 
this time 
Booths & Dutch Twentsche Overzee 
Handel Maatshappij . (Hide & skin sector of 
Phillips) 
Late 40s’ Bulleys Tanneries Ltd (Thika 
& Kahawa factories) 
Thika Built during1944/5 with Italian POW 
labour .TomBooth bought? 
Mr Poulson Snr was Manager from Sept 
1948 until 1962 
 New Zealand Light Leather  
 Great Northern Tannery  
1962  Appears to have been family 
struggle over control of 
business 
John Sebastian Booth was briefly replaced 
by John Wales Booth 
1963 About this year the leather 
and building side split 
Booth International formed with JSM Booth 
in charge and Alfred Booth separated as a 
building business 
1964 Ken Chapman Snr moved 
from Philadelphia to Boston 
With the close of the Surpass business the 
main Booth activity was importing NZ 
sheep to the Boston area 
1964 Booth Family Split John SM Booth forms Booth International 
and his cousins stay with the construction 
business Alfred Booth and Co 
1967-68 Jim Jackman takes over as 
technical director from Mr 
Simon 
Booth International Directors were JSM 
Booth, Mr Simon/Mr Jackman and David 
Donald who later had a period at K Shoes 





Ulster Leather & Atlantic 
Tanning bought from UCT 
ltd 
Joseph Dub de Dubski, ex UCT joins 
Bulleys in 73/4 for short contract. 
1972/3 ET Holden ltd (Jedburgh) Sheepskin & latterly Pigskin tannery, then 
w/blue for Pavlova 
1974  Booth International becomes 
a public company 
During the 1970s the HQ is moved to 
Turney Bros Trent Bridge Leather Works 
1980 Wades closed  
1981 Garnar-Scotblair buys 
Booths 
Became Garnar-Booth, to the disgust of the 
newly acquired Scotblair units. 
1981 Turney Bros closed  
1986 Melrose closed  
1987 Hitchin closed  
1987 Pittards bought Garnar-
Booth 
Became Pittard-Garnar (for a short while), 
thus Booths title in trade lost 
 Booth Overseas closed  
1988 Atlantic Tanning closed  
1993 Pavlova Leather closed  
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1995 Ken Chapman goes 
independent with Booth Inc 
in Boston 
Main St, Peabody, Mass 





9.2 The Booths and the Booth Men 
 
Alfred Booth (founder) JP  1834-1914 
Rt Hon Charles Booth (founder) 1840-1916 Privy Councillor, Social pioneer, and 
catalyst for the introduction of the Universal Retirement 
Pension introduced in the UK in 1908 
 President of the Royal Statistical Society.  
Fellow of the Royal Society.  
Doctor of Science                             --- Cambridge University.  
DCL (Honorary Doctorate, Civil Law) --- Oxford University.  
LLD (Honorary Doctorate of Law)     --- Liverpool University. 
 
Charles Booth (Elder) father of Charles and Alfred Booth Founders 1799-1860 
JSM Booth 1913-1994   MD Booth International 1964-1980 Grandson of 
Charles and son of George Booth (GMB)  
 
Charles Booth Junior, eldest son of Alfred became partner in 1895 focused on 
shipping 
Alfred Allen Booth (Sir Alfred Allen Booth, 1st Bt...)  Younger brother of 
Charles Jnr of 46 Ullet Road, Liverpool. joined company in 
1895 focused on shipping  
George Macaulay Booth GMB second son of Charles, joined in 1895. Focused at 
first on leather. Father of JSMB. Director of the Bank of 
England, Deputy Director-General of Munitions Supply during 
First World War. Founder of M&G Trusts  
Dr Henry Booth Born 1901 son of Charles Booth jr (who became a director of 
Midland railway in 1898) Great Great nephew of Henry Booth 
(1789-1869) who was a partner with Stephenson in the 
development of the rocket steam engine.  Chemist, worked in 
leather trade for 50 years in factories in Abingdon. Retired 




David Allcock  Technical, Wades & Holdens 
Richard Amis CBE last Chairman of Alfred Booth & Co on whose watch the 




John Barlow (Dr) original 60s/70s R&D, John went to the US with Rohm and 
Haas and then returned to Pittards in the UK 
John Bartle  Suede technician, Melrose 
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Charles Becker had charge of sales of shoe leather from both Gloversville and 
Philadelphia in 1894. Worked out of New York sorting office 
Rowan Bell  Kahawa Tannery manager circa 70s then went to NZ 
Ron Bennett Director Pavlova, Wades from 1952 until 1971 then Turneys 
before Wades 
John Burstow  Ulster Leather/ATCo 
David Boyce  (Accountant – Melrose, Pavlova, Kinswood) 
David Bolle  Pavlova Sales 
Arthur Baxter   (ran Booth & Co London Ltd with CJG in 1910 
Horace Bradley,  traffic manager of the Booth Line, retired 1945 after nearly 
forty-four years service in the New York office of the 
company. He joined the predecessor organization, Booth Co., 
steamship agents and leather merchants, on May 4, 1901, and 
remained through two reorganizations. 
Dick Biggwither Supremo Booth & Co (England) Ltd 
Paul Bloodworth  Peripatetic Accountant – 1966-1994        Melrose Bulleys 
Holdens  ATCo/ULCo Turneys Scotblair Pittards Booth 
& Co (England) & partially Booth (Boston), Roorda BV 
Tony Boucher Last Manager Booth & Co (England) Ltd.  Died 2010 in 
Chichester 
W.C.Burton Sailed with George Booth to US in 1917 to join the New York 
office (An American living in London as joint MD of JG White 
& Co which had set up the trams in Manáos and Para) 
 
W.J. Cannon Cannons of Lincoln. W.J. Cannon was there in 1915 and 
advised George Booth on war supplies 
Paul Chapman Finished at Pavlova 
David Church  Penultimate accountant Turneys. 
Frank Critchley (Accountant/Secretary Wades 60s & 70s)  
K Chapman Snr Booth (Boston) Ltd but started in Philadelphia in the 1940s 
Ken Chapman Jnr Booth Boston plus Turneys. Owns Booth and Co Inc, One of 
two remaining companies (2011) retaining the Booth name 
A.N.Connett Sailed to US to join Booth New York with George in 1917. An 
American and with Burton was joint MD of J.G.White & Co. 
Harold Connett Surpass Leather was Chairman of Tanners Council of America 
1942 
Benajamin Crimp Brazil 
J.Clissold  Brazil 
Paul Crompton Worked first for the Booths in China then ran USA and died 
with his family on the Lusitania 
David Crompton USA. Became head of Booth interests in the US when 
C.W.Jones returned to Liverpool as a Director of Booth 
Steamship Company in 1910. Brother of Paul 
John Coggins (Dr)  Original Booths R&D 
William Cunningham  In 1890 joined Sydney Office. Cunningham moved to    
Gloversville in 1898 and later took over the pickled sheepskin 





Ken Delves  Booth International Director, Managing Director Pavlova. Born 
in Southwell, Notts 
David Donald  (Group FD mid 60’s to 1981) 
David (Mac) McDowell (Melrose & ET Holdens) 
Dieter Demenco  (Turneys for a spell 1978) 
Joseph Dub (de Dubski) Slovakian – major player UCT Ltd 
 
Kevin Feenan  Sales manager ATCo & ULCo 
Alec Finch  Melrose MD, Director Booth International. then Pavlova; had 
job of closing many Booth and Garnar plants 
Thomas Fletcher  Partner, managed New York, started 1867. Died in 1904 
Enfield Fletcher son of Thomas 
Tom Fletcher  son of Thomas 
Richard French Last accountant Booth Overseas? 
 
Alan Game Worked at Russells, Pavlova and at J&T Beavens at Holt. Died 
in 2010 
Clement Gardiner Booth Man in US around 1917 
CJ Garland One of the “Garland Brothers” in Liverpool 19th cent. Died 
1904 
Chris Glaysher  Tombooth 
AE Gaenslen (NY)  opened Boston office and subsequently became partner in 
Alfred Booth and Co 
Captain Good Booth Line master used as technical adviser for the Iquitos 
harbour works 
Charles Good   Brazil 
Mike Green  Booth & co (England) ltd 
Robin Grossert Accountant/Secretary Tombooth/Bulleys 
 
Jim Hillman   Long time Pavlova accountant, before David Boyce 
F.G. Heise  Liverpool 1890s 
Gustav Richard Heise Died 1896, worked with Alfred Booth and Co for 27 years.   
Kurt Herschfeldt  (original Atlantic Tanning boss) 
Jack Husselby  Long time Wades Gen. Mgr & Technical  person (went to BLC 
on closure of Wades)   
 
Jim Jackman Wade Technician who became head of Booths R&D after Mr 
Simon in 1968 
Joe Jackson works engineer Pavlova 
C.W. Jones Sir Clement Jones. Hired by George Booth in July 1902 to help 
in the USA. Remained a great friend of Booths until he died 
29
th
 October 1963. “No choice could have been more fortunate 
for me in those first years in America when friction between 
factories and the young Englishman representing the absentee 
English owner would have been fatal”.  Crow (p40) 
 
James Kent Gloversville tanner invented Dongola tanning and the 
foundations of modern fatliquoring 1830-1885 
Tadeus Kieniowicz Last Accountant Wade & Co 
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Julius Kuttner  US manager who ran Kent tannery in Gloversville after Booths 
bought it and set up to develop Chrome Tanning. Died 1901 
Bill (William) King (Bulleys technical – Canadian ex Kenya Hide Improvement 
commission) 
Franklyn B. Kirkbride Appointed manager of American interests in August, 1905 (he 
was succeeded by Paul Crompton and Clement.W.Jones) All 
three made a strong team in the USA when George left in 
January 1906 
 
Cyril Ladegourdie Chief Engineer Bulleys Tanneries 
Ralph Liddyard Works Manager Pavlova 
F.Lingebach    (NY)  
James J. Lyons  February 12, 1890 – January 7, 1966 New York, American 
Democratic politician who served as Borough President of the 
Bronx (1934-1962). 1903 he worked as office boy in Surpass 
Leather and later as salesman. Quoted as saying he had sold 
enough leather to cover 4 million pairs of women’s feet. 
 
Leo Macdonough  (Group Accountant, then MD at Atlantic Tanning Co/ULC, 
then Pavlova) 
Sir Peter Meinertzhagen Managing Director Alfred Booth and Co 1946-57 
Ernie Mills  Group Accountant & manager of Pavlova from 1969 
FE Miller   Australia 1890s.  Frank Miller established the office close to 
the current Sydney Opera House  
J.P.Mathieu    Philadelphia tanner who worked with Booth to develop Surpass 
Slavik Moucka (Chief  Technician UCT/ULC) 
AE Mould    Liverpool 1890s  
 
Len North  One time Group Accountant?  
Trevor Norris  Technical Director Turney Bros in the 1970s 
 
 
Paddy O’Flynn Formed OFRO. Quote JSMB  “Our F***ing Rawstock 
Organisation”- Booth Overseas & Tombooth 
Mike Parsons Pavlova, then ET Holdens – later BLC CEO and Scottish 
Group 
Mr Poulter Snr Joined group from Pittards in 1948 and worked in Kenya. 
Bulleys having spent time in Wades, Pavlova and Melrose 
(which had just been bought). He worked there until the 
company split in 1962 
Ron Poulter Jnr Studied at Leeds in 1961-65 with a grant from Booths and then 
worked at Pavlova 1965-1971, then Turneys until 1973 before 
leaving to join Eastern Counties, then Hodgsons in 1977. From 
2006 in New Zealand. 
Robert Parsons  JSMB introduction – Cuero Garments ltd, Ex`Captain retired 
from the army 
Pete Paterno  American engineer at Turneys 
Beatrice Potter Beatrice Potter (Webb) Cousin-in law of Charles and Mary 
Booth and worked with   Charles on the “Book”.  Very much 
influenced by her friendship with the family 
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William Purcell Brazil 1890s 
 
Mr Robilliard  Booth manager in Manáos 1908 
J Rotton Production, Pavlova Bulleys. Production Director Turneys. 
Grandson of GMB 
John Rozemulder OFRO & Tombooth 
 
Augustus Schultz Born in Germany .......Obtained his chrome patents in 1884 and 
then went on to work on inventions in central heating 
Mr Simon  Headed Booth R&D before Jim Jackman 
Selby Smith  New Zealand based Booth England 
Bill (William) Stewart Director, Nottingham Tanneries Managing Director of Wades, 
Turneys and Charles Tanneries 
Paul Stribbling Group Co Sec at time of “Going Public” and to 1979 
C.H.Skinner  USA 1890s 
Henry Sheppard Chief engineer Pavlova 1969 to closure. Did a lot of group 
work 
T.B.Southgate  Brazil 
 
Harold Tregoning Engineer in charge of harbour works in Iquitos, which Booths 
were constructing. A friend from Harrow of George so they had 
major reunion in 1908 
 




Charles Wade Came from Grantham (Bjorlows) to the Nuneaton plant and 
then in 1901 bought Whitemoor Leather Works with Booth 
help to set up Wade and Co1856-1924. Highly respected by 
Booths as a technician and tannery manager 
Max Wade  Charles Tanneries Sales – Original Wade family 
Weston Wade   As Max Wade above. 
John R Webb   Liverpool 1890s 
Marcel Werviel Took over Bulleys after Mr Poulter 
Peter Wilcox Original Booths 60s/70s R&D  
George S Wolff    German origin Philadelphian who developed enamel finish to 
   copy patent. Booth had JV with him, but not very successful 
 
Yagnesh Kumar Zala [Babu!] (technician – Bulleys/R&D/Pavlova) 
 
 
The first group of “Booth Men” were defined in the 1880s and 1890s when Charles 
Booth moved to his system of less involved management.  
 
Turney Brothers only 
 
Sir Arthur William Black  28 February 1863 – 13 July 1947[1] was an English lace 
manufacturer from Nottingham and a Liberal Party politician 
who served in local government in Nottingham before holding 
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a seat in the House of Commons from 1906 to 1918. He was a 
director of Turney Brothers 
Charles J. Pain, F.C.A.  Vice-Chairman in 1927 
Sir Arthur W. Black director 1927 
John A. E. Turney  director 1927 









ABC  Heavy sheep grains made in Nuneaton Leather Company  
for the New York market     1882 
Bonafide  glazed kid made for Booth by Richard Patsowsky of NY: a  
  crude chrome tannage, based on Shultz patents  1891-93 
Daisy Kid Ceara goat with Dongola Tannage to make an imitation kid 1880 
Dongola Tannage invented by James Kent very good for kid and kangaroo, 
although later adapted for all leathers    1877 
Elite Glace  Kid leather from Wades     1947 
Ideal  Enamelled leather to look like Patent (by Wolff)  1898 
Eureka 
Surpass A chrome tanned black glazed kid (on Ceara goat and others) 
          1894 
Ajmal Camel A chrome tanned East African or Bactrian aniline printed camel skin – 
Melrose, circa 1966 
  
 294 
Ngombe As above but on East African bovine crust    1975? 
Cordovan High glazed horse butt shells for American golf shoes. Melrose 
Tannery       1950s 
Drysoft Hi Tech chamois (really a Pittards brand)   1990s 
Locarno Calf Turney Bros       1926 
Trent Bridge Willow Calf Turney bros high class calf   1918 on 
Meltan  Sole leather from Melrose tanners    1950s on 
Oasis kid Popular bookbinding leather made by Odell Wilson and Tilt until 




Alfred Booth & Co 
Charles Booth & Co 
Surpass Leather Co (1904 50% from 1908 100%) 
Booth and Kent (from 1878 100%) 
Kent and Booth 
Booth and Kent and Company, Gloversville. “A large leather mill 
operation on Washburn and Grand Streets, across from Kent Street. 
(from Decker, 1998, Gloversville) On the site in Gloversville a Plaque 
was put up, dated 1920 which calls it Surpass Leather Company, 
founded 1870.  It is not clear why the  1870 date was chosen nor 
when the Gloversville factory was renamed Surpass. 
Booth and Co, Inc 
Booth & Co formed in 1901 to manage the tug and barge operations 
on the River Amazon 
Melrose Tanners  100% purchased in 1948 
The Pavlova Leather Company 
The Boniface Sheepskin Company 
Turney Brothers 100% from 1971 
Charles Tanneries  Set up in 1946 To sell Wades production and 
named Charles as key members of both Wade and Booth families 
called Charles 
Nuneaton Wool Co possibly this is the same as the leather Co. 
Nuneaton Leather Co (Booth 50% Johnson 50%) 
Wade and Co (50% Booth 50% Wade although at start up Booths had 
the majority. Booth bought 100% on the death of Charles Wade in 
1956) 
Atlantic Tanning 
New Zealand Light Leather (10% Booth and 90% NZ fellmongers) 
later sold to Gomshall. Important source of crust for Pavlova from 
1970 
OFRO 
Bulleys Tanneries Ltd (Thika & Kahawa factories) 
Tombooth 
Booth & Co (England) 
Booth Overseas 
Booth & Co (International) 
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Densten Felt & Hair Co, USA (bought around 1910) 
Gardiner-Lucas Glue & Gelatine Corporation USA (bought around 
1910) 
B.Cannon & Co Ltd, Lincoln (acquired pre WWI, glue and gelatine; 
but there was some fellmongering or leather making done in Lincoln 
also, which was closed in 1917 when Alfred Booth bought into the 
Pavlova leather syndicate) 
The Booth Steamship Co. Set up 1881 and reformed in 1901 on the 
purchase of Red Cross Iquitos Steamship.  
The Unit Construction Company acquired 1919 from Crittalls 
In 1964 after a family split the leather business was established 
separately as Booth and Company (International) Ltd. It became a 
public company in 1974 and was sold to Garnar-Scotblair in 1981 
forming Garnar-Booth. John Sebastian Macaulay Booth was the 
Managing Director during this period. He was the grandson of Charles 
Booth who died on 23rd November 1916 
Booth Mechanical services. Originally part of Alfred Booth Group. 
Continues to supply plumbing and heating services in the west of 
England, Based in Liverpool. 
J.G.White and Co (purchases twice in 1917 and 1931 and formed the 
basis of the foundation of the unit Trust concept) 
 
9.5 Books and publications by Charles Booth 
 
1889           Life and Labour of the People Vol 1. 
1891           Life and Labour of the People Vol 2. 
1892 Pauperism: a Picture. Endowment of Old Age: an 
Argument.   
1892/7       Life and Labour of the People in London, 1--9 Vols. 
1894           The Aged Poor in England and Wales: Condition.              
1899           Old Aged Pensions and the Aged Poor: a Proposal. 
1901 Improved Means of Locomotion as a First Step towards   
the Cure for the Housing Difficulties of London. 
1902/3        Life and Labour of the People in London, 1--17 Vols. 
1910  Poor Law Reform. Reform of the Poor Law by the        
Adaptation of the Existing Poor Law Areas, and Their 
Administration. 
1911 Comments on Proposals for the Reform of the Poor Laws. 
1913           Industrial Unrest and Trade Union Policy.                              
 
 





Figure 15: Booth Line funnel and poster 
 1866-1986 Liverpool - Oporto - Lisbon - Brazil.  
 1867-1881 (summer only) Hamburg - Antwerp - Havre - Lisbon 
- Brazil. 
 1881-1964 Liverpool - Para (direct, passengers) 
 1881-1964 Hamburg - Antwerp - Havre - Lisbon - Brazil.  
 1881-1964 Manáos - Para - Galveston - New York. 
 1881-1885 London - Para (sail)  
 
9.7 Norcross 1901 
 
Booth & Co 
This firm are among the largest and richest in the business.  They import skins from 
Brazil and other points, and manufacture at Gloversville and Philadelphia.  No house 
has done more for the trade than Booth & Co. They have introduced the dongola and 
the patent kid tannage, and have been active in protecting the interests of the trade in 




9.8 The Booth factory in Gloversville 
 
(from Gloversville by Lewis Decker, 1998 Arcadia Publishing) 
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